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 i 
ABSTRACT 
Good Risk Assessment Practice in Hospitals 
Risk assessment is essential to ensure safety in hospitals. However, hospitals 
have paid little attention to risk assessment. Several problems have already been 
identified in the literature about current risk assessment practice, such as 
inadequate risk assessment guidance and bias in risk scoring.  
This research aimed to improve current risk assessment practice in hospitals 
in the National Health Service (NHS) in England. To address this aim, the research 
investigated current risk assessment practice and designed a new risk assessment 
approach by the use of mixed methods. One hundred hospitals’ risk assessment 
documents were reviewed to examine the current recommended risk assessment 
practice. Seventeen interviews and sixty-one questionnaires were conducted, a 
risk management system from a single hospital was reviewed, and strategic risks 
from thirty-four hospitals were reviewed, in order to examine how risks are 
assessed in actual practice. Following that, the proposed approach was designed 
by conducting requirements analysis and then evaluated by interviews and 
questionnaires with ten healthcare staff. 
The findings of this research reveal that hospitals conduct risk assessments in 
different ways (i.e. with a focus on individual patient-based, operational and 
strategic risks). There are also many problems involved in current risk assessment 
practice regarding both the foundations and use of risk assessment. For example, 
organisation-wide risk assessments predominantly rely on risk matrices which 
might lead to wrong risk prioritisation and resource allocation; and risks tend to 
reflect existing or past problems rather than being proactive. All these reveal a 
need to improve current risk assessment practice. 
This research makes an important contribution to the current understanding 
of risk assessment practice in hospitals by providing extensive evidence on both 
recommended and actual practice, and proposes a new risk assessment 
framework. The framework guides healthcare staff on how to conduct risk 
assessment in a more comprehensive way by encouraging its potential users to 
consider good risk assessment practice. 
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levels  (GGI 2009) 
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Safety The minimisation of any undesired situations in the healthcare 
delivery system that may lead to a threat, harm or loss to any 
parts of that system 
System A combination of interacting elements organised to achieve 
stated purpose(s) (ISO 2008) 
Tolerability The degree of acceptability of a risk 
 
 
xiv 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 1 
 
  
 
  
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Healthcare organisations deliver safe care to millions of patients every day 
(Woodward et al. 2004). However, there are also a number of patients that are 
exposed to harm. This could be due to the healthcare system being inherently 
risky (Leape et al. 1998) and error-prone (Hutchinson et al. 2015), as well as to a 
lack of application of effective safety interventions (Shojania and Thomas 2013).  
Indeed, a large number of patients experience adverse events during their care 
delivery. In the world, approximately, 42.7 million patients are estimated to 
experience adverse events each year (Jha et al. 2013). Examples of the 
estimations of adverse event rate from a range of countries include: 
 25.1 percent of patient admissions in the USA, of which 84.4 percent lead 
to temporary harm, 2.9 percent to permanent harm, 8.5 percent to life-
threatening situations and 2.4 percent to death (Landgrigan et al. 2010), 
 12.9 percent in New Zealand, of which 75 percent result in minor harm 
and 15 percent in permanent disability or death (Davis et al. 2002), 
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 12 percent in Sweden, of which 70 percent were preventable with 88 
percent resulting in temporary harms, 9 percent in permanent disability 
and 3 percent in death (Soop et al. 2009), 
 6.8 percent in Canada, of which 55.7 percent result in no or minor harm, 
12.5 percent in temporary harm, 5.2 percent in permanent harm and 15.9 
percent in death (Baker 2004), 
 10.8 percent in the UK, of which 66.4 percent lead to no or minor harm, 
19.1 percent to temporary harm, 6.4 percent to permanent harm and 8.2 
percent to death (Vincent et al. 2001). 
To illustrate further patient safety related issues in the UK healthcare system, 
over 1 million people experience incidents each year in the National Health 
Service (NHS), of which 69.4% result in no harm to patients, 24% result in low 
harm (e.g. requiring minor treatment), 6% result in moderate harm (e.g. requiring 
further intervention) and 0.6% result in death or severe harm (e.g. causing 
permanent harm) (Davies 2014). Although these estimations may vary and the 
grounds for their reliability may be questionable due to the under-reporting of 
incidents and the measurement methods of adverse events rates (Shojania and 
Dixon-Woods 2016), the estimations given illustrate that experiencing adverse 
events is a widespread problem all over the world (Hutchinson et al. 2015; 
Thomas et al. 2000).  
To reduce harm in healthcare, substantial attention has been paid to patient 
safety, especially in the last two decades (Hayes et al. 2014; Sujan et al. 2015; 
Vincent and Amalberti 2016). Some leading reports have been published to 
increase safety awareness, including An organisation with a memory (DoH 2000), 
To err is human (Kohn et al. 2000), and Crossing the quality chasm (IOM 2001). A 
number of research studies were conducted with the aim of reducing harm, 
including studies related to patient falls (Aranda-Gallardo et al. 2015; Lovallo et 
al. 2010), the mortality rate (Chou et al. 2015) and infections (Chandonnet et al. 
2013). Sweeping reforms have been proposed in these reports, driven by safety-
critical industries (e.g. nuclear, aviation and defense), such as the implementation 
of incident and risk reporting systems (Mitchell et al. 2016; NHS England 2015b). 
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Yet, safety interventions in the healthcare industry have been found to have a 
limited effect on patient safety (Dixon-Woods and Pronovost 2016; Dückers et al. 
2009; Hudson et al. 2012; Sujan et al. 2016). 
In healthcare, safety interventions have paid more attention to the investigation 
of harm, rather than focusing on ways to minimise harm before it occurs (Sujan et 
al. 2017; Ward et al. 2010). A risk-based approach could complement current 
reactive practice, which is through risk assessment as part of risk management. 
Yet, even risk assessment has its problems when it is in place. Eidesen et al. 
(2009) claim that many of the problems are in relation to the foundations and the 
use of risk assessment, such as how to express risk and how to use risk 
assessment as a tool to improve patient safety. In addition, the risk register 
systems tend to be used as bureaucratic data collection systems (Illingworth 
2015a); responsibilities for safety concerns are diffused (Berwick et al. 2013); risk 
assessment techniques are not used much, and if used, they may be used without 
training (Card et al. 2012b; Ward et al. 2010); and insufficient risk evaluation 
guidance is provided (Card et al. 2013). All these indicate that there is great 
potential to improve current risk assessment practice.  
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS 
The overall aim of this research study is to improve current risk assessment 
practice in hospitals in NHS England. In particular, this research aims to design a 
better risk assessment approach in hospitals by learning from prescribed good 
risk assessment practice as well as from challenges in current practice. 
1.3 RESEARCH SCOPE 
The scope of this research is risk assessment that is applied to patient safety. Risk 
assessment is a part of risk management, and it consists of risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation steps. 
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The research focuses on risk assessment practice instead of focusing on risk 
management as a broader field. This is due to the fact that there have been many 
studies conducted regarding the reactive application of risk management by 
giving less attention to risk assessment. In addition, this study focuses on risk 
assessment in hospitals. Although patient safety related research studies have 
already dominated within hospital settings, the characteristics of hospitals as 
being complex, employing a large number of healthcare staff, having the highest 
healthcare spending, and experiencing an enormous number of incidents still 
make hospitals an attractive setting in which to conduct research (Davies 2014; 
Vincent and Amalberti 2016). Thus, this research also focuses on improving safety 
in hospitals, particularly hospitals in NHS England since the researcher is based in 
England. 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
Figure 1.1 presents the structure of this thesis. The thesis contains eight chapters. 
Each chapter is summarised below: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the underlying motivation, aims, scope and thesis 
structure. 
Chapter 2: A Literature Review for Risk Assessment 
This chapter presents an overview of the research topic, explains good risk 
assessment practice, addresses gaps in the literature, highlights areas for further 
research and sets research questions for investigation. 
Chapter 3: Research Process 
This chapter introduces the research process followed in this research by 
outlining the research paradigm, research questions, research methodologies, 
research design and research methods. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 5 
Chapter 4: Recommended Risk Assessment Practice in Hospitals in the NHS 
England 
This chapter investigates current recommended risk assessment practice, ‘work 
as described’, through the analysis of hospitals’ risk assessment policies and 
procedures. 
Chapter 5: Actual Risk Assessment Practice in Hospitals in the NHS England 
This chapter further investigates the actual risk assessment practice, ‘work as 
done’, through conducting interviews and questionnaires as well as analysing a 
risk management system and Board Assurance Frameworks (BAF). 
Chapter 6: Proposed Risk Assessment Approach 
This chapter proposes a new risk assessment approach through the design of a 
Risk Assessment Framework (RAF). It is designed by learning from good risk 
assessment practices prescribed in safety-critical industries and by addressing 
existing challenges within current risk assessment practice in hospitals. 
Chapter 7: Evaluation of the Proposed Risk Assessment Approach 
This chapter presents the results of an initial evaluation of the proposed risk 
assessment approach through conducting a case study, interviews and 
questionnaire. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter presents a brief response to each research question, discusses the 
contributions of this research and outlines potential further works. 
1.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented an overview of this thesis. This research took its 
motivation from the need to improve safety in hospitals with a potential 
improvement area being identified as risk assessment. Finally, this chapter has 
introduced the structure of this thesis, summarised in Figure 1.1. 
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CHAPTER 2  
A LITERATURE REVIEW FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides the background to the research topic. An overview of NHS 
England is presented to understand the system to be improved. Then, in order to 
understand the science behind risk assessment, more groundwork is laid down by 
explaining what safety is, how accidents occur and what is involved in risk 
assessment. Leading on from this, the healthcare literature is reviewed to 
describe hospital applications as well as their existing challenges. Additionally, 
good risk assessment is explained as a reference point to determine potential 
improvements by learning from a number of national and international risk 
assessment guidelines. Gaps in the literature and potential areas for 
improvements are then identified. Finally, in light of the findings set out in this 
review, the research questions are presented.  
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2.2 APPROACH TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research subject ‘risk assessment in hospitals’ falls under several different 
topics such as risk management, safety, patient safety and quality. To provide a 
comprehensive review of the research topic, a narrative review approach was 
taken. 
Primary and secondary literature regarding safety and risk assessment has been 
explored by using a multitude of search criteria and terms. Numerous sources 
were reviewed including, books, journals, reports, standards and white papers to 
conduct this search. These sources were identified via several routes: electronic 
healthcare databases (namely, PubMed and EMBASE), electronic science 
databases (namely, Science Direct, the Wiley Online Library and Elsevier), the 
Google Scholar search engine, the Department of Health’s and its partner 
organisations’ (including the NPSA, and the Health Foundation) publications 
databases, the British Standards Online (BSOL) library, reference chasing, relevant 
journals and searching publications by key authors.  
The search of the above corpora was conducted using key terms, including 
accident models, adverse events, hazard, healthcare, hospitals, NHS England, 
patient safety, risk, risk assessment, risk management, and safety. 
A large number of papers were reviewed to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of risk assessment and its applications in hospitals. Several 
databases were used to search for a combination of key terms (e.g. ‘risk 
assessment’ AND (‘hospital’ OR ‘healthcare’)). Papers were first screened based 
on title and abstract, and their selection was made based on the relevance of the 
research subject. In addition, key journals and reports were searched to provide 
information on the state of the science on the research subject. Papers were 
excluded if they primarily focused on clinical interventions or technical 
applications of other industries as well as if they were in low quality in the 
explanations and evidence provided. Selected papers were then used to provide 
a comprehensive literature review of the research topic.  
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In addition to these selections, subscriptions were made to the relevant leading 
journals such as British Medical Journal Quality and Safety, Journal of Patient 
Safety, Risk Analysis, Ergonomics, Journal of Risk Research, and Safety Science. 
Furthermore, relevant LinkedIn groups (i.e. NHS Quality and Risk Managers) and 
Twitter accounts (i.e. NHS Improvement, Health Foundation and SRA-Risk 
Analysis) related to healthcare and safety-critical industries were followed and 
consulted to understand people’s practical experience.  
2.3 AN OVERVIEW OF HEALTHCARE IN ENGLAND 
Healthcare is defined as “care activities, services, management or supplies related 
to the health of an individual” (BSI 2011a). The healthcare system involves 
organisations, people and activities (WHO 2009). Ferlie and Shorthell (2001) 
explain the healthcare system by dividing it into four levels. These are: (1) the 
individual patient, (2) care teams (e.g. practitioners and patient family members), 
(3) organisations (e.g. hospitals) and (4) the political and economic environment 
(e.g. suppliers and national authorities) (Ferlie and Shorthell 2001).  
In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) delivers health care. The NHS was 
established after the Second World War. Each of the UK’s four countries has its 
own NHS which is financed mainly through taxation (Grosios et al. 2010). 
Therefore, it is the responsibility of NHS England to lead healthcare services in 
England (Davies 2014). NHS England deals with over 1 million patients every 36 
hours with around 1.2 million staff and with an annual budget of around £101.3 
billion (NHS 2016).  
Figure 2.1 shows the different levels of involvement in the healthcare system. For 
instance, there are local health and care services in the centre of the healthcare 
system that include GP surgeries, hospitals, pharmacies and community groups; 
and there are local and national organisations that investigate the care delivered 
by the local healthcare services. Additionally, there are a number of other 
organisations that are part of the healthcare system. For instance, the 
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Department of Health shapes healthcare in England, the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides guidance and advice to improve 
health and social care, and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) regulates health 
and social care (Grosios et al. 2010). Furthermore, the NHS Litigation Authority 
(NHS LA) manages negligence and other claims, and supports initiatives to 
improve safety (NHS LA 2017). 
Figure 2.1 The health and care system in the UK DoH (2013) 
 
In addition to the involvement of a large number of stakeholders in the delivery 
of healthcare system, each patient care delivery process is tailored to the needs 
of individual patients. Indeed, the healthcare system is complex, and healthcare 
delivery is difficult to achieve (Vincent and Amalberti 2016).  
The difficulty of the healthcare delivery process has also been observed in the 
management of safety in healthcare. To deal with such a difficulty, engineering 
and management approaches have been implemented in healthcare 
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organisations (Cagliano et al. 2011; Clarkson et al. 2004; Carayon and Wood 
2010). Particularly, safety in healthcare has evolved and developed in hospital 
contexts (Vincent and Amalberti 2016). This could be due to the fact that 
hospitals are complex, and hospitals have dominated healthcare spending and 
provision (Davies 2014). 
As a result, progress has already been achieved on some issues (Illingworth 
2015b; Vincent and Amalberti 2016). For instance, the percentage of patients 
surveyed receiving care free from pressure ulcers, falls, urine infections (in 
patients with a catheter) and venous thromboembolism increased by 3 percent 
between 2012 and 2015 (Illingworth 2015b). However, there is little evidence to 
demonstrate significant contributions of these safety applications to patient 
safety (Hudson et al. 2012; Sujan et al. 2016), and safety interventions have 
remained predominantly reactive (Dixon-Woods and Pronovost 2016; Dückers et 
al. 2009; Sujan et al. 2017). Thus, this research focuses on the proactive 
intervention of risk assessment to improve safety in hospitals. 
Before moving on to the discussion of risk assessment, the safety context is 
explained in the following section. 
2.4 UNDERSTANDING SAFETY 
The literature provides a variety of definitions of safety. Some of these definitions 
are given below. 
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines safety as “the condition of being 
protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk or injury”, 
 US Department of Defense identifies safety as, “freedom from those 
conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to 
or loss of equipment or property”  (DoD 1984), 
 Hollnagel (2014b), who divides safety into Safety I and Safety II, identifies 
safety as “nothing unwanted” or “the freedom from unacceptable risk” as 
well as a situation in which “as many things as possible go right”. 
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Safety I focuses on “What goes or went or could go wrong?” by aiming at “as few 
things as possible going wrong”. Safety II focuses on “How do things usually go 
right?” by aiming at “as many things as possible going right” (Hollnagel et al. 
2015). In so doing, while the Safety I aims to reduce the number of incidents by 
learning from extraordinary cases, the Safety II approach encourages learning 
from every day experience and adjusting performance to  address changing 
demands (Hollnagel 2014b). 
In the safety literature, the Safety I approach has been predominantly used in all 
industries. A large number of methods (e.g. FMEA, RCA and HAZOP) have been 
developed and successfully used based on this approach. In contrast, the Safety II 
approach has been used less, and few methods have been developed based on it, 
though one such method is FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method) 
(Hollnagel 2004).  
Hollnagel et al. (2015) explains that the need for the Safety II approach in 
healthcare is due to complexity and performance adjustments in everyday 
activities. Sujan et al. (2017) also highlights the value of the Safety II approach to 
learning from everyday experiences. Although the Safety II approach has a 
potential to minimise blame, since it focuses on success instead failure, it may 
still be reasonable to focus on negatives in healthcare for three primary reasons. 
First, there is little evidence to demonstrate that the applications of Safety II 
make systems safer than the applications of Safety I. Second, safety-critical 
industries (e.g. aviation and nuclear) are still successfully using the Safety I 
approach. Third, one argument Hollnagel (2014b) made to justify the Safety II 
approach was that accidents occur rarely, and, it is therefore easier to learn from 
every day successes. Although this might be true, not all incidents in healthcare 
occur rarely and most of them are repeat occurrences. This research, therefore, 
determines safety through adopting the Safety I approach, but while keeping in 
mind that there might be potential for the application of Safety II in some specific 
parts of the healthcare system. 
In the healthcare literature, safety primarily focuses on patient safety from the 
perspective of Safety I (Sujan et al. 2017; DoH 2002; Hignett et al. 2016). Patient 
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safety is defined as “the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse 
outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of healthcare” (Vincent 2010). 
Additionally, health and safety at work is another prioritised topic for safety in 
healthcare, one which is more advanced than patient safety (Card et al. 2012a; 
Ward et al. 2010). A health and safety at work act is defined as “An act to make 
further provision for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work, 
for protecting others against risks to health or safety in connection with the 
activities of persons at work…” (HM Government 1974). Based on the above 
safety descriptions, safety in healthcare can be defined as follows: 
The minimisation of any undesired situations in the healthcare delivery 
system that may lead to a threat, harm or loss to any parts of that system.  
While the definition above reflects the Safety I view, another definition can be 
provided from a Safety II perspective as follows: 
The maximisation of all desired situations in the healthcare delivery 
system that may help to achieve success in any parts of that system. 
To promote safety in healthcare, Vincent highlights that: 
“Safety emerges from the interaction of the components of the system. It 
is more than the absence of adverse outcomes and it is more than 
avoidance of identifiable ‘preventable’ errors or occurrences. Safety does 
not reside in a person, device or department. Improving safety depends on 
learning how safety emerges from the interaction of components.” 
(Vincent 2010). 
Thus, a safe system aims to minimise exposure to hazards and their impacts from 
the system, from its parts and from the interaction of these parts (Hollnagel 
2008; Vincent 2010). Figure 2.2 explains this with the Safety I approach.  
The healthcare delivery process impacts on the safety of both patients and 
healthcare staff. A hospital is considered to be a system, and many hazards may 
exist in this system, which could increase risks. There is also the possibility of 
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failures and errors in the system, which can lead to the occurrence of accidents. 
However, accidents and risks can be controlled to minimise the negative 
consequences. While risk assessment is a way to prevent harm before it occurs as 
well as to minimise it when it occurs, incident investigation aims to learn from the 
harm experienced. In order to learn from accidents and prepare a basis for risk 
assessment, accident models are used.  
Accident models help understand the underlying causes of accidents so that, in 
turn, actions can be taken to prevent their reoccurrence or similar ones. In so 
doing, it is essential to understand the ways that failures and errors can lead to 
harm as well as the ways in which hazards can trigger risks in the system to be 
assessed. 
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Figure 2.2 Potential influencing factors on safety in healthcare adapted from SIA (2012) 
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2.4.1 DEFINITIONS OF FAILURES AND ERRORS 
2.4.1.1 Failures 
A failure is defined as the “termination of the ability of an item to perform a 
required function” (BSI 2006). Failure(s) can be considered to be an outcome of 
an initial error, when the initial error is not recovered and its consequences are 
shifted (Woods et al. 2010). Figure 2.3 shows this relationship between failure 
and error. 
 
 
 
It is difficult to detect an error at the beginning, but detection becomes easier 
when the initial error leads to a failure. To illustrate this, an initial error, such as 
the poor maintenance of a medical device, might lead to malfunctioning of the 
medical device, and, then, to a service failure resulting in cancellation of patient 
appointments. 
2.4.1.2 Errors 
An error is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “something incorrectly 
done through ignorance or inadvertence; a mistake, e.g. in calculation, 
judgement, speech, writing, action, etc.” It is also defined as achieving a wrong or 
unintended action or the failure of a planned action (Aspden et al. 2006). Errors 
reveal symptoms about systems, organisations or technologies that should be 
investigated in depth (Hollnagel 1991; Rasmussen et al. 1987; Reason 1990). In 
addition, errors could contribute to accidents or near misses (Cagliano et al. 
Initial 
“Error” 
Recovery Interval(s) 
Outcome Failure(s) 
Shift in 
Consequence(s) 
“Error” 
Detection 
Time 
Figure 2.3 Relationship between error recovery and outcome failure adapted from Woods 
et al. (2010) 
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2011). However, this can be minimised by understanding the reason behind the 
errors.  
In the healthcare context, a large number of errors occur, some of which lead to 
adverse events (Vincent et al. 2013). Of these, errors, in medication are a widely-
discussed topic as this is estimated to be the major cause of harm (Choo et al. 
2010). A medication error is identified as “a failure in the treatment process that 
leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to the patient” (Ferner and Aronson 
2006). Figure 2.4 shows the classification of medication errors based on a 
psychological approach.  
According to this approach, errors are divided into mistakes and skill-based 
errors. While mistakes are categorised into knowledge or rule based errors, skill-
based errors are categorised into action or memory-based errors (Reason 1990). 
However, it is possible to prevent some of these errors. Reason (1990) 
recommends the improvement of knowledge to prevent knowledge-based errors, 
and the application of better rules to prevent mistakes caused by poor rules. In 
addition, Aronson (2009) suggests that staff training may reduce action-based 
errors, and checklists and computerised systems may eliminate memory-based 
errors.  
Figure 2.4 Classification of medication errors Ferner and Aronson (2006) 
Errors 
When actions are intended but not performed 
Mistakes 
Errors in planning actions 
Knowledge-based 
errors Rule-based errors 
Good rules            
not applied or 
misapplied 
Bad rules 
Skill-based errors (slips and lapses) 
Errors in executing correctly- planned actions 
 Action- based 
errors (slips) 
 Technical errors 
Memory- based 
errors (lapses) 
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Although some of the errors can be prevented, accidents may still occur in 
complex systems due to several contributing factors. In complex systems, the 
system is composed of many parts and it is difficult to understand the system as a 
whole. Vincent et al. (1988) identify seven factors that influence safety and 
quality of the clinical practice, which are (1) patient factors (e.g. personality and 
condition), (2) task and technology factors (e.g. task design and the use of 
protocols), (3) staff factors (e.g. knowledge and skills), (4) team factors (e.g. 
supervision and communication), (5) work environmental factors (e.g. staffing 
levels and environment), (6) organisational and managerial factors (e.g. policy 
and financial resources), and (7) institutional context factors (e.g. economic and 
regulatory context).  
The next section explains how these multiple factors contribute to accidents 
through the use of different accident models.  
2.4.2 UNDERSTANDING ACCIDENTS 
An accident is defined as an “undesired event giving rise to death, ill health, 
injury” (BSI 2004a). Similarly, in healthcare, an accident is defined as “an incident 
that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally, and which may result in damage 
or injury” (House of Commons 2015), and it can be interchangeably used with the 
terms: incident, adverse event, critical incident and sentinel event (Aronson 2009; 
Woodward et al. 2004). However, an incident or an adverse event can result in all 
degrees of harm or loss (e.g. no harm or loss and significant harm or loss), 
whereas a critical incident or a sentinel event results in harm or loss with severe 
consequences (e.g. severe harm or death). 
Since system elements are subject to failures in complex systems, there is always 
a possibility of an accident occurring (Harris 2006). However, accidents resulting 
in severe consequences do not often occur and, therefore, learning from them is 
difficult (Venkatasubramanian and Zhang 2016). To address this challenge, 
accident models have been developed, and accident causation analysis has been 
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conducted to understand the nature of accidents and their contributing factors 
(Li et al. 2017; Luo et al. 2013).  
A number of models have been developed to understand accidents. Hollnagel 
(2004) divides these models into three categories, sequential, epidemiological, 
and systemic, as shown in Figure 2.5. Both sequential and epidemiological models 
represent cause and effect thinking, which considers accidents as predictable and 
resultant phenomena. Systemic models, on the other hand, define accidents as 
emergent phenomena, in which accidents are considered normal or natural and 
where something happens unpredictably due to the complex conditions 
(Hollnagel 2004).  
 
2.4.2.1 Sequential accident models 
Sequential models imply that accidents transpire as a result of sequential events 
occurring in a specific order (Hollnagel 2004). A specific type of accident 
potentially follows the same route and series of events (Huang et al. 2004). Figure 
2.6 demonstrates a sequential accident model in a normally functioning system. 
An unexpected event initiates a sequence of events and leads to an unexpected 
consequence.  
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 
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Principle of 
causation 
Complex outcomes 
(‘Emergent’) 
Multiple causes 
(‘Latent’) 
Single causes 
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Epidemiological model 
Systemic model  
Figure 2.5 Summary of a history of accident modelling adapted from SIA (2012) 
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The first model for this way of thinking was developed by Herbert Heinrich in 
1931, and is called the Domino Model, Domino Theory, or Domino Effect 
(Heinrich 1931). Based on this model, an accident is considered to be a link in the 
chain, and it results from one of five factors falling in a sequence. These factors 
are: (1) the social environment, (2) the fault of the person, (3) unsafe acts 
(mechanical and physical hazards), (4) the accident and (5) injury (Heinrich 1931). 
In other words, all accidents result from the social environment leading to a fault 
of person, which results in unsafe acts, which lead to an accident and, in turn, an 
injury. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the domino model. 
 
Figure 2.7 Domino model of accident causation adapted from Heinrich (1931) 
 
The domino model suggests that accidents can be prevented through removing 
one of these five blocks, so that the domino effect is interrupted (Hollnagel 
2004). Among these five blocks, Heinrich focused on the removal of the fault of 
person. His study found that 88 percent of preventable accidents result from the 
unsafe acts of persons, 10 percent result from the unsafe machines and 2 percent 
are unavoidable (Heinrich 1931). Thus, this model considers humans as the main 
reason for accident.  
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Figure 2.6 Sequential accident model adapted from Hollnagel (2004) 
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Risk management techniques and methods have been developed based on the 
logic of the sequential models such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Watson 1961) 
and Five Whys (Ohno 1988). However, these techniques may identify different 
causes. Card (2016), for instance, demonstrates this by explaining a wrong 
medication incident through the use of the Five Whys technique. The incident 
could be explained by a wristband not being checked due to the wristband being 
missing. This could also be explained by the wristband printer being broken 
because of a label jam, due to poor product design (Battles et al. 2006). However, 
the cause of the missing wristband could also be thought of as stemming from a 
broken printer which could in turn be explained by the purchasing process of the 
printer being poor, which again in turn stems from the fact that non-clinical 
equipment is not seen as safety-critical in the organisation (Card 2017). This 
indicates that different individuals may identify a different root cause(s) by the 
use of Five Whys, which makes the technique less reliable.  
Although the sequential models are attractive as they lead people to think in the 
style of a domino effect (Dorner 1980), they have been claimed to over-simplify 
the cause and effect relations regarding the accidents in complex systems 
(Hollnagel 2004). As a consequence, epidemiological models were developed for 
a better understanding of accidents (Hollnagel 2004).  
2.4.2.2 Epidemiological accident models 
Epidemiological models view accidents as a result of a combination of factors, 
which include environmental conditions, performance deviations leading to 
unsafe acts as well as latent conditions (Figure 2.8). Such factors pass through 
system barriers and defences, and, in turn, can lead to accidents. Adding barriers, 
therefore, can prevent accidents in these models (Hollnagel 2004). However, it 
should be mentioned that adding new barriers might raise new risks in the 
system.  
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The Swiss Cheese Model is a well known epidemiological model (Reason 1997). It 
has been widely accepted in healthcare (Perneger 2005). This model emerges 
from a triggering event through different levels of barriers from institution to 
technical. Since these barriers might not be perfect, weaknesses may exist due to 
latent conditions and active failures. If hazards break through all the “holes”, this 
could lead to harm or loss (Vincent 2010). Figure 2.9 illustrates the Swiss cheese 
model applied in a hospital setting. 
 
Figure 2.9 Reason's Swiss cheese model adapted from Vincent (2010) 
 
Performance 
deviation 
Normally 
functioning 
system 
Direction of causality 
Direction of reasoning 
Barriers      
and  
defences 
Accidents 
En
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
ta
l c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s Unsafe 
acts 
Unsafe 
acts 
Latent 
conditions 
Latent 
conditions 
Latent 
conditions 
Latent 
conditions 
that in which has 
could 
lead to 
could 
lead to 
Figure 2.8 Epidemiological accident model adapted from Hollnagel (2004) 
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Epidemiological models provide a notion of latent conditions and a basis for 
understanding accidents in complex systems (Hollnagel 2004). However, 
epidemiological models still follow the principles of sequential models, and their 
focus remains on system components rather than on the overall system 
(Hollnagel et al. 2006). Additionally, epidemiological models tend to predict the 
general likelihood of an event without explaining where and when it may happen. 
Thus, they show the general health of the system and, in turn, predict the general 
failure types (Reason et al. 2006). It has also been argued that such models are 
unresponsive to the major changes in recent decades in the types of hazards, the 
nature of accidents, the complexity of industries, technology, regulations and 
public views of safety (Hollnagel 2004; Leveson 2004). 
Accidents may occur as a result of unsafe interaction of system components even 
if all components operate successfully (Leveson 2004; Leveson 2017; Sujan et al. 
2017). Hence, systemic accident models were developed to address the 
challenges of epidemiological models (Hollnagel 2004). 
2.4.2.3 Systemic accident models 
Systemic accident models have been built on systems theory. In systems theory, 
multiple factors act concurrently and accidents arise from combined mutually 
interacting factors (Klockner and Toft 2015; Leveson et al. 2016). Therefore, the 
interaction of these factors must be considered to understand the accidents and 
prevent similar ones (Hollnagel 2004; Sheridan 1992; SIA 2012). Figure 2.10 
illustrates all the events which contribute to an accident. 
Since each event could be preceded by other events, there is no direction of 
causality in this model. Events are linked to each other, and they are explained by 
considering their blunt and sharp-ends. While people interact with the hazardous 
process at the sharp-end, factors at the blunt-end also contribute to accidents. 
These factors include government, regulatory, company, management and local 
workplace factors as well as social norms (Hollnagel et al. 2013; Woods et al. 
1994). 
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The key concepts of systemic models, are provided by Rasmussen (Rasmussen 
1997). His risk management framework provides a six-level socio-technical 
system (Figure 2.11). These levels are government, regulators and associations, 
company, management, staff and work. His model also considers a range of 
research disciplines (e.g. political, economics and psychology) and environmental 
stressors (e.g. change in political climate, technology and financial pressure) by 
demonstrating the integration between all factors (Dallat et al. 2017; Rasmussen 
1997). This model indicates that risk management is part of a larger system, and 
any change in one part of the system has an influence on the risk management 
system.  
Figure 2.10 Systemic accident model adapted from Hollnagel (2004) 
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Having built on this risk management framework, Rasmussen introduced the 
Accimap approach to analyse accidents (Rasmussen 1997). His works have 
inspired a number of researchers (Le Coze 2014; Le Coze 2017).   
The Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) was one of the first models to 
recognise the system approach in accident modelling. FRAM describes everyday 
activities as functions (Hollnagel et al. 2014). Functions are represented by 
hexagons, and six different characteristics are defined for each function. These 
characteristics are input (I), output (O), preconditions (P), resources (R), time (T) 
and control (C). Functions are then linked to each other to represent the relations 
and dependencies (Hollnagel 2012). Figure 2.12 presents part of the FRAM 
network for a drug dispensing procedure and illustrates multiple functions 
(activities) that have been identified as relevant to this procedure, and the 
interactions among them. 
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Figure 2.11 The Socio-technical system involved in risk management Rasmussen (1997) 
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In addition to the FRAM, the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP) has also been introduced as a systemic model, on which the STPA 
(Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) method has been built (Leveson 2004). 
STAMP considers accidents as a result of inadequate controls in the system 
instead of due to component failures (Hollnagel 2014b). 
In the healthcare literature, a few studies have used systemic models (Clay-
Williams et al. 2015; Alm and Woltjer 2010; Pawlicki et al. 2016; Leveson et al. 
2016). For instance, Clay-Williams et al. (2015) used FRAM and revealed the 
difference between ‘work as done’ and ‘work as imagined’. Alm and Woltjer 
(2010) used FRAM and uncovered a number of systematic interdependencies 
within a surgical procedure. Pawlicki et al. (2016) used STPA and revealed a 
comprehensive list of causal scenarios as well as a number of unsafe control 
actions. Indeed, hospitals are by nature complex and accidents will occur due to 
several interacting factors. It can, therefore, be expected that hospitals should 
adopt systemic models. Conversely, it can also be argued that not all parts of 
hospitals are complex, and so accidents may be able to be understood through 
the use of epidemiological models. Furthermore, many other complex industries 
also use epidemiological models and even use methods that were built on 
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sequential models. For instance, FTA and ETA are still successfully used in nuclear 
industries. Accident models can, therefore, be selected depending on the system 
needs, safety objectives and the complexity of the situations and the different 
parts of the healthcare system may thus require the use of different or a 
combination of accident models. All accident models were developed to 
understand how accidents occur, and risk assessment processes were developed 
to help prevent them. Yet, it should be noted that accident models provide a 
basis for risk assessment practice (Hollnagel 2004).  
Risk assessment is a way of preventing unwanted events or at least minimising 
their negative consequences (Hollnagel 2014a; Hollnagel 2008). However, the 
majority of the risk assessment techniques are built on the sequential and 
epidemiological accident models and thus they can only reveal sharp-end failures 
(Dallat et al. 2017). However, this could be also due to the way in which these 
techniques are applied. While these techniques still add value to risk assessment 
practices, this research considers that risks should be assessed by determining 
several factors with a systems approach to minimise harm before it occurs. These 
factors include sharp-end, blunt-end, human performance variability and missing 
barriers through a consideration of all system elements and the interactions 
between them.  
The following section explains the science behind risk assessment in the context 
of safety risk management. 
2.5 RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment is a fundamental part of risk management (BSI 2009; NIST 2012). 
It is an overall process of risk identification, analysis and evaluation (ISO 2009). 
Figure 2.13 illustrates the risk assessment process as part of the risk management 
process provided by British Standards (BSI 2009).  
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Risk assessment provides evidence-based information to make risk-based 
decisions and to satisfy organisational objectives (BSI 2010; Torabi et al. 2016). To 
do so, risk assessment addresses the following questions: “What can happen and 
why?”, “What are the potential consequences?”, “What is the probability of its 
occurrence?”, and “Are there any factors that mitigate the consequence or 
probability of the risk?” (BSI 2010; Kaplan and Garrick 1981). 
Since the risk assessment process is part of the risk management process, the 
next section provides an overview of risk management. 
2.5.1 AN OVERVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is defined as “coordinated activities to direct and control an 
organisation with regard to risk” (ISO 2009). Risk management is part of 
governance and organisational management (ISO 2017).  
In healthcare, risk management is defined as “the process of identifying, 
assessing, analysing and managing all potential risks” (NPSA 2006). Risk 
management has been an essential component of the healthcare system since 
the 1970s (Kuhn and Youngberg 2002). It traditionally focused on the reduction of 
Establishing the context 
Risk identification 
Risk analysis 
Risk evaluation 
Risk treatment 
Risk assessment 
 
 
 
Communication 
and consultation 
 
 
 
Monitoring and 
review 
Figure 2.13 Risk assessment process BSI (2009) 
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litigation costs, and then moved on to the reduction of the frequency of adverse 
events (Vincent 1995; Vincent and Amalberti 2016). Since then, risk management 
in hospitals has become a part of clinical governance to improve the quality and 
safety of patient care (Cagliano et al. 2011; NPSA 2006).  
In hospital settings, incident investigation and risk assessment are two essential 
risk management applications to ensure safety. Risk management can thus be 
implemented before, during and after adverse events (Proag and Proag 2014). 
However, most applications to manage risks are positioned after the occurrence 
of an adverse event (Sujan et al. 2016). Healthcare organisations have, therefore, 
mostly focused on incident investigation by asking “What went wrong?” rather 
than on risk assessment by asking “What could go wrong?”. 
However, risk management cannot solely rely on responding to incidents. 
Hazards and controls change over time in dynamic environments. Consequently, 
incidents may not occur in the same way as they have occurred before 
(Rasmussen 1997). Instead, risk assessment, which is the focus of this research, 
could help understand potential risks, determine ways to reduce them and 
monitor the change. A need for such a proactive approach has also been 
highlighted by healthcare researchers to manage risks before they lead to 
adverse events (Cagliano et al. 2011; Hudson 2003; Hudson et al. 2012; Sujan et 
al. 2017).  
Before moving on to explain risk assessment in detail, the terms hazard and risk 
are described to understand risk assessment better.  
2.5.2 DEFINITIONS OF HAZARDS AND RISKS 
2.5.2.1 Hazards 
A hazard is something that may cause harm or loss as a result of the physical 
properties, materials, operating conditions and designs involved (Crowl 2003; 
Stephenson 1991). Similarly, in the healthcare context, hazards are defined as 
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“situations with the potential to cause harm” (NPSA 2007). For instance, shallow 
water constitutes a hazard and diving itself is an action that precipitates the risk 
(Beer and Ziolkowski 1995); a medicine itself constitutes hazard, and taking an 
overdose that precipitates the likelihood resulting in severe harm is a risk (NPSA 
2007). The relationship between risk and hazard is illustrated below in Figure 
2.14.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 2.14 the exposure to a hazard in a sequence of events leads to 
a hazardous situation, which may lead to harm. Risk is the consideration of the 
probability of the occurrence of harm and its potential severity. 
2.5.2.2 Risks 
There has been some ambiguity in the understanding of risk terms stemming 
from conflicting values and human judgement and knowledge (Aven 2012a; Aven 
2010; Johansen and Rausand 2015). In fact, there are a range of definitions 
provided for the term risk. The majority of these definitions refer to something 
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Figure 2.14 Pictorial representation of the relationship of hazard, sequence of 
events, hazardous situation and harm BSI (2012) 
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negative, some to uncertainty and some to an impact on objectives (Aven 2012a; 
Aven 2012b; Suddle 2009). For instance, risk is considered as an event, a 
consequence, an uncertainty and a combination of likelihood and consequence. 
The key definitions regarding these aspects are given below. A risk is defined as: 
 “the likelihood of an event, hazard, threat, or situation occurring and its 
undesirable consequences; a potential problem” (BSI 2004b). 
  “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (BSI 2009). 
 “the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon 
objectives” (AS/NZS 1999). 
  “the combination of likelihood and consequence of a hazard being 
realised” (NPSA 2007).  
 “expected loss” or “an event or consequence” (Aven 2012b). 
Actually, there is not a single perfect definition that can fit all circumstances. For 
instance, risk in finance might refer to both potential positive and negative 
impacts with a consideration of uncertainty, whereas risk in the safety context 
often refers to something negative. So, the best definition for one particular 
organisation or industry might not be the best for another. The solution is to 
select the most appropriate definition and to ensure that everyone in the 
organisation treats risks by considering the same definition. 
Regarding all given definitions, a risk could be something that threatens the 
financial or operational objectives. Indeed, a variety of classification schemes 
have been provided in the literature to categorise risks. For instance, the ISO risk 
management standards categorise risks as strategic risks, programme risks, 
project risks, financial risks, safety risks, compliance risks and operational risks 
(BSI 2011b). Furthermore, the Orange Book categorises risks by determining 
external environment (e.g. political and legal), existing operations (e.g. delivery 
and capacity) and change (e.g. policy, projects and targets) (HM Treasury 2004).  
Having provided basic terms, risk assessment process in hospitals is explained in 
the next section.  
CHAPTER 2: A LITERATURE REVIEW FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
 31 
2.5.3 RISK ASSESSMENT IN HOSPITALS 
Risk assessment is a process to analyse the risks to the whole system, including 
patients, staff, visitors and organisations (Kavaler and Spiegel 2003; NPSA 2006; 
Francis 2013). To do so, risk assessment in the context of safety seeks to answer 
the questions: “What can go wrong?”, “How bad is it?”, “How often does it 
occur?”, and “Is there a need for action?” as in Figure 2.15 (NPSA 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A number of risk assessment methods are used to address these questions. In 
some cases, healthcare staff respond to such questions by using their 
professional judgement, without using prospective hazard analysis techniques; in 
other cases organisational risk assessment forms or other tools and techniques 
may be used. These include brainstorming (Carroll 2009; Holloway and Wheeler 
2010; NPSA 2006), safety walkabouts (Singer and Tucker 2014; Rotteau et al. 
2014), risk matrices (Solberg et al. 2015; Ward et al. 2010) and checklists (e.g. 
surgical safety checklists, health and safety checklists and checklists for medical 
devices) (Devcich et al. 2015; Gawande 2010; Ong et al. 2015).  
In NHS hospitals, the documentation of all risks is recommended and a risk 
register template is provided. A risk register system is widely used to record 
identified risks and help diagnose problems in the organisation (GGI 2009; 
Illingworth 2015a). The risk register system includes the risk reference data, the 
risk owner, a risk description, the likelihood and impact ratings of the risk, the risk 
proximity (when the risk is likely to occur), action plans, action owners, and a 
completion date for each suggested action (NHS England 2015c).  
Figure 2.15 Key four questions to assess risks NPSA (2006) 
What can go 
wrong? 
How bad? 
How often? 
Is there a need 
for action? 
Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
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In addition, the application of risk assessment is supported by and has been 
investigated by some external organisations. These organisations include NHS 
Improvement, which gathers the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) and the 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) under its umbrella, the National 
Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA), the Care Quality Commission (CQC), 
and the Health Foundation. A number of key reports have been published by 
these organisations such as Continuous Improvement of Patient Safety 
(Illingworth 2015a), Seven Steps to Patient Safety (Woodward et al. 2004), Risk 
Assessment Programme (NPSA 2006), and Healthcare Risk Assessment Made Easy 
(NPSA 2007).  
Continuous Improvement of Patient Safety argues the need for change in the way 
safety is understood and improved. The report highlights the necessity of 
assessing risks proactively before harm occurs (Illingworth 2015a). 
Seven Steps to Patient Safety explains the importance of risk assessment, and its 
integration into everyday activities. Risk assessment is explained as a process to 
help organisations recognise a wide range of risks that they face, to understand 
their ability to control these risks, and to determine the likelihood and 
consequences of these risks (Woodward et al. 2004). 
Risk Assessment Programme provides more details on the application of risk 
assessment. The risk assessment process is divided into four tasks: planning the 
assessment (e.g. defining key objectives, scope and resources), mapping out the 
service to be assessed (e.g. defining components and activities), meeting to 
conduct the assessment, and reviewing the assessment outcomes. The report 
states that risk assessment should involve those staff connected to the assessed 
risk. It also provides some information on the currently used risk assessment 
methods in healthcare (NPSA 2006). 
Healthcare Risk Assessment Made Easy provides a summary for a simplified risk 
assessment process (NPSA 2007). 
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However, there has been little evidence to explain the general principles behind 
risk assessment in healthcare, and to propose a comprehensive risk assessment 
approach. Yet, a number of challenges have already been identified in the 
healthcare literature regarding the current risk assessment practices. Eidesen et 
al. (2009) argue that these challenges are mainly in relation to the fundamentals 
of risk assessment and its use. Specifically, these challenges are about how to 
express risk, how to analyse it, how to determine organisational factors within 
risk assessment as well as how to use risk assessment as a tool to ensure patient 
safety (Eidesen et al. 2009).  
Berwick et al. (2013) argue that responsibilities for safety and quality concerns 
are diffused. Consequently, responsibilities might not be clearly owned: for some 
tasks there might be multiple people in charge whereas for some others no-one is 
in charge. Furthermore, Illingworth (2015a) reports that risk register systems 
have been used as a bureaucratic data collection system. This might result in lack 
of understanding of the risks as well as registering risks without aiming to 
managing them. Vincent et al. (2013) state that risk registers have been used as a 
tick-box exercise to meet regulatory requirements. Consequently, risk 
assessment can be insufficiently conducted and may focus mainly on regulatory 
requirements instead of risk reduction.  
Additionally, it is claimed that prospective hazard analysis techniques are not 
used much to assess risks, and if used, they may be used without training (Card et 
al. 2013; Card et al. 2012b; Vincent et al. 2013; Ward et al. 2010). This could 
potentially lead to inadequate assessments, and, in turn, ineffective measures 
could be taken to manage the assessed risks. 
What is more, risk scoring can be subjective (Card et al. 2013). Most of the risks 
are estimated based on an individual’s knowledge. Therefore, different 
individuals may prioritise the same risk differently due to their varied risk 
perception, which is a reflection of social (e.g. culture and values) and human 
(e.g. individual profession, belief and values) dimensions (Wood et al. 2012). 
Consequently, individuals may under- or over-value some of their risks resulting 
in organisations treating their risks according to biased estimations.  
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Given all these challenges, there is great potential to improve current risk 
assessment practice in hospitals. In contrast to healthcare, safety-critical 
industries (i.e. aviation, nuclear, and chemical industries) are more advanced 
regarding their risk assessment applications (Audit Commission 2009; Rogers 
2002; Sujan et al. 2015). For instance, biased estimations are minimised by the 
involvement of multidisciplinary skilled teams, by the use of a variety of risk 
assessment techniques, and by the use of quantitative data as well as qualitative 
data (BSI 2010). In addition, a large number of extensive guidelines have been 
established which provide a context to risk assessment, including how to express 
risk, how to analyse it, which techniques to use and how to conduct risk 
assessment. For instance, the US Department of Defence (DoD) has established a 
military standard for safety (DoD 2008), the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has introduced a safety management system manual (FAA 2004), the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) has 
provided enterprise risk management guidance (COSO 2004), and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has provided a risk management 
handbook (NASA 2011). Furthermore, the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) has published a variety of guidance material on risk 
assessment for the use of all industries as well as for the use of specific industries 
(e.g. EN ISO 17666, ISO 31000, and ISO 31010).  
As there are a large number of risk assessment guidelines for safety-critical 
industries, this research aims to improve the current risk assessment practice in 
hospitals by learning from them. Indeed, the healthcare industry has been 
encouraged to learn from safety-critical industries to improve safety (Department 
of Health 2000; Kohn et al. 2000), and safety-critical industries have more mature 
safety management practices than hospitals (Sujan et al. 2016). However, the 
applications in safety-critical industries may need to be tailored before being 
transferred to healthcare. Table 2.1 demonstrates comparisons between 
healthcare and safety-critical industries relevant to tailoring risk assessment 
practice based on research which has identified the characteristics of these 
industries. 
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Table 2.1 Comparisons between healthcare and safety-critical industries 
Healthcare industry Safety-critical industries 
Dynamic and complex (Cook and Rasmussen 
2005; Dekker and Leveson 2015) 
Dynamic and complex (Vincent 2006) 
Service delivery (Kapur et al. 2015) Mostly product manufacturing and service delivery 
in aviation (Kapur et al. 2015) 
Vulnerable individuals are the inputs of the care 
process (Kapur et al. 2015; NPSA 2010) 
Raw materials are often the inputs of process 
(Kapur et al. 2015) 
A diverse set of activities and more manual 
process (Vincent 2010) 
Less diversity in activities and more automated 
processes (Vincent 2010) 
Some parts loosely coupled (easier to understand 
system behaviour) and some others tightly 
coupled (Cook and Rasmussen 2005) 
Mostly tightly coupled (hard to estimate system 
behaviour) (Cook and Rasmussen 2005) 
Lack of safety training (Pronovost et al. 2009) Skilled and highly trained staff (Pronovost et al. 
2009) 
Lack of safety standards and regulations (Dixon-
Woods and Pronovost 2016; Macrae and Vincent 
2014) 
Adequate standards and regulations to support and 
control safety (Rogers and Gaba 2011; Vincent 
2010) 
Individuals at risk (Rogers and Gaba 2011) Many lives at risk (e.g. aviation) (Rogers and Gaba 
2011) 
Thousands of incidents are reported annually, 
but there is still underreporting (Benn et al. 2009; 
Noble and Pronovost 2010) 
Hundreds of incidents are reported annually with 
better reporting culture (Benn et al. 2009; Buckle et 
al. 2003) 
Lack of feedback from the reported incidents 
(Benn et al. 2009) 
Better lessons learnt and feedback (Benn et al. 
2009) 
Difficult to delay processes if there is a safety 
concern (productivity is prioritised over safety) 
(Hollnagel et al. 2015)  
Process is stopped if there is a threat (safety is over 
productivity) (Hollnagel et al. 2015) 
‘Speaking Up’ is used to raise safety concerns 
(Francis 2015) 
‘Just culture’ is used to encourage staff raise safety 
concerns (Francis 2015) 
Less value is  given to safety activities and activity 
is predominantly reactive (Sujan et al. 2015) 
More value is given to safety activities, and reactive 
and proactive activities are balanced (Sujan et al. 
2015) 
Not designed to be safe (Illingworth 2015a) Designed to be safe (Illingworth 2015a) 
Safety is not a part of everyday action 
(Illingworth 2015a) 
Safety is a part of everyday action (Illingworth 
2015a) 
Risk register system is used as a bureaucratic 
data collection exercise (Illingworth 2015a) 
Risk register is used to diagnose problems 
(Illingworth 2015a) 
Lack of risk assessment techniques used (Ward et 
al. 2010) 
A large number of techniques have been developed 
and used (Ward et al. 2010) 
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The next section provides detailed information on good risk assessment practice 
to provide a better understanding of what this is.  
2.6 GOOD RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
Thirty-five national and international risk assessment standards (see Appendix 1 
for a list of these standards), which have been established by well-respected 
standardisation bodies, regulatory bodies and professional organisations, are 
here reviewed to explain risk assessment practice. Within this thesis, such 
standards are used to describe prescribed good risk assessment practice since 
those standards have been judged by well respected institutions such as the 
British Standards Institution (BSI) and the International Organisations for 
Standardisation (ISO) and recognised by a large number of organisations and 
researchers in a range of industries. More importantly, such standards are 
developed and reviewed by multiple technical committees that comprise the 
representatives of standard users, local and central government, industry bodies 
and research and testing organisations. 
As risk assessment is not a stand-alone activity: good risk assessment practice 
should determine activities prior, during and after risk assessment. 
2.6.1 PRIOR TO THE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Prior to the risk assessment practice, the assessment context should be 
established by determining the following: internal parameters (e.g. culture, 
policies and perception of internal stakeholders), external parameters (e.g. social 
environment, key trends and perceptions of external stakeholders), 
responsibilities, assessment methodology, and risk criteria (BSI 2010). 
Organisational risk assessment policies or procedures provide many of these 
details. 
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Risk assessment methods should be also selected prior to undertaking the risk 
assessment. There are a range of methods that can be used; however, the most 
appropriate methods should be selected. BS EN ISO 17776 divides potential 
methods to support risk assessment into four categories: (1) 
experience/judgement, (2) checklists, (3) codes/standards, and (4) structured 
review techniques. Using experience is appropriate when there is adequate 
knowledge and expertise. Checklists are useful when all hazards are known and 
identified. Codes and standards refer to a list of statements for recommended 
practice. Structured techniques are developed to assess unforeseen hazards and 
unintended events which may be inadequately assessed by other methods (BSI 
2002). However, no single technique is perfect by itself (Redmill et al. 1999). The 
most suitable risk assessment techniques can be selected based on objectives, 
the needs of decision makers, an assessor’s competence with the tool, the nature 
of risk, the level of uncertainty, resource availability (e.g. skills and budget), 
information availability, or regulatory requirements (BSI 2010; BSI 2011b; Crowl 
2003; Mullai 2006).  
In addition, the system to be assessed should be described prior to the risk 
assessment. A clear understanding of the system leads to the recognition of all 
potential risks and, in turn, leads to a more effective risk analysis (Redmill et al. 
1999; DoD 2008). The system description includes the identification of system 
objectives, system boundaries, system parts and the interactions of these parts 
(FAA 2004; CAA 2010; ORR 2015; RSSB 2014). System modelling diagrams can be 
used to describe systems. Table 2.2 provides six such diagrams, indicating the 
suitability of each diagram type (task, information, organisational, system, flow 
and communication) to system attributes in healthcare. 
In Table 2.2, larger ticks indicate a significant suitability to capture those system 
attributes, whereas small ticks indicate partial suitability and no ticks indicate 
that there is no suitability for the provided diagram type. 
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Table 2.2 Suitability of different diagram types for representing a range of system attributes 
in healthcare Ward et al. (2010) 
Characteristics of Interest 
System Mapping Approaches 
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Process and procedure 
(e.g. patient pathways)   
    
Human behaviour 
(e.g. performance measures)  
     
Role and responsibilities 
(e.g. team working) 
      
Communication 
(e.g. referral) 
      
Human-technology interface 
(e.g. medication devices)  
     
Procurement and supply 
(e.g. medication flow) 
      
significant match      partial match 
 
Each diagram type is briefly described below: 
Task diagrams represent the hierarchical structure of operations or tasks and 
plans (Ward et al. 2010). 
Information diagrams demonstrate the hierarchical structure of documents or 
information to understand issues regarding documentation such as the level of 
usage of electronic documents and the degree of standardisation of documents 
(Jun et al. 2009). 
Organisational diagrams show the hierarchical structure of the people or roles 
within the organisation(s) (Ward et al. 2010).  
System diagrams describe the transformation of data or objectives to activities, 
including where to store data and how to sequence activities (Ward et al. 2010). 
Flow diagrams depict the sequences of process steps visually for a better 
understanding of the process (Jun et al. 2009).  
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Communication diagrams represent information and material interactions 
between stakeholders to understand the relationships among different hospitals, 
departments, teams and individuals (Jun et al. 2009). 
Jun et al. (2009, 2010) claim that the use of flow charts and system diagrams can 
allow for an effective description of system attributes (see Table 2.2). Indeed, in 
healthcare, flowcharts have been predominantly used to describe systems 
(DeRosier et al. 2002; Jun et al. 2010).  
2.6.2 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The risk assessment process consists of three steps: risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation (Figure 2.13).  
2.6.2.1 Risk identification process 
The risk identification process involves finding, recognising and describing risks 
(BSI 2009) alongside the consideration of risk sources, events, their causes and 
their consequences (BSI 2010; Haimes 2009; BSI 2014). 
Hazards can be determined as risk sources (ISO 2009). Additionally, contributory 
factors can also be determined to be risk sources. For instance, the COSO 
Enterprise Risk Management Framework lists nine factors that could potentially 
give rise to an event (COSO 2004). These are economic, natural environment, 
political, social, technological, infrastructure, personnel, process and technology. 
Similarly, Vincent et al. (1998) identify seven factors that influence the safety and 
quality of clinical practice. These factors are patient characteristics (e.g. 
personality and condition), task (e.g. task design and the use of protocols), staff 
(e.g. knowledge and skills), team (e.g. supervision and communication), work 
environment (e.g. staffing levels and environment), organisational and 
management (e.g. policy and financial resources), and institutional context (e.g. 
economic and regulatory context). In addition, Simsekler et al. (2014) propose a 
risk source categorisation scheme (with patient-sourced, staff-sourced, task-
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related, communication, equipment-related, environmental and organisational 
categories) to identify risks in healthcare after comparing multiple risk source 
categorisation schemes.  
An event is described to be “occurrence or change of a particular set of 
circumstances” (ISO 2009). Events should be identified by considering multiple 
operation modes, including normal, degraded and emergency modes (ORR 2015), 
and should be linked to objectives (COSO 2004; BSI 2009). Additionally, events 
should be categorised in order to help management determine risks better. A 
categorisation scheme is provided by COSO and includes economic, population 
health, service delivery, human resources, technology and natural environment 
event categories (COSO 2004). However, this classification can be tailored 
depending on the nature of the events and organisational strategies. 
As indicated by accident models, several factors lead to accidents. There might be 
several causes for a single event (BSI 2011b). While causes could be 
straightforward in some cases, causation may not be evident for other cases (BSI 
2009). Thus, risk sources need to be determined to define the factors that 
contribute to the occurrence of the potential events. 
Events have potential consequences, which may have impact people, 
organisations and the environment with both immediate and knock-on effects 
(ISO 2000; BSI 2009; BSI 2010).  
2.6.2.2 Risk analysis process 
A risk analysis process determines the nature and the level of risk (BSI 2009). In 
so doing, risk analysis involves the analysis of consequence, likelihood and 
uncertainty as well as the consideration of existing controls to prevent or mitigate 
risks (NASA 2011; BSI 2010; BSI 2009). 
Consequence analysis determines the severity of both immediate and knock-on 
consequences relating to objectives (BSI 2010). Since a single risk could lead to a 
number of different consequences in the same consequence domain (BSI 2011b), 
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the severity of the consequence can be determined by considering the worst 
credible consequence (AFSC 2000; CAA 2010; FAA 2004; NASA 1999). This can be 
defined as the most unfavourable condition, but reasonable, condition (FAA 
2004). However, this might add more complexity to the risk assessment practice. 
However, organisations can identify their own strategies by ensuring that 
everyone uses the same strategy. 
Likelihood is explained to be a chance of something happening, which can be 
estimated by using probability or frequency (ISO 2009). Historical data, predictive 
techniques (e.g. scenario analysis and decision trees) and expert opinion can be 
used. Historical data can be used to determine the probability of the 
reoccurrence of an event. Predictive techniques can be used when historical data 
are inadequate or unavailable to estimate probability of an event. Expert 
judgement can be used when all relevant information is available (BSI 2010). 
Uncertainty is defined as “the state, even partial, of deficiency of information 
related to, understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequences, or 
likelihood” (ISO 2009). Uncertainty might result from limited data or poor data 
quality as well as from sociological, psychological and cultural factors (ISO 2013; 
NASA 2011). To estimate the degree of uncertainty, the availability and quality of 
information regarding the risk should be known by assessors (BSI 2010).  
NASA lists five generic factors for ranking uncertainty, which are (1) the 
uniqueness of the risk (“Is this risk issue unique?”), (2) the cross-cutting character 
of the identified risk event (“Does this risk affect a large number of functions?”), 
(3) the complexity of the risk issue (“Does the risk involve complex interactions?”), 
(4) the propagation potential of the event resulting in more severe consequences 
(“Could this risk lead to a propagation of events?”), and (5) the detectability of 
the risk (“Is there anything that inhibits the ability to detect the full extent of 
risk?”) (NASA 2011). Among these factors, detectability is also used with Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to estimate the criticality of a risk.  
Additionally, risk analysis determines existing controls and their effectiveness (BSI 
1996; BSI 2009). Controls are measures to prevent or mitigate risks as well as 
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recover from the occurrence of these risks (ISO 2015; BSI 2011b). Controls 
compromise safeguards and barriers. Safeguards aim to mitigate human error 
through local warnings and signs, alarms and human machine-interface (McLeon 
et al. 2010). Barriers can be in relation to design features, hardware, process and 
tasks, or a combination of these (ISO 2015).  
Card et al. (2014) describe three hierarchies of risk controls, which are 
elimination (developing controls to eliminate the source of harm), design controls 
(developing engineering controls with a less reliance on human beings), and 
administrative controls (developing controls by relying on human beings) (Card et 
al. 2014a; Card et al. 2014b). Effectiveness of existing controls is assessed by 
considering three questions: “What are the existing controls for a particular 
risk?”, “Are those controls capable of adequately treating the risk so that it is 
controlled to a level that is tolerable?”, and “In practice, are the controls 
operating in the manner intended and can they be demonstrated to be effective 
when required?” (BSI 2010). 
Following that, the level of risk is measured by combining likelihood and 
consequence after assessing of the effectiveness of existing controls (BSI 2009). 
Detectability can be also considered in addition to likelihood and consequence to 
measure risk criticality level (BSI 2010).  
2.6.2.3 Risk evaluation process 
The risk evaluation process assists in making decisions in relation to risk 
tolerability and prioritisation (BSI 2014; BSI 2009). To determine the tolerability of 
a risk, the estimated risk level is compared with the risk criteria (BSI 2009).  
Risk criteria are “terms of reference against which the significance of a risk is 
evaluated” (ISO 2009). So, risk criteria are the reference points used in making 
risk-based decisions. Therefore, it is essential to set risk criteria well when 
establishing the assessment context. Risk criteria can involve the consideration of 
organisational priorities, the needs of stakeholders, socio-economic and 
environmental aspects, regulations, policies and standards (ISO 2009; ISO 2002). 
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For instance, hospitals would not accept a risk of surgical instrument being 
retained in a patient’s body after a surgical procedure since there is a national 
requirement for the prevention of this event. Here, this requirement can be 
determined as one of the risk criteria. 
Decisions regarding risk tolerability are often made through the use of risk 
matrices. Different bands on the risk matrix are used to support decision-making. 
For instance, for a risk matrix with three band, an upper band represents 
intolerable risks, a middle band encourages the “As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP)” principle, and a lower band represents negligible risks (BSI 
2010). However, there might also be some other aspects to take into account 
when deciding on the tolerability of risks including psychological, societal, moral, 
emotional, political and financial aspects (Suddle 2009).  
The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) identifies three risk acceptance principles. 
These are: the application of codes of practice (e.g. standards and rules), 
comparison with similar reference system(s), and explicit risk level (ORR 2015). If 
risks are known and well understood, the application of codes of practice can be 
applicable (ISO 2015). If the system to be assessed is sufficiently similar to any 
other reference systems, the comparison with the similar reference system can 
be applicable. When the risks are not covered by these two acceptance 
principles, explicit risk level can be determined to make decisions in relation to 
risk acceptance (ORR 2015; RSSB 2014). 
Regarding risk prioritisation, multiple factors may be relevant and need to be 
determined, including likelihood, consequence and detectability of a risk as well 
as vulnerability and speed of onset (or velocity) (COSO 2012). Vulnerability is 
explained as the degree to which a system is susceptible to or unable to cope 
with the risk (Parry et al. 2007). The higher the vulnerability, the greater the 
impact of the risk event. Speed of onset (or velocity) refers how quickly a risk 
event manifests itself (COSO 2012). To measure risk priority by combining these 
factors, a nominal measurement scale for each factor can be used; an example is 
given in Table 2.3 
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Table 2.3 Nominal measurement scales to assess risks 
Score Consequence Likelihood Detectability Vulnerability Speed of 
Onset 
1 Negligible Rare Very high Very low Very low 
2 Minor Unlikely High Low Low 
3 Moderate Possible Medium Medium Medium 
4 Major Likely Low High High 
5 Extreme Frequent Very low Very high Very High 
 
While measurements such as those in Table 2.3 provide valuable insights into the 
criticality of a risk, the factors that influence the decisions made on the 
tolerability of a risk also play an essential role in prioritising risks.  
2.6.3 POST RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
After risk evaluation, the last step in risk assessment, risk treatment options are 
considered. Risk treatment involves the selection and implementation of one or 
more options to modify risk. These options include avoiding the risk, taking the 
risk to pursue an opportunity, removing the risk source, changing the likelihood, 
changing the consequence, sharing the risk with other parties and retaining the 
risk (BSI 2010).  
Additionally, the BS EN 31010, Risk Management Standard, states that findings of 
the risk assessment should be documented. The documentation of assessed risks 
should include assessment objectives, an assessment of scope, a system 
description, context, risk criteria, risk assessment methodology, sources, 
assessment results, discussions, recommended actions, a follow-up review time 
schedule and references (BSI 2010).  
Good overall risk assessment practice not only considers the risk assessment 
process steps, it also takes into account prior, and post risk assessment activities. 
However, it should be noted that different industries might need to adjust some 
of these elements based on their needs and capacity. Additionally, the success of 
the practice relies on assessors’ knowledge and skills, organisational culture and 
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multiple other factors (e.g. using the right techniques, involving appropriate 
people and implementing recommended actions).  
2.7 DISCUSSION 
The findings of this chapter demonstrate that safety in healthcare needs to be 
improved despite significant efforts. Although some safety interventions have 
already been adopted to promote safety (Illingworth 2015b; Vincent et al. 2013), 
these applications have been found to be limited in their effectiveness (Dixon-
Woods and Pronovost 2016) and predominantly focused on reactive approaches 
after harm occurs (Sujan et al. 2015). Therefore, this research defines the first 
gap as: 
There has been a lack of proactive applications to ensure safety in 
healthcare.  
Risk assessment, however, is a proactive application to ensure safety. While risk 
assessment is already utilised in healthcare, current risk assessment practice has 
been argued to be insufficient and a number of weaknesses have already been 
defined. For instance, there is a lack of clarity about how to express risks and how 
to use risk assessment as a tool to improve patient safety (Eidesen et al. 2009); 
only few risk assessment techniques used (Gray and Cohen 2012; Vincent et al. 
2013; Ward et al. 2010); and biased risk estimations are often made (Card et al. 
2013; Gadd et al. 2003). All these challenges lead to the second gap: 
There is a need to improve current risk assessment practice. 
This need can be responded to both by considering existing challenges as well as 
introducing the missing elements for good risk assessment practice. The 
challenges, for instance, could be addressed by a number of recommendations. 
Safety culture could be improved to encourage the involvement of more staff in 
risk management (Kuhn and Youngberg 2002). Staff skills/knowledge could be 
improved in the area of risk assessment to implement risk assessment more 
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effectively (Card et al. 2014b). A risk communication tool could be developed for 
the use of high-level stakeholders as in regulators and the healthcare 
organisations (Sujan et al. 2016).  
Additionally, a number of proactive hazard analysis techniques could be 
transferred from safety-critical industries (DeRosier et al. 2002). Although, 
specific tools and techniques from other industries may not easily transfer into 
healthcare, the principles behind them could be (Vincent et al. 2014). Michie et 
al. (2005) claim that better healthcare outcomes might be achieved through 
providing theoretical understanding of the processes that relate to behaviour 
change of the healthcare professionals (Michie et al. 2005).  
Mullai (2006) also highlights the importance of the understanding of risk 
management in the first place to manage risks. Moreover, a widely known risk 
management standard, BS ISO 31000 (2011), explains that successful risk 
management practice depends on the effectiveness of the risk management 
framework in providing adequate foundations. Therefore, this research focuses 
on the design of a risk assessment approach to support healthcare staff in risk 
assessment by learning from prescribed good risk assessment practices of safety-
critical industries. 
To design such an approach, the general principles behind risk assessment 
practice should be considered. Since risk assessment is built on accident models 
and sequential accident models are criticised by researchers, this research 
assumes that accidents result from several contributing factors arising from 
different levels of the system (Underwood and Waterson 2014). Therefore, this 
research determines multiple contributing factors rather than seeking a cause 
and effect relationship.  
The research takes a further step and includes in its scope the improvement of 
risk assessment practices in hospitals in NHS England. This is due to the fact that 
hospitals are complex, an enormous number of incidents occur in hospitals, and 
hospitals have the highest healthcare spending and employ a large number of 
staff (Davies 2014; Vincent and Amalberti 2016). 
CHAPTER 2: A LITERATURE REVIEW FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
 47 
It should be also noted that risk assessment is not a stand-alone activity, and it is 
part of a larger system (e.g. quality and safety management). Thus, any behaviour 
change in the linkages and interactions of the parts influences the entire system 
(Dekker and Leveson 2015). Effective risk assessment practice, therefore, 
requires additional considerations prior to, during and after the assessment (HSE 
2006b). However, there is little evidence which establish how risks are assessed 
in hospitals and whether hospitals practice the fundamental elements of good 
risk assessment. While there have been some attempts to conduct risk related 
studies, they remained in focus on particular steps of the risk assessment or on 
the assessment of specific risks. For instance, it is often clinical risks such as 
venous thromboembolism (VTE) (Wilson 2015) and falls (Saverino et al. 2015) 
assessed. Simsekler (2014) developed a risk identification framework. However, 
his framework remains conceptual and, therefore, it helps little to the real-life 
scenarios by itself. Card (2013) focused on risk control and provided practical 
ways of generating options for active risk control. However, risk control is a 
follow-up step of the risk assessment. This research thus attempts to investigate 
current practice in hospitals, identifies the problems involved in it, and proposes 
an improved risk assessment approach. 
The main research question that drives this thesis is: How can current risk 
assessment practice be improved to ensure safety in hospitals?  
To investigate this main research question, a set of questions was derived from 
the preliminary evidence gathered in this chapter. These questions fall into three 
general categories: prescribed good practice, current practice in hospitals and 
proposed risk assessment practice. 
Prescribed good practice: 
RQ1: What is prescribed good practice in risk assessment? 
Current practice in hospitals:  
RQ2: How is current risk assessment performed in hospitals? 
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RQ3: What are the problems with current risk assessment practice in 
hospitals? 
Proposed practice:  
RQ4: How would good risk assessment practice be tailored to hospitals? 
RQ5: What views do healthcare staff have on the proposed risk assessment 
practice? 
The first category, prescribed good practice, aims to reveal a clear understanding 
of what good risk assessment practice constitutes by addressing RQ1. The second 
category, current practice, is designed to investigate current risk assessment 
practice in hospitals by addressing RQ2 and RQ3. The third category, proposed 
practice, seeks to translate good practice applications to current risk assessment 
practice in hospitals through addressing RQ4 and RQ5.  
In this research, while this chapter addressed the RQ1 through the review of a 
large number of international and national risk assessment standards, it did not 
provide much evidence regarding current risk assessment practice. Therefore, 
more evidence will be collected to understand the practical applications of risk 
assessment in hospitals in NHS England. In so doing, RQ2 and RQ3 are explored in 
Chapter 2, 4 and 5; and RQ4 and RQ5 are addressed in Chapter 6 and 7.  
2.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter examined existing literature on safety, accidents, and risk 
assessment practice. In addition, this chapter identified gaps in the literature in 
order to introduce areas for further research. The literature published, so far, 
predominantly focuses on safety after harm occurs and pays less attention to risk 
assessment to prevent harm in the first place. Indeed, there is a lack of research 
providing an understanding of current risk assessment practice in hospitals. 
However, there have been a number of challenges identified regarding the 
current risk assessment practice in hospitals, which indicates that there is 
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potential to improve current risk assessment practice. Therefore, this research 
first investigates current risk assessment practice and, then, proposes a new risk 
assessment approach by building on the general principles behind risk 
assessment.  
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
The previous chapter identified gaps and limitations in the existing literature on 
risk assessment, from which the research questions emerged. This chapter 
presents an overview of the process taken in this research by following a research 
process framework as in Figure 3.1 (Sim and Wright 2002).  
 
 
3. Research 
methodology 
1. Research 
paradigm 
5. Research    
methods 
2. Research     
question 
4. Research         
design 
Figure 3.1 Relationships between research process components adapted from Sim and 
Wright (2002) 
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Firstly, this chapter provides an introduction to research paradigms and their 
influence on this research. Following that the research questions are presented 
again, the methodological approach is explained, the research design is outlined 
and the methods to be employed in this research to address research questions 
are outlined. Lastly, ethical considerations taken in this research are explained. 
3.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
Guba (1990) defined paradigms as “a basic set of beliefs that guides action, 
whether of the everyday garden variety or action taken in connection with a 
disciplined inquiry”. A research paradigm guides researchers by providing 
directions in the research process. Guba (1990) classifies research paradigms into 
four categories: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism. 
Each paradigm is characterised by the way it responds to three fundamental 
questions. These are: (1) ontological, by asking “What is the nature of the 
knowable?”, (2) epistemological,  by asking “What is the nature of the 
relationship between the inquirer and the known?” and (3) methodological,  by 
asking “How should the inquirer go about finding out knowledge?” (Guba 1990) 
Table 3.1 illustrates these four paradigms with their characteristics. 
Table 3.1 Characteristics of research paradigm adapted from Guba (1990) 
 
Paradigm Classification 
Paradigm Characteristics 
Ontological Epistemological Methodological 
Positivism Realism Objectivism Experimental/ 
manipulative 
Post-positivism Critical realism Modified objectivism Modified 
experimental/ 
manipulative 
Critical theory Critical realism Subjectivism Dialogical, 
transformative 
Constructivism Relativism Subjectivism Hermeneutic, dialectic 
 
Positivism is based on reality by looking for “How things really work” (Guba 
1990). The role of the researcher is to test theories and to contribute to the 
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development of laws. Natural science studies often follow a positivist approach 
(Bryman 2001). Post-positivism is a modified version of positivism by still looking 
for reality but by considering the fact that it is impossible for humans to perceive 
the entire true reality. Critical theory is based on critical realism (reality exists, 
but can never be fully apprehended), but with a subjectivist approach by 
considering the values that mediate inquiry. Constructivism is also a subjectivist 
approach which assumes that reality can change depending on the perception of 
knowledge, and constructivism rejects the use of natural science methods to view 
truths about the social world (Guba 1990; Robson 2002). 
Much research in social science uses critical realism to provide an appropriate 
framework for designing real world studies (Robson 2002). The research 
presented here accepts that reality is out there, however it can be difficult to see 
it as it is. This was due to the fact that the current risk assessment practice was 
not known well and observations can be fallible. Different individuals might 
understand and apply risk assessment differently. Therefore, this research also 
fits closer with critical realism and modified objectivism, which falls under post-
positivism paradigm. Indeed, this research does not aim to test a theory and 
rejects the use of natural science methods to reveal truths; it aims instead to 
understand the current risk assessment practice and to improve it. To reveal 
reality more objectively, triangulation of sources is used.  
In the next section, research questions are listed, which are drawn from the 
primary conclusions of the literature review. 
3.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As introduced in Section 2.7.1, this research primarily explores the following 
question: 
How can current risk assessment practice be improved to ensure safety in 
hospitals? 
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In addition to this, the following five additional research questions were derived 
and are elaborated throughout the current research. 
1. What is prescribed good practice in risk assessment? 
2. How is current risk assessment performed in hospitals? 
3. What are the problems with current risk assessment practice in hospitals?  
4. How would good risk assessment practice be tailored to hospitals? 
5. What views do healthcare staff have on the proposed risk assessment 
practice? 
3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Methodology is the overall approach to research. It refers to the general 
principles of investigation, which are based on underlying theoretical and 
philosophical assumptions (Sim and Wright 2002). Thus, the selection of a 
research methodology influences the effectiveness of the scientific research to 
achieve its aims (Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009; Eckert et al. 2003). 
Since this research aims to design a better risk assessment approach in hospitals 
to improve safety, this research is considered to be design research. Therefore, 
design research methodologies were sought to find the most suitable 
methodology for this research. Since DRM is a commonly accepted methodology 
in design research including healthcare design research (Jafri 2010; Beniuk 2012; 
Simsekler 2014; Eckert et al. 2003), it is adopted as a core methodology in this 
research.  
DRM is developed by Blessing et al. in 1992 to support design researchers by 
providing a rigorous approach (Blessing et al. 1992). The DRM provides an 
appropriate framework to address the current research questions. The DRM 
framework consists of four stages: research clarification, descriptive study I, 
prescriptive study and descriptive study II (Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009). Figure 
3.2 illustrates the relationships between the DRM stages, their basic meanings, 
and their main outcomes. 
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In the Research Clarification (RC) stage, researchers aim to find some evidence to 
formulate a realistic and worthwhile research goal primarily through a literature 
search. This stage develops an initial description of the existing and desired 
situation, formulates criteria to measure the success of the research, and 
provides an overall research plan (i.e. focus, goals, problems, research questions, 
approach and expected contribution) (Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009).  
In the Descriptive Study I (DS-I) stage, researchers analyse the existing process 
further to elaborate the initial description of the current situation, to identify 
current problems and to identify factors that influence its success. This stage 
provides a basis for the development of the existing design (Blessing and 
Chakrabarti 2009). 
In the Prescriptive Study (PS) stage, researchers describe the desired situation 
utilising their increased understanding of the existing situation. They develop a 
model or theory to describe the desired situation (Blessing and Chakrabarti 
2009). 
In the Descriptive Study II (DS-II) stage, researchers evaluate their developed 
model or theory in terms of whether it functions as intended. Additionally, the 
Research Clarification 
Descriptive Study I 
Prescriptive Study  
Descriptive Study II  
Stages 
Literature 
analysis 
Empirical data 
analysis 
Assumption 
experience 
synthesis 
Empirical data 
analysis 
Basic Means 
Goals 
Understanding 
Support 
Evaluation 
Main Outcomes 
Figure 3.2 The DRM framework Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009) 
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model or theory is evaluated by considering its impact, applicability and 
usefulness based on the success criteria that they developed in the Research 
Clarification stage (Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009).While each step has been 
explained in sequence, DRM allows iterations to improve the understanding and 
efficiency of the design process (Chakrabarti et al. 2004). Researchers also 
revealed the need for iterations within each design research stage as well as 
between different stages (Antonsson 1987; Reich 1995). However, it is also 
recommended to plan stages in order to avoid too many unexpected iterations. 
DRM gives a goal-directed and flexible approach to allow researchers adjust the 
DRM framework steps based on the needs of the research topic instead of strictly 
following a step by step approach. Indeed, researchers following a design 
methodology with a goal-directed and flexible approach were found to produce a 
higher quality of design than those following a step by step approach (Fricke 
1993).  
Table 3.2 Types of design research with the DRM framework Blessing and Chakrabarti 
(2009) 
Research 
Clarification 
Descriptive Study I Prescriptive Study Descriptive Study II 
1. Review-based Comprehensive   
2. Review-based Comprehensive Initial  
3. Review-based Review-based Comprehensive Initial 
4. Review-based       Review-based 
Review-based 
Initial/  
Comprehensive 
Comprehensive 
5. Review-based Comprehensive Comprehensive Initial 
6. Review-based 
 
 Comprehensive Comprehensive 
7. Review-based 
 
   Comprehensive Comprehensive 
 
Blessing and Chakrabarti (2009) identified seven potential design research types 
through the use of the DRM framework. Table 3.2 lists these research types by 
considering whether a particular research stage requires a review-based, a 
comprehensive or an initial study. A review-based study only focuses on the 
Review-based 
Comprehensive 
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literature review. A comprehensive study includes both a literature review and 
other studies through which the researcher produces results (e.g. empirical 
study). An initial study provides initial results for the use of other researchers 
(Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009).This research project most closely sits with Type 
5, which is called Development of Support Based on a Comprehensive Study of the 
Existing Situation. Design-related PhD studies often aim for Type 5 and 6, but end 
up with Type 2 and 3 (Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009). In this current research, 
Type 6 could not be performed due to feasibility and time constraints. However, 
an initial investigation could be completed in the Descriptive Study II stage, and 
so the research falls under Type 5. 
While this research used the DRM framework, this study could have used other 
methodologies. For instance, healthcare-specific methodologies could have been 
used. Of these other methodologies, the Plan Do Study Act (PDSA) cycle is widely 
used in healthcare for quality improvement (Varkey et al. 2007), a participatory 
approach has been used in healthcare for establishing consensus between 
different stakeholders for an integrated care programme (Eyre et al. 2017), and a 
system-based user-centred approach has been used for designing healthcare 
(Clarkson et al. 2004). However, the PDSA method tends to be oversimplified by 
its users in healthcare (Reed and Card 2016), and it does not allow iterations 
between adjacent steps whereas design studies often require iterations. A 
participatory approach is also mentioned within the context of healthcare 
improvement methodologies; however, it is not a research methodology by itself 
since it does not provide any guidance on how to carry out a research study. 
While a system-based user-centred approach could have been applicable in this 
research, the DRM framework also follows similar paths in terms of 
understanding the needs, developing potential solutions, and implementing and 
evaluating the proposed solutions. Additionally, most of the healthcare 
methodologies are used for specific clinical studies whereas this research is about 
the design of a new risk assessment approach. Thus, this research selected the 
use of DRM. 
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However, while the DRM framework provides good guidance on how to conduct 
design research, it does not provide methods to be used (Blessing and 
Chakrabarti 2009). It needs to be tailored to each research project and suitable 
methods should be selected to apply the research methodology. The following 
section explains the research design and methods selected for this research 
study.  
3.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
A research design provides structured guidance for data collection and analysis in 
order to address the research questions (Bryman 2001; Sim and Wright 2002). 
This research is designed on the overall research methodology by employing 
research methods given in Table 3.3, which lists the methods employed in 
relation to the DRM stages, research questions and chapters.  
In the Research Clarification stage, documents were reviewed to justify the 
necessity of the research, to provide a basic understanding of the research topic 
and to design the research questions. 
Since the Descriptive Study I seeks to provide a deep understanding of the 
current risk assessment practice in hospitals, hospitals’ risk assessment 
documents were reviewed to understand the recommended practice. 
Additionally, interviews and questionnaires were conducted to understand the 
practical experience of NHS staff in conducting risk assessments.  
As the Prescriptive Study proposes a new approach, documents were reviewed to 
describe the good prescribed risk assessment practice and group discussions 
were made to help the design of the proposed approach. 
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Table 3.3 Research design and methods 
Research 
Methodology 
Stages 
Research Questions Chapters 
Methods 
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Research 
clarification 
 1, 2, 3      
Descriptive 
study I 
What is prescribed good 
practice in risk assessment? 
2      
How is current risk assessment 
performed in hospitals? 
2, 4, 5      
What are the problems with 
current risk assessment 
practice in hospitals? 
2, 4, 5      
Prescriptive 
study 
How would good risk 
assessment practice be 
tailored to hospitals? 
6      
Descriptive 
study II 
What views do healthcare staff 
have on the proposed risk 
assessment practice? 
7      
 
In the Descriptive Study II, interviews and questionnaires were conducted to 
ensure that the proposed practice satisfies its potential users, and group 
discussions and a case study were conducted to evaluate the proposed approach. 
Overall, a variety of methods were selected to collect data and to evaluate the 
findings. Document analysis was conducted to reveal the described risk 
assessment practice. Interviews and questionnaires were conducted to 
understand the practical experience of healthcare staff on risk assessment as well 
as to evaluate the proposed risk assessment approach. Group discussions and a 
case study were conducted to design and evaluate the proposed approach.  
While a number of methods were selected to conduct this research, multiple 
other methods could have also been used such as ethnography, control studies, 
and workshops. As a result, the research could have provided a better 
understanding of the current risk assessment practice, and the proposed 
approach could have been evaluated more reliably. For instance, ethnography 
could reveal the culture of risk assessment practice in hospitals; and control 
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studies and workshops could provide a more reliable evaluation of the proposed 
risk assessment approach. However, such methods could not have been used in 
this research due to the limited time availability of healthcare staff and their 
unwillingness to be involved in the research study. Additionally, these methods 
might still not provide as much information as received from interviews. 
A brief description is provided for each method below while more details can be 
found in the relevant chapter. 
3.5.1 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
The documentation of personal (e.g. letters and photographs) and impersonal 
(e.g. public inquiries, internet sources and organisational documents) data are 
valuable sources for researchers (Bryman 2001; Grbich 1999). Documents not 
only provide data on the research context but also can be used to verify findings 
from other sources.  
For this research, documentation data sources include incident and risk records, 
official reports, hospitals’ risk assessment policies, procedures and strategies, 
hospital board meeting notes, academic journals, and national and international 
risk management standards.  
Document analysis mainly involves three steps: skimming (superficial 
examination), reading and interpretation (Bowen 2009). All chapters, except 
Chapter 7, conducted document analysis to support evidence collected in relation 
to the understanding of current and proposed practices. In Chapter 4, especially, 
a detailed document analysis was conducted through a Freedom of Information 
(FOI) request of the risk assessment policies and procedures. However, document 
analysis alone may not reveal the practical experience of the healthcare staff in 
risk assessment (see section 4.4). Therefore, this study also uses other methods 
to understand actual practice, including interviews and questionnaires. 
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3.5.2 INTERVIEW 
Interviewing helps researchers gain information in relation to the perspectives, 
understanding and experience of people on a specific topic (Grbich 1999). 
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Structured 
interviews tend to be used in quantitative research whereas semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews tend to be preferred in qualitative research (Bryman 
2001). In a structured interview, the interviewer lists questions and asks the same 
questions to each interviewee in the same sequence (Grbich 1999). In a semi-
structured interview, the interviewer does not have to follow the same sequence 
or ask the same questions. In an unstructured interview, the interviewer starts by 
asking a single question and the rest depends on the nature of the conversation 
(Bryman 2001). 
Since this study seeks to understand the perceptions of people involved in 
current risk assessment practice, interviews were conducted to reveal the 
practical experience of the healthcare staff. In hospitals, healthcare staff with 
different professions and experience might conduct risk assessments differently. 
Thus, unstructured and semi-structured interviews were conducted to be able to 
adjust questions depending on the responses. Unstructured interviews, detailed 
in Chapter 5, were used to gain an understanding of current risk assessment 
practice through having a natural conversation with the interviewees. Semi-
structured interviews, found in Chapter 5 and 7, were designed to reveal the 
practical experience of healthcare staff in risk assessment and to evaluate the 
proposed risk assessment approach. Due to the time constraints of the 
healthcare staff, participation in interviews was limited. Consequently, the 
findings from interviews can only reflect the views of participants (see section 
5.2.4.5). To mitigate the effects of such a limitation, a questionnaire that 
minimises time requirements for participation was also administered. 
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3.5.3 QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaires are frequently used in social and health research to collect data 
(Sim and Wright 2002). Conducting a questionnaire helps researchers collect data 
regarding beliefs, opinions, or reasons for an event or facts through asking 
questions (Blessing and Chakrabarti 2009). These questions can be both open-
ended and closed-ended. Open-ended questions allow participants to respond in 
his/her words. Closed-ended questions provide a list of predetermined responses 
from which the participants pick the one that most closely represents their 
opinions (Sim and Wright 2002).   
This research uses questionnaires to collect data since completing a short 
questionnaire with well-formulated questions would save time for both the 
researcher and participants. In Chapter 5, a questionnaire with an electronic and 
paper-based version was designed to understand current risk assessment 
practice. In Chapter 7, a paper-based questionnaire was designed to evaluate the 
proposed framework. Both questionnaires have open-ended and closed-ended 
questions to direct participants with predetermined responses as well as to give 
them the flexibility to respond in their own words.  
However, it should be noted that questionnaires also have limitations. For 
example, the questionnaires within this research have limits since they did not 
provide duplicating and reversing questions (see Chapter 5 and 7). As a result, it 
might have led to verification bias in the study and participants might have 
responded the questions in favour of the research.  
3.5.4 GROUP DISCUSSION 
Group discussion is also a method of collecting data from multiple people (Pope 
and Mays 2006). Smaller scaled groups lead to a better use of group discussions 
(Payne and Payne 2004). Group discussions can generate a large amount of data 
with many critical comments on the topic to be discussed (Pope and Mays 2006). 
The speed and practicality of a group discussion increases the value of group 
discussion as a research method (Payne and Payne 2004).  
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For this research, group discussion was made at all stages of the research through 
meetings with three researchers including the researcher and two supervisors. It 
was conducted to enhance the validity of the research findings instead of 
collecting data. Particularly, group discussions were held to develop and evaluate 
the proposed approach. In turn, the researcher made continuous improvements 
based on these discussions. 
3.5.5 CASE STUDY 
A case study entails a detailed analysis of a single case (Bryman 2001). It aims to 
describe a problem, to build a solution, to interpret the solution critically or to 
build a theory (Yin 1993). Stake (1995) divides case studies into three categories: 
(1) intrinsic to have a better understanding of a particular case, (2) instrumental 
to use the case to gain a greater understanding of a theory or issue, and (3) 
collective to use multiple cases to gain a greater understanding of a theory or 
issue (Stake 1995). 
In this research, an instrumental case study was conducted in Chapter 7 in 
combination with interviews to give an example of the use of the proposed 
approach. 
3.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In most research, there are ethical and legal considerations that must be 
addressed in conducting the study. The ethical considerations require that 
participants should not be harmed due to their participation in the research, and 
that they should give their informed consent for their involvement (Bowling 
2002). Sim and Wright (2002) list central issues in research ethics as informed 
consent, privacy and confidentiality, anonymity, deception, risk of harm and 
exploitation.   
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Healthcare staff from different professions and Trusts participated in this 
research, and their participation was voluntary. Since this research involves 
participants from multiple Trusts in NHS England, the researcher obtained Health 
Research Authority (HRA) approval (see Appendix 2).  
The obtainment of HRA approval required lots of efforts and it took 
approximately 6 months. 1 month required to complete and revise the necessary 
documents. Following that it took around 2 months to receive peer review 
comments from the Research and Development Department at the Cambridge 
University Hospitals (CUH) NHS Foundation since they were the sponsor of this 
research study. After making necessary changes based on the comments given, 
an application was submitted to gain HRA approval. HRA approval comprised a 
review by an NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC) on behalf of the participating 
organisations. It took almost 3 months for the NHS REC to approve this research 
study without giving any changes. The REC reference of this study is 
16/HRA/4955. 
After obtaining the HRA approval, a confirmation of capacity and capability of the 
nine participating Trusts were received by email in order to conduct the study on 
the sites of these Trusts. So, while nine Trusts were involved in this study, 
participants of this study were not limited to these nine Trusts.  
Furthermore, a letter of access was gained from the CUH NHS Foundation Trust 
through the application of a research passport, which took 1 month to gain (see 
Appendix 3). This approval was obtained to access hospitals’ risk register and 
incident reporting systems.  
Returning to the central issues of research ethics, informed consent was obtained 
from each participant either verbally prior to their participation or as a signed 
form; all data were analysed anonymously; participants were informed about the 
research study; and participants were informed that they could withdraw their 
participation at any point.  
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3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of the research process employed in this 
research. The research paradigm adopted here is post-positivism: accepting that 
there is a reality, but one that may never fully be apprehended. Therefore, 
different sources were used to identify the reality as closely as possible. The 
Design Research Methodology was selected as it is widely used in the design 
research field and successfully applied in the healthcare research field. This 
chapter then introduced the methods that were selected to address the research 
questions. The following chapters put this research methodology into practice to 
reveal the existing situation in more detail so as to investigate potential areas for 
improvement in risk assessment practice in hospitals. 
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDED RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  
RECOMMENDED RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
IN HOSPITALS IN NHS ENGLAND 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 
Given the lack of substantial literature detailing current risk assessment practice 
in hospitals in NHS England, this chapter investigates the current recommended 
risk assessment practice to explore ‘work as described’. To do so, this chapter 
clarifies the recommended risk assessment practice in hospitals in NHS England, 
and asks whether there is a need for improvements, and if so, what the potential 
improvements might be. In turn, the two research questions (RQ2 and RQ3) are 
partially addressed and evidence is provided for the main research question: 
“How can current risk assessment practice be improved to ensure safety in 
hospitals?”. 
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4.2 METHODS 
Document analysis was conducted by collecting risk assessment documents from 
each NHS England Acute Trust. To obtain data, a Freedom of Information Act 
2000 (FOI) request was sent to all NHS England Acute Trusts (n=160) on July 11, 
2016, by e-mail. The hospitals were asked to provide their current risk 
assessment procedure and policy (or nearest equivalent documents, e.g. risk 
management policy, strategy, procedure or guidance). Once the request is 
received by hospitals, hospitals aim to respond to the request within 20 working 
days (NHS England 2000). 
Collected documents were analysed to explore the recommended risk 
assessment practice. In so doing, documents were initially reviewed to determine 
how risk terminology is defined, how risks are assessed, and what guidance is 
provided on risk assessment. In the second review, existing challenges were 
identified by considering the findings from documents and good risk assessment 
practice. Following that, potential areas for improvement were recommended.  
4.3 RESULTS 
62.5 percent of hospitals (100) responded within 35 working days following the 
FOI request. From these responses, 142 documents (4190 pages) were collated. 
The majority of the hospitals (66) provided only one document, and the 
maximum number of documents provided by a single hospital was four 
documents.  
Most of the collected documents were titled as risk assessment (or risk 
management) policy, strategy or procedure. Other documents were also 
received, including risk assessment guidance, incident reporting policy, risk 
handbook, and health and safety policy. 
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4.3.1 RISK TERMINOLOGY 
A review of the collected documents revealed that a variety of definitions are 
provided for the term risk and risk assessment. Results show that 87 out of 100 
hospitals provided a definition for the term risk. Among these definitions, the 
majority (63) defined risk to be something negative such as a “potential adverse 
event”, “threat to objectives”, “potential harm” or “potential harm, loss or 
damage”. The remainder (37), however, described risk in more neutral terms 
such as “an event”, “uncertainty on objectives” or “an uncertain outcome” which 
may result in either positive or negative consequences. Table 4.1 presents these 
definitions in more detail.  
Table 4.1 Characteristics of the provided risk definitions 
Risk Description 
Number of 
Hospitals 
Event 
Neutral 
Negative (e.g. adverse event and unfavourable event) 
 
1 
16 
Impact on objectives 
Neutral (i.e. ISO risk definition) 
Negative (e.g. threat to objectives) 
 
32 
9 
Harm 11 
Harm, loss or damage 14 
Uncertainty of outcome 4 
 
However, it should be noted that most of the given risk definitions (32) used the 
ISO Risk Management Standard definition of “the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” or similar. Indeed, 31 hospitals cited well-known risk management 
standards (e.g. AS/NZA 4360:1999, ISO 31000:2009 and ISO 31100) in their 
documents. Furthermore, 55 hospitals provided a clear definition for the term 
risk assessment. Risk assessment was often defined as either “an examination of 
a potential risk”, or “a systematic process of assessing the likelihood of something 
happening and its potential consequence”. Yet, few hospitals provided clear 
definitions for all risk assessment terms in their documents. 
Although healthcare staff may not always be using these documents in their daily 
risk assessment practices, these collected documents are intended to guide them. 
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Therefore, clear terminology in such documents may help understand the risk 
assessment practice better. However, the majority of the hospitals clearly 
described two types of risks, namely operational and strategic risks. Both clinical 
and non-clinical risks can be defined under the umbrella of these two types. 
Representative definitions are provided below: 
Operational risks are defined as: 
“by-products of the day to day running of a trust and include a broad 
spectrum of risks including clinical risks, fraud risk, financial risk, legal 
risks arising from employment law or health and safety legislation and 
risks of damage to assets or systems failures.” (pg4, Risk Management 
Policy and Guidance, University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust) 
and strategic risks are identified as: 
“representing a threat to achieving the Trust’s strategic objectives or to its 
continued existence.” (pg4, Risk Management Policy and Guidance, 
University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust) 
The front-line staff assess operational risks and the board-level staff assess 
strategic risks. Operational risks are assessed in a bottom-up manner from front-
line staff to board-level staff and are registered in the Trusts’ risk register 
systems. Conversely, strategic risks are assessed top-down and stated on the 
Board Assurance Framework (BAF), which is a document that gathers information 
in relation to the strategic risks. The front-line staff often assess operational risks, 
and if they cannot manage these risks, they are escalated to a higher managerial 
level. Consequently, some of the operational risks can be escalated to the board-
level and such risks can be treated as strategic risks. The board-level, in general, 
identifies strategic risks, and informs the lower-level staff of these strategic risks, 
if necessary. 
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4.3.2 RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
Findings from the collected documents show that risk assessment generally 
involves the identification of risk, the measurement of the level of risk by 
multiplying the likelihood and consequence scores, the prioritisation of risk 
through the use of risk matrices, and the determination of the required actions to 
manage these risks. In so doing, each hospital provides a standard risk 
assessment template, which is either available electronically on the risk register 
system or manually as a form. Hospitals also provide various risk assessment 
forms for the assessment of specific types of risks such as stress risk assessment, 
moving and handling, and new and expectant mother risk assessment forms.  
Table 4.2 Recommended tools and techniques to support risk assessment 
Techniques and Tools 
Number of 
Hospitals Cited 
Risk 
Identification 
Risk 
Analysis 
Risk 
Evaluation 
Audit 100    
Risk registers 100    
Incident reporting 100      
Heat map/ risk matrix 99            
Root Cause Analysis 52    
Checklist 38  
  
Whistle blowing 33    
Walk-around/ walk about 29  
  
Horizon scanning 20    
Benchmarking 15    
SWOT 7  
  
Brainstorming/ mind storming 5  
  
PEST/PESTLE analysis 5    
Decision tree 3   
 
Grapevine/ intuition 2    
Lean analysis 2    
FMEA 1    
Bow-tie analysis 1    
Event tree analysis 1    
Fault tree analysis 1    
: Strongly Applicable,   : Applicable 
 
The collected documents also revealed that hospitals recommend the use of a 
number of techniques to support risk assessment practice. Table 4.2 lists all the 
tools and techniques except specific risk assessment forms that were mentioned 
in these documents, and shows to which risk assessment step these tools could 
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be applicable (see Appendix 4 for a brief summary of each tool and technique). 
The decisions on the applicability of these tools on the risk assessment steps 
were made by reviewing the British Standards (BSI 2010) on risk assessment 
techniques in conjunction with discussions with the research team and a risk 
manager from an acute specialist hospital.  
As Table 4.2 indicates, almost all hospitals recommend audits, risk registers, 
incident reporting and risk matrices to support risk assessment practice. Other 
techniques were widely mentioned to assess risks including checklists, whistle 
blowing, walk-arounds, horizon scanning and benchmarking. Furthermore, a few 
hospitals recommended the use of decision trees to support risk assessment, and 
a single hospital recommended the use of FMEA, the bow-tie analysis, event tree 
analysis and fault tree analysis. 
However, it was recognised that some of these tools and techniques are not 
strongly applicable to conducting a full risk assessment. While almost all are 
applicable to identifying risks and most are applicable to analysing risks, the 
majority are not applicable to evaluating risks. These tools and techniques are 
therefore considered to support risk assessment rather than constituting risk 
assessment tools or techniques in themselves. For instance, risk registers were 
highlighted in each document to support risk assessment, and can even be 
applicable to all stages of risk assessment. However, they are a database to keep 
risk records. Indeed, risk registers are defined as “a database that holds the main 
record of all identified risks to the trust’s objectives and operations.” (pg 7, Risk 
Management Strategy and Policy, Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust).  
It was clear from the reviewed documents that a central tool in hospital risk 
assessment practice is the use of risk matrices. Risk matrices were recommended 
to be used to determine the level of risk, to evaluate the tolerability of a risk, and 
to allocate resources for risk treatment. They were found to be embedded in the 
risk assessment system and, therefore, the efficiency of their use should have a 
strong influence on risk assessment performance. Therefore, the following 
section looks at risk matrices in more detail.  
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4.3.3 RISK MATRICES  
Since risk matrices are core to organisation-wide risk assessment, the documents 
collected were reviewed to investigate the risk matrices currently being used. 
Findings revealed that 99 out of 100 hospitals provided a standard 5x5 risk matrix 
which consists of a consequence and likelihood axes. The consequence (C) axis 
was categorised with nominal descriptors, and a score from 1 to 5 is assigned for 
each descriptor as follows: negligible=1, minor=2, moderate=3, major=4 and 
catastrophic=5. Likewise, the likelihood (L) axis scale most often used was: 
rare=1, unlikely=2, possible=3, likely=4 and almost certain=5. Since a score is 
assigned to both consequence and likelihood, risk scores are estimated by 
multiplying consequence and likelihood scores to categorise the level of risk or 
risk rating (e.g. low, moderate, high and extreme) (Figure 4.1). 
         
             Figure 4.1 A standard risk matrix 
 
4.3.3.1 Characteristics of risk matrices 
Figure 4.2 illustrates every type of risk matrix used and by how many hospitals. 
Each risk matrix type is identified with a unique code from M1 to M28. In total, 
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there were 28 different risk matrices defined, of which M9 was by far the most 
commonly used.  
 
Figure 4.2 Risk matrix types (the number of acute trusts used) 
 
Coloured bands represent the level of risk (risk rating) categories, the tolerability 
of a risk and the level of management action needed. For example, a green band 
(a risk score of 1-3) on the risk matrix of M9 represents low risk, a yellow band (a 
risk score of 4-6) represents moderate risk, an orange band (a risk score of 8-12) 
represents high risk, and a red band (a risk score of 15-25) represents extreme 
risk. Similarly, a risk matrix with three coloured bands categorises risk levels as 
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDED RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
 
 73 
low, moderate and high; and one with five coloured bands categorises risk levels 
as very low, low, moderate, high and extreme. It was found that 23 percent use a 
risk matrix with three coloured bands, almost 71 percent use one with four 
coloured bands and 6 percent use one with five coloured bands.  
Although coloured bands are used to determine the tolerability of a risk, only 28 
percent of hospitals stated the link between band colour and risk tolerability on 
their policies and procedures. For instance, if M9 is used, a green band represents 
tolerable risks, a yellow band and an orange band represent undesirable risks and 
a red band represents intolerable risks. The majority of hospitals instead 
mentioned the acceptability of a risk; however, they did not provide much 
information on which risks were acceptable or which ones were not despite the 
fact that Trusts have a list of events which are not acceptable, called never 
events, and which include wrong site surgery, wrong route administration of 
medication and falls from poorly restricted windows (NHS England 2015a). 
Additionally, the review of the collected dataset showed that nine hospitals use 
asymmetrical risk matrices, namely M11, M12, M13, M15, M18, M22 and M28. In 
an asymmetrical risk matrix, a risk score can be assigned to different risk levels. 
For instance, a risk score of 5 (L:5 x C:1 or L:1 x C:5) can be assigned both to 
moderate and high risk levels in risk matrix M11. 
To determine the level of management action, hospitals provided guidance based 
on the coloured bands. The level of management action comprises the 
distribution of responsibilities, the determination of action prioritisation and the 
assignment of risk review frequency. Table 4.3 provides examples of this. 
However, the specific management actions can vary from hospital to hospital. 
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Table 4.3 Level of management action for each coloured band 
Coloured Bands 
Management 
Responsibility  
Action Prioritisation 
Review 
Frequency 
3 Coloured bands 
   
Green band (Low)  
Orange band (Moderate)  
Red band (High) 
Ward/ department 
Division/ Directorate   
Board 
No immediate action required  
Action required  
Immediate action required 
Annually 
Quarterly      
Monthly 
 
4 Coloured bands 
   
Green band (Low) 
Yellow band (Moderate) 
Orange band (High)  
Red band (Extreme) 
Ward/ department 
Division 
Directorate  
Board 
No immediate action required  
Action required  
Action required  
Immediate action required 
Annually 
Quarterly 
Monthly 
Monthly  
 
5 Coloured bands    
Dark green band (Very low) 
Green band (Low) 
Yellow band (Moderate)  
Orange band (High) 
Red band (Extreme) 
 Ward/ department 
Ward/ department 
Division 
Directorate 
Board 
No action required 
No immediate action required  
Action required  
Action required  
Immediate action required 
Annually           
Bi-annually 
Quarterly 
Monthly  
Monthly 
 
Hospitals may well provide different guidelines for scoring risks as well as 
different risk matrices, which may lead to a different decision being made on the 
management of the same risk, although it must be noted that their practical use 
may in any case differ from the recommendations. 
4.3.3.2 Consequence and likelihood scoring guidance 
All hospitals provided nominal descriptors to score consequence and likelihood 
(e.g. negligible and minor; rare and unlikely). However, although the majority of 
hospitals provided further guidance for scoring consequence and some for 
likelihood, none provided any justification for their recommended guidance. 
85 out of 99 hospitals offered detailed guidance for scoring consequence, all of 
which were based on a single report, A risk matrix for risk managers (NPSA 2008). 
These hospitals provided explanations for each nominal descriptor by considering 
each consequence domain (i.e. impact on safety, quality, human resources, 
statutory requirements, reputation, business objectives, finance, service 
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interruption and the environment). For instance, a nominal descriptor of 
negligible is explained as “minimal injury requiring no/minimal intervention or 
treatment” by considering the consequence domain of impact on the safety 
(NPSA 2008). 
In relation to the guidance provided for the likelihood scoring, this was provided 
in three different ways: (1) by explaining each score on a nominal descriptor (e.g. 
L:1=rare and L:2=unlikely), (2) by providing a time-based frequency scale (e.g. 
L:1=not expected to occur for years, L:2=annually, L:3=monthly, L:4=weekly and 
L:5=daily), and (3) by using probability (e.g. L:1= <0.1% and L:5= >50%). While 
almost all (96 out of 99) hospitals used a nominal descriptor, almost two in five 
(40) hospitals additionally provided time-based explanations, and slightly more 
(44) hospitals additionally provided probabilistic explanations of each score. 
However, only one in four (25) hospitals provided all these types of guidance, and 
no guidelines were provided relating to when to use nominal descriptor, time-
based frequency scale or probability scale. 
A variety of probability scoring guidance was provided alongside 12 different 
probability scoring schemes. For instance, a risk with the probability of 10% can 
be scored as 1 (with the guidance of L:1=0-10%, L:2=11-30%, L:3=31-70%, L:4=71-
90% and L:5=90-100% in the use of M9) and yet in others can be scored as 5 (with 
the guidance of  L:1=1 in 100000, L:2=1 in 10000, L:3=1 in 1000, L:4=1 in 100 and 
L:5=1 in 10 in the use of M2). Similarly, a risk with a probability of 50% can be 
scored as 5 in most of the hospitals, but can also be rated as 3 in a number of 
other hospitals.  
Additionally, only sixteen hospitals provided further guidance in scoring a risk 
where there might be multiple potential consequences in the same consequence 
domain. To illustrate this concept, a risk of a patient falling on a ward could lead 
to outcomes of different severity: no harm (C:1 x L:4), minor cuts and bruises (C:2 
x L:3), hip fracture (C:4 x L:2), or death (C:5 x L:1). Of those who provided 
guidance, five advised the worst-case scenario strategy; four advised the highest 
risk score strategy; one advised the most likely scenario strategy; and six advised 
the reasonably foreseeable worst-case scenario strategy. For example, following 
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the worst case scenario strategy would lead to death being determined, and, in 
turn, to a score of 5 (C:5 x L:1); whereas following the most likely scenario 
strategy would lead to no harm being determined, and, in turn, to a score of 4 
(C:1 x L:4). Both, however, could lead to biased decisions being made on the 
management of risks. 
4.4 DISCUSSION 
The findings in this chapter show that most of the hospitals which responded 
consider risk as something negative (e.g. an adverse event or a threat to 
objectives), and few hospitals provided a clear description for all risk assessment 
terms (e.g. risk, hazard and risk assessment) in their policies and procedures. 
Although it is arguable whether hospitals need to explain every single risk term in 
their policies and procedures, providing a common understanding of terminology 
is considered to improve the effectiveness of risk assessment practice (Lyon and 
Hollcroft 2012). The problems with the misuse of risk terminology have been 
highlighted not only in healthcare but also in other industries (Aven 2012a; Aven 
2010; Johansen and Rausand 2015; Mullai 2006). For instance, the terms of risk 
and issue have been interchangeably used (NHS England 2015c); and risk 
assessment can also be interchangeably used with risk management (Mullai 
2006). 
Although risk assessment terms were not clearly defined in these policies and 
procedures, the risk assessment process itself is explained in all documents. It 
was revealed that risk assessment is predominantly undertaken using risk 
matrices. While other techniques and tools were mentioned as supporting risk 
assessment practice, some are not applicable to all steps of the risk assessment 
process. Furthermore, some of the ones that are applicable to all steps of the risk 
assessment process are claimed to be used infrequently, and if used, they can be 
used without training (Card et al. 2012b; Dul et al. 2012; Gray and Cohen 2012; 
Vincent et al. 2013; Ward et al. 2010).  
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Since current hospital risk assessment practice predominantly utilises risk 
matrices, the success of this practice is highly dependent on the use of risk 
matrices. However, the findings of this research reveal a number of issues with 
the guidance given on the use of risk matrices. Moreover, there are a number of 
inherent limitations identified in the literature regarding risk matrices (Ale et al. 
2015; Ball & Watt 2013; Baybutt 2015; Card et al. 2013; Cox 2008; Cox & Popken 
2007; Duijm 2015; Smith et al. 2009; Vatanpour et al. 2015). For instance, a risk 
matrix can only assess an individual risk at any one time (Cox 2008; Baybutt 
2015), and quantitatively low risk ratings can be assigned to qualitatively high risk 
rating categories (e.g. high and moderate) (Cox 2008; Cox et al. 2005). 
4.4.1 PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF RISK 
MATRICES 
The review of the risk assessment policies and procedures reveal a lack of clarity 
in the guidance provided in the following areas: the meaning of coloured bands, 
what to do when a risk could result in different consequences, which likelihood 
scoring scheme to use and in what circumstances, and the risk scoring strategy. 
The bands on the risk matrices are designed to represent the tolerability of a risk 
(e.g. a green band refers to tolerable risks) (Macdonald 2004; BSI 2010). 
However, not all hospitals used this function of risk matrices. Hospitals instead 
used coloured bands to determine the level of a risk and the level of 
management action needed. In fact, considering the low reliability of risk scoring, 
the tolerability of a risk might require consideration of many other factors as part 
of the risk management strategy, in addition to likelihood and consequence. 
These factors include the detectability of a risk, the rapidity with which the risk 
will manifest itself and legal requirements (COSO 2012; Suddle 2009; ORR 2015). 
Yet, no mention was found in the collected documents to justify this as being a 
part of risk management strategy. 
The majority of hospitals provided descriptions for scoring the consequence for 
different domains (e.g. for the impact on safety and reputation). However, no 
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guidance was found detailing what to do when a risk could result in different 
consequences for different domains. For instance, a potentially delayed cancer 
treatment might result in severe harm to patients as well as patient complaints 
and reputational damage at different scoring levels. This, however, can be 
considered as a limitation of the use of risk matrices. Risk matrices evaluate risks 
by considering a single consequence domain. To address this problem, 
aggregating or combining analysed risks has been recommended (BSI 2011b). 
Similarly, Card et al. (2013) suggested compiling an index of total assessed risk 
score. This allows risk assessors to consider all types of consequence domains as 
well as all potential consequences in the same consequence domain. However, 
there is no evidence found in the literature to support the effectiveness of such 
an approach.  
Turning to guidance for scoring likelihood, hospitals provided different types of 
likelihood scales (i.e. nominal, time-framed and probability), and yet none of the 
hospitals provided any further guidance on when to use which type of likelihood 
scoring scale. Regarding suggestions to clarify which scales to use and when, it 
was stated, “Probability scores have been developed for projects and business 
objectives” (NPSA 2008). Similarly, Duijm (2015) recommends using probability 
for one-off projects and frequency for continuous operations. 
It was also not always clear from the collected dataset what to do when a risk 
might result in different severity of consequences in the same consequence 
category. For instance, a risk of patient fall could result in different severities of 
harm such as no harm, minor cuts, or hip fractures. Some hospitals, however, 
provided a range of strategies for such circumstances. These strategies were 
namely adopting the worst-case scenario, the highest risk score, the most likely 
scenario or the reasonably foreseeable worst-case scenario. However, the worst-
case scenario might lead to an over consideration of the most extreme cases; the 
most likely scenario might ignore the extreme cases; and the highest risk score 
scenario might require the measurement of risk scores for all possibilities, which 
could be considered to be time consuming. Although consideration of the 
reasonably foreseeable worst case scenario might also lead to the multiple 
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possibilities having to be worked out, this strategy is also recommended in the 
literature, where it is referred to as the worst credible case scenario (Pasquini et 
al. 2011; ORR 2015; AFSC 2000; Manuele 2014). 
4.4.2 PROBLEMS WITH THE DESIGN OF CURRENTLY USED RISK 
MATRICES 
Design-related problems primarily relate to the replacement of risk ratings by risk 
scores, and to the placement of the borders of the coloured bands. 
 
Figure 4.3 A quantitative risk matrix for M9 
 
Hospitals replace risk ratings (a combination of consequence and likelihood 
values) by risk scores (multiplying consequence and likelihood scores, typically a 
score of between 1 and 25). At the same time, they use the real world 
descriptions for consequence (e.g. minimal injury, minor injury, major injury 
leading to long-term incapacity and death) and likelihood (not expected to occur 
for years, annually, monthly, weekly and daily) axes. However, the product of 
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consequence and likelihood scores will bear little relationship to the underlying 
risk ratings. For instance, a risk score of 25 is not 25 times as bad as a risk score of 
1 from the description of the consequence and likelihood. To illustrate this 
concept, Figure 4.3 shows the significance of the risk ratings between the lower 
right and upper left corner as being £0 to over £500,000, instead of 1 to 25. Thus, 
the use of risk scores might mislead assessors in determining the significance of a 
risk, especially when comparing one risk to another.  
While discussion here was about the replacement of risk ratings by risk scores, 
there are also limitations inherent to the use of qualitative risk rating categories 
(e.g. low, moderate and high). It has been claimed that the nominal descriptors 
(e.g. negligible and minor; rare and unlikely) are a simplification to make risk 
related decisions; identical qualitative risk ratings can be assigned to 
quantitatively different risk ratings; and quantitatively small risks could be 
assigned to a high qualitative risk rating categories (Cox 2008; Cox et al. 2005). 
Such limitations are demonstrated in Figure 4.3 by the use of the M9 risk matrix. 
The descriptions of the likelihood and consequence axes are used: L:1 for p<0.1%, 
L:2 for p=0.1-1%, L:3 for p=1-10%, L:4 for p=10-50%, and L:5 for p>50% for 
likelihood; and C:1 for no claim, C:2 for claim less than £10,000, C:3 for 
claim(s)between £10,000 and £100,000, C:4 for claims between £100,000 and £1 
million and C:5 for claims more than £1 million for consequence (NPSA 2008). 
Figure 4.3 shows that a quantitative risk rating of £10,000 can be assigned to high 
or extreme risk rating categories. Furthermore, a risk score of 8, for instance, can 
be assigned to the quantitative risk rating of £1,000 to £5,000 (L:4 x C:2) as well 
as £100 to £10,000 (L:2 x C:4). These examples show that the use of risk scores as 
well as qualitative risk ratings categories can mislead assessors in determining the 
true value of the risks.  
Some hospitals were found to use such asymmetrical risk matrices, where a risk 
score can be assigned to different risk rating categories when using the same risk 
matrix. Such matrices do not use the product of consequence and likelihood 
scores to establish risk rating categories. For example, a risk of incomplete orders 
of intraocular lenses might be something that hospitals could face at all times 
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(with a likelihood score of 5). However, they could manage this situation before it 
leads to any significant consequences (with a consequence score of 1). On the 
other hand, a risk of failure to the manual handling of infectious blood samples 
might be something which is not expected (with a likelihood score of 1), yet it 
could lead to multiple organ failure and death (with a consequence score of 5). 
While both risks are scored as 5 (L:5 x C:1 and L:1 x C:5), the latter situation is 
something far less desirable than the former. However, the use of risk scores 
assigns them to the same risk level; whereas the use of M22, which is an 
asymmetrical risk matrix, would assign the former as a low risk and the latter as a 
high risk. While technically this could be considered as an inconsistency in the use 
of risk matrices, practically it can be explained as a result of organisational 
strategy. These hospitals may have designed the coloured bands on the risk 
matrices by determining risk ratings rather instead of risk scores. However, no 
rationale has been found to explain why these hospitals use asymmetrical risk 
matrices.  
Additionally, results show that two risk matrices (M3 and M6, see Figure 4.2) 
share an edge between green and red cells even if there is an intermediate band 
between green and red cells. Cox (2008) criticises this matrix design since it could 
lead to categorising risks incorrectly and recommends adding an intermediate 
band between green and red cells. Indeed, all hospitals that reviewed in this 
study use risk matrices with at least one intermediate band. However, Cox (2008) 
also warned that having two or more intermediate bands could also lead to 
incorrectly categorising the risk ratings, and 77 percent of the hospitals have two 
or more intermediate bands. The limitations inherent in risk matrix designs, 
therefore, increase the risk of misprioritisation. 
4.4.3 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF RISK 
MATRICES 
There are some limitations inherent to the use of risk matrices which also apply 
to the risk matrices currently used in hospitals. 
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The risk rating is assigned to the risk matrix by simply determining the likelihood 
and consequence of the risk. However, this simplification has recently been 
criticised by some researchers and it is recommended that additional factors are 
considered (Aven 2017; Khorsandi and Aven 2017; Askeland et al. 2017). These 
factors include determination of the uncertainty about the events and their 
consequences, and the strength of knowledge of the assessors (Aven 2011; Aven 
2012b; Aven and Krohn 2014). On one hand, these factors may indeed help 
better estimate the real value of risks. The strength of knowledge of assessors 
can be evaluated by considering data used for the assessment, the justification 
for the assumptions made, and by reaching agreement between the assessors 
regarding the assessment (Aven 2017). On the other hand, it adds more 
complexity to the current practice, which may be undesirable in hospitals under 
current circumstances.  
A risk matrix can only assess an individual risk at any one time (Cox 2008; Baybutt 
2015), which limits the understanding of the links between different risks. Many 
of the risks immediately evident are linked to other less visible risks: for instance, 
a risk to inpatient bed capacity may be linked to delays in surgery, and delays in 
discharge. However, other tools and techniques can be also used with risk 
matrices to address this challenge. For instance, FMEA may help to identify all 
undesired events in relation to the system to be assessed, and the bow-tie 
technique may help in understanding the pathways of a risk from its sources to 
consequences (BSI 2010). However, FMEA still works on a single failure 
assumption. Furthermore, there is little evidence to show that such tools, 
especially the bow-tie, are used in healthcare (Broggi et al. 2013; 
Chatzimichailidou et al. 2017; Lago et al. 2012; Wierenga et al. 2009) and thus 
understanding of risk relationships may remain poor. 
Subjectivity also impacts the effectiveness of risk matrices. While a qualitative 
risk rating system itself involves some subjectivity (Cox 2008), cognitive bias leads 
to subjectivity in judgements as a result of different perspectives stemming from 
job function or seniority, personal experiences and the level of confidence (Ball 
and Watt 2013; Hubbard and Evans 2010; HSE 2001; Smith et al. 2009). 
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Furthermore, individuals might purposefully be subjective. Risks can also be 
deliberately understated or overstated in order to avoid or gain management 
attention. For instance, a study revealed that the patient risk of metal phosphide 
poisoning was overstated due to the ethical and legal issues involved (Nocera et 
al. 2000). Suggestions to overcome these problems include the use of 
quantitative data, risk scoring guidance and a separate risk matrix for each 
consequence domain (e.g. financial and harm related consequences), as well as 
through the involvement of team assessment, and peer review (Card et al. 2013; 
Duijm 2015; Aven 2012a). Since data in healthcare might not be easily quantified, 
providing better guidance on scoring risks and encouraging staff to use this 
guidance may be helpful to overcome bias in decisions. However, anecdotal 
evidence so far shows that healthcare staff might score risks without 
consideration of the descriptors behind the scores. As a result, different 
individuals might score the same risk differently even in the same hospital. 
In summary, there are a number of limitations to using risk matrices explored in 
this section that might lead to errors in risk prioritisation and inadequate 
resource allocation. However, there are also real advantages to using the risk 
matrices as a tool in assessing risks. A risk matrix helps to visualise risks through 
using coloured cells, and there is no need for expertise to use this tool (Cox 2008; 
Thomas et al. 2014). These features make the risk matrices the most commonly 
used tool to assess risks in hospitals. 
In order to obtain greater benefit from the use of risk matrices, the gaps in 
current practice need to be addressed, although it must be noted that simplicity 
is a key attraction of risk matrices particularly in a hospital context. Bearing this in 
mind, the following pages provide suggestions for potential improvements to the 
currently-used risk matrices in hospitals. 
Due to the limitations of risk scoring and risk matrices, one recommendation 
might be to replace the risk scoring mechanism with a risk rating mechanism and 
to use a risk matrix with three coloured bands. However, the use of a qualitative 
risk rating mechanism would require more time to prioritise risks since all risk 
ratings are assigned to three categories (e.g. low, moderate and high). There are 
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also limitations inherent to qualitative risk rating, as mentioned earlier. While the 
use of a quantitative risk rating mechanism may overcome some of the 
limitations of qualitative risk rating, quantification may limit the main attraction 
of risk matrices. For example, quantification of data in healthcare might not be 
easy and it might be unreliable in some cases. Therefore, it is essential to be 
aware of the limitations inherent to the risk matrices used, and not to solely rely 
on risk scores when making risk-based decisions.  
Building on the all discussions so far, further recommendations on use of risk 
matrices in English acute hospitals can be summarised as follows: 
 Clarify the terminology used in risk assessment. 
 Introduce guidance on what to do when a risk has several consequences 
in multiple domains (e.g. a single risk may lead to personal injury, 
economic loss or reputational damage).  
 Clarify which likelihood scoring scheme (i.e. nominal, time-framed and 
probability) to use in which circumstances. 
 Clarify how risk should be scored where a range of consequence could 
occur with different likelihoods (e.g. a risk of patient fall could lead to no 
harm, minor cuts or hip fracture with different likelihoods). 
 Remind risk assessors that risk scores might show little relation to the real 
risk rating, and, therefore, a balanced and unbiased professional 
judgement should be involved when making risk-based decisions. 
 Remind risk assessors that a risk matrix is not a tool for them to make 
decisions; but rather is one of several methods designed to support their 
decisions. 
Indeed, hospitals may assess risks by considering multiple other factors. These 
other factors may include a consideration of the cost of recommended actions, 
the ease of these actions, their implementation time, the urgency of mitigating 
the risk, and social and organisational factors (Baybutt 2015; Haimes 2012; 
Ruzante et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2010; Choo et al. 2010). Thus, the risk 
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assessment may involve professional judgement to determine all these factors in 
conjunction with the use of risk matrices.  
While a number of recommendations have been made regarding current 
recommended risk assessment practice, the limitations of this analysis should 
also be mentioned. The main limitation of this study is that the reviewed risk 
management policies and procedures may not reflect the actual practice of risk 
assessment. In practice, these documents may seldom be referred to, and could 
in turn be considered only as a paperwork exercise rather than fulfilling their 
purpose of providing good guidance on risk assessment. However, this study 
aimed to reveal ‘work as described’, while the next chapter investigates ‘work as 
done’ to reveal actual practice. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the recommended risk assessment practice in acute 
hospitals in NHS England through the analysis of risk assessment policies and 
procedures. The findings of this chapter revealed that risk matrices play a key role 
on organisation-wide risk assessment practice, and different hospitals might use 
different types of risk matrices by providing a different level of guidance. 
However, the main concerns identified here are the adequacy of the guidance 
provided and the limitations inherent to the risk matrices. Risk matrices may be 
being used inappropriately by hospitals, who may then inadvertently reach 
inadequate decisions and inadequately deploy resources to manage risks. While 
there is not a magical solution to improve the current design and the use of risk 
matrices, hospitals can improve their current recommended risk assessment 
practices by providing better guidance on risk scoring and risk terminology as well 
as by encouraging their staff to identify and understand the limitations inherent 
to risk matrices.  
The following chapter presents evidence regarding actual risk assessment 
practice as currently conducted in hospitals in NHS England. 
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CHAPTER 5  
ACTUAL RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE IN 
HOSPITALS IN NHS ENGLAND 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO ACTUAL PRACTICE 
This chapter explores the actual risk assessment practices, ‘work as done’, in 
hospitals in NHS England. A set of exploratory studies was conducted to gain an 
understanding of overall risk assessment practice, to reveal the practical 
experience of NHS staff of risk assessment practice, and to highlight the 
challenges within current risk assessment practice. This was undertaken through 
conducting interviews and questionnaires, investigating a risk register database, 
and reviewing the Board Assurance Framework (BAF) documents. 
At the end of this chapter, the overall risk assessment practice is explained, and a 
number of requirements are identified for the design of a proposed risk 
assessment approach in hospitals. 
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5.2 OBSERVATIONS FROM INTERVIEWS 
5.2.1 METHODS 
Informal and formal interviews took place in order to reveal the practical 
experience of NHS staff of risk assessment in hospitals. A purposive sampling 
technique was used to ensure participants had sufficient experience of risk 
assessment, and to involve existing contacts of the research group at the 
Engineering Design Centre in this study. The inclusion criterion for both the 
informal and formal interviews was to select participants who have been involved 
in at least one risk assessment. 
Informal unstructured interviews took place with five NHS staff from a single 
acute teaching Trust, to extend the researcher’s understanding of the current risk 
assessment practice as well as to understand participants’ experience in risk 
assessment. Interviews were arranged by sending invitation emails to existing 
contacts working at the single acute care teaching Trust. The interview date and 
time were arranged according to the availability of each participant. Following 
that face-to face interviews were conducted, and written notes were taken 
during the interviews. All data from the interviews were recorded on the 
researcher’s office computer after removing all personal information (if there was 
any) and a unique code was added for each participant.  
Formal semi-structured interviews took place with twelve NHS staff from multiple 
Trusts to understand participants’ experiences in risk assessment. Questions for 
the formal interviews were developed by the researcher based on the literature 
findings with some input from the research team (see Appendix 5 for the 
interview schedule). Interviews were arranged through sending invitation emails 
to potential participants. In addition to the use of existing contacts, the 
researcher identified potential participants through reviewing profiles of NHS 
staff on LinkedIn. The selection of these participants was based on their profile 
information to ensure they have sufficient experience of risk assessment. After 
filtering their profiles based on their job titles, a number of participants were 
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selected and sent the invitation email. The information sheet (see Appendix 6) 
and interview schedule (see Appendix 5) were also attached in the email. 
Telephone interviews were preferred to allow healthcare staff from different 
geographical regions to participate without the barrier of travel. However, there 
was a bias towards participants from the East of England for practical reasons so 
as to allow face-to-face interviews, where possible, in addition to telephone 
interviews.  
After receiving approval from participants in the formal interviews, the interview 
time was arranged and a consent form (see Appendix 7) was sent via email. 
Informed consent was obtained either verbally prior to the interview or as a 
signed form. At the beginning of the formal interview, participants were informed 
about the research study. Then, interviews were audio recorded with the 
permission of the participants. After the transcription of the audio recordings, a 
unique code was added for each participant. All data were then analysed 
anonymously.  
Collected data from the formal interviews were analysed to identify key themes 
in participants’ understanding of risk assessment. To do so, inductive thematic 
analysis was used. Transcripts were read, and coded by the researcher. The 
coding processes were manually conducted by reading the printed transcripts. 
First-cycle coding was conducted to list all codes. Second-cycle coding focused on 
the relationships between different categories to identify key themes. To reduce 
bias, discussions were made with three researchers on the emerging themes. 
After that, codes were clustered under five different themes: 
 Description of risk assessment 
 Experience of conducting a risk assessment 
 Experience with the use of an organisational risk matrix 
 Experience with the use of risk assessment guidelines 
 Difficulties of conducting risk assessments. 
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5.2.2 RESULTS FROM INFORMAL INTERVIEWS 
Since the informal interviews were unstructured and not audio recorded, results 
only present the key observations based on the notes taken. Five informal 
unstructured interviews were conducted with healthcare staff from a single acute 
teaching hospital. Characteristics of these participants are given in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Characteristics of the participants for informal interview 
Identifier Interview Type  Position 
F1 Face-to-face Health and Safety Officer 
F2 Face-to-face Head of Patient Safety 
F3 Face-to-face Assistant Director-Risk and Patient Safety 
F4 Face-to-face Datix System Manager 
F5 Face-to-face Risk and Quality Advisor 
 
Informal unstructured interviews were held between 2014 and 2015. The 
researcher arranged meetings for an hour and the duration of each interview was 
approximately 45 minutes. Interviews were conducted primarily to extend the 
researcher’s understanding of the current risk assessment practice and to 
understand participants’ experiences of current risk assessment practice. Thus, 
the researcher started the conversations by asking general questions such as 
“How is risk assessment conducted?”, “Which tools are used to conduct risk 
assessments?”, “Who conducts risk assessments?”, and “How does the risk 
register system work?”. Although there were some other topics that were 
discussed with participants such as in incident reporting systems, patient 
discharge problems, and health and safety manuals, these parts were not 
mentioned in this section since they were found to be less relevant to this 
research study. 
It was observed that a health and safety officer (F1) had a slightly different view 
than other participants. He was confident about the assessment of health and 
safety related risks in the hospital. F1 also claimed that their practice meets with 
the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. Others, 
however, predominantly focused on the negative sides of the current risk 
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assessment practices in the hospital. This could be due to the fact that health and 
safety risk assessments tend to be conducted by the health and safety staff, 
whereas other types of risks tend to be assessed by clinical staff, who have less 
experience of risk assessment. 
Participants gave two ways in which risk assessments were conducted, either by 
completing a risk assessment form or registering a risk through the use of Trust’s 
risk register system. The risk register system is a database that can be easily 
accessed through Trust’s intranet page, and it contains multiple steps that 
require the involvement of multiple staff from different levels. Front line staff 
register risks, and risk leads approve these entries as well as making adjustments 
to them if necessary. Following that, the assigned level of staff decides whether 
or not to take any action, with the decision based on the level of risks. If the 
assigned level of staff cannot resolve these risks, these risks are escalated to a 
more senior level.  
F2 explained that a risk matrix with 3 coloured bands is embedded in the risk 
register system to prioritise risks. Risk owners score likelihood and consequence 
of the risk from 1 to 5, and then assign the risk scores (1 to 25) to the Trusts’ risk 
matrix. A higher risk score gets a higher priority in terms of the management of 
the risk. A risk score of 15 or above is deemed a high risk; a risk score of between 
8 and 15 a moderate risk; and below 8 a low risk. However, F4 stated that risks 
are over scored in order to attract managerial-level attention to solve an existing 
problem. F2 and F3 pointed out the subjectivity of risk scoring on the risk register 
system. Similarly, F5 stated that “different people have scored the same thing in 
very different ways”. This could be a result of healthcare staff scoring risks using 
their professional judgement rather than basing them on the explanations behind 
each likelihood and consequence score.  
Although the risk register system is in place in the Trust, participants highlighted a 
number of problems with its use. For instance, F2 said “People tend to use the risk 
register system to get money or to cover their back by claiming that they warned 
the managerial level through registering risks.” F1 claimed that the approval 
process can take too long and suggested that it requires a time limit (e.g. 72 
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hours), after which the entry, should be removed from the approval page. 
Indeed, F5 stated that there are a lot of risk assessments awaiting approval in 
some divisions, which discourages people from undertaking future risk 
assessments. In addition, F5 also pointed out that while the risks are registered, 
often no subsequent action is taken. 
When participants were asked “Who should be involved in a risk assessment 
practice?” they all gave the same response, claiming that everybody should be 
involved. However, they all admitted that this does not happen in practice, and it 
is often only a few staff who are involved in risk assessments. Yet, it was also 
observed that participants were keen to improve their current risk assessment 
practice. For instance, F4 was working on a project to upgrade the Trust’s risk 
management system, and F5 and F3 were keen to use prospective hazard analysis 
techniques. However, F5 highlighted that very few people have training on such 
techniques, except RCA techniques are a commonly used in the Trust. F1, who 
delivers risk assessment courses, also claimed that the Trust needs more training 
for all staff. 
Although these results only reflect the participants’ views in risk assessment or 
the researcher’s observations from these unstructured interviews, F3 stated that 
his experience with other Trusts’ risk assessment practices was similar to that of 
his current Trust. He also added that some Trusts might be better in some areas, 
such as in the assessment of strategic risks, and others are better in other aspects 
such as operational risk assessments.  
5.2.3 RESULTS FROM FORMAL INTERVIEWS 
Twelve formal semi-structured interviews were conducted with healthcare staff 
from seven different Trusts and two other organisations (NHS England and a 
consultancy company). Eleven interviewees gave permission to audio record the 
interview. One interviewee preferred not to be recorded, but allowed the 
researcher to take some notes during the interview. The average length of time 
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spent in an each interview was 46 minutes. The characteristics of the participants 
for the formal interviews are provided in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Characteristics of participants for formal interviews 
Id
e
n
ti
fi
e
r 
Interview 
Type 
Interview 
Duration 
Type of 
Trust 
Job Title 
Years of 
Experience 
in NHS 
Safety and Risk 
Management Training 
T1 Telephone 46 mins Acute Head of 
integrated 
clinical 
governance 
38 Risk assessment, risk 
management, FMEA 
and RCA 
T2 Telephone 26 mins Mental 
health 
Team leader 27 Risk assessment and 
suicide prevention 
F6 Face-to-face 48 mins Acute 
teaching 
An 
anaesthetist 
9 Simulator training 
T3 Telephone 49 mins Other Head of 
patient safety 
investigation 
33 Risk management 
T4 Telephone 34 mins Acute Clinical 
engineer 
7 Managing safely, RCA 
and risk management 
T5 Telephone 53 mins Acute Clinical 
engineer 
10 Risk assessment 
T6 Telephone 36 mins Mental 
health 
Team leader 15 Risk assessment and 
risk management 
T7 Telephone 45 mins Mental 
health 
Patient safety 
practitioner 
15 Risk assessment 
T8 Telephone 60 mins Other Risk 
management 
consultant 
10 Health and safety risk 
assessment 
T9 Telephone 42 mins Acute 
teaching 
Quality 
improvement 
fellow 
16 Risk management 
F7 Face-to-face 69 mins Acute 
Specialist 
Head of 
nursing 
30 Risk assessment, RCA 
and risk management 
T10 Telephone 50 mins Acute 
Specialist 
Risk manager 30 Health and safety, risk 
management, RCA, 
IOSH, risk officer and 
human factors 
 
Table 5.2 shows that participants were involved from a range of Trusts, including 
acute, acute teaching, mental health and acute specialist. The average number of 
years of experience per participant was 20 years. All participants had received at 
least a single safety-training programme. 
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5.2.3.1 Description of risk assessment 
Four participants claimed that risk assessment is something they do 
unconsciously at all times. For instance, T2 described the risk assessment as “your 
sub-conscious”. F6 explained it as “learnt behaviour” and highlighted that 
everyone does it differently. Likewise, T4 expressed it as “judgement of the 
consequences of the incident” and T7 as “having a good conversation with an 
individual to find out what is going on”. T8 and F7 highlighted that risk 
assessment is used to prevent patient harm. However, some other participants 
provided a wider perspective for the aim of risk assessment by defining it as 
“looking for unforeseen events, which may be positive or negative, and then 
planning and mitigating these events” (T9) or “It covers all variety of risks within 
the hospital including strategic, financial, health and safety and clinical” (T10). T5 
also described risk assessment as a process of risk identification, risk analysis and 
the consideration of control measures to manage that risk.  
Turning to the recommended risk assessment practice, risk assessment was often 
defined as a systematic process of assessing the likelihood of something 
happening and its potential consequence. However, participants provided a 
variety of descriptions for risk assessment, and participants’ roles were found to 
have an impact on their responses. Arfanis et al. also highlighted that people 
from different professions with varied degrees of training and experience possess 
different levels of understanding of risk (Arfanis et al. 2011). For instance, on the 
one hand, all participants working in Mental Health Trusts provided a definition 
that refers to something they do as part of their daily jobs. This could be due to 
the fact that every individual referred to the mental health services should 
receive a risk screening, which involves an overall assessment of the broad areas 
of potential risks (DoH 2010). On the other hand, participants working in acute 
hospitals tend to be involved in risk assessment less frequently and often follow a 
more systematic risk assessment process. 
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5.2.3.2 Experience of conducting a risk assessment 
Six participants shared experience in risk assessment with the use of a risk 
assessment template or form; four with a risk register system; three with RCA, 
two with FMEA; two with a safety walkabout; one with a checklist; and one with 
professional judgement. Clearly, some of the participants mentioned their 
multiple experiences, and the use of these techniques reveal that participants use 
the techniques and tools that are recommended in their organisational risk 
assessment policies and procedures.  
All participants defined their risk assessment experience as a team assessment, or 
at least involving different individuals at different stages of the assessment. 
Three participants described risk assessment experiences based on the risk 
assessment of individual patients. For instance, T2 described her experience with 
a patient coming into accident and emergency who had overdosed with alcohol 
and needed medical treatment. Since the reason behind taking the alcohol 
overdose was not resolved, her team considered that the patient was at risk of 
taking an overdose again. The team assessed the risk through the use of their 
personal judgement. T7 depicted her experience with assessing the risk of self-
harm of a patient while moving her from young patient insecure services to adult 
insecure services through the use of a risk assessment form.  
Five participants stated that their risk assessment experiences came from 
investigating incidents such as patient fall risk assessment (T9) and medical 
device-related incident investigation (T5). Two participants described their 
experiences with health and safety risk assessment, namely the risk assessment 
of trip hazards (T8) and new hospital designs (T10). In addition, two participants 
(T9 and T10) described their role in assessing project risks and strategic risks, and 
three participants (T1, F7 and T10) recounted their role in reviewing risks. 
Overall, the findings show that three ways of assessing risks are used: individual 
patient-based risk assessment through the use of professional judgement, 
operational risk assessments through completing a risk assessment form, and 
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specialised risk assessments through using specific risk assessment forms (e.g. 
suicide and patient falls). In turn, risks are either qualitatively assessed often 
through the use of professional judgement, or semi-quantitatively assessed 
through the use of risk scores.  
5.2.3.3 Experience with the use of organisational risk matrices 
Since the risk matrix is embedded in the risk register system and organisational 
risk assessment forms, the researcher asked further questions regarding their 
experience with risk matrices. Ten out of twelve participants provided their 
opinions on risk matrices used in their Trusts. For instance, T2 found risk matrices 
helpful for supporting conversations about risk, F5 viewed it as a supporting 
mechanism to professional judgement, and T4 found it provided a common 
language. Likewise, T3 claimed, “I think people know risk matrices well”. 
Furthermore, T3 commented that “I quite like [risk matrices], because they make 
people argue less about the numbers”, and T10 found them helpful, saying “The 
risk matrix helps us in a variety of ways: to prioritise risk, to make sure we are 
raising awareness, and to give people the understanding of what needs to go to 
what level of committee and responsibility”.  
However, participants also criticised the risk matrices in terms of the subjectivity 
of the risk scoring (T9) and the danger of risk matrices being another tick-box 
exercise (T8). While subjectivity of the risk scoring can be minimised by the use of 
guidance, all participants admitted that they often do not use risk-scoring 
guidance when they assess risks. However, they claimed that they would talk to 
their colleagues when they are unsure about the score of a risk. 
Additionally, risk matrices were criticised regarding their use in risk prioritisation. 
It was recommended other factors should be considered when prioritising risks 
(T2, T3 and T4). For instance, T3 suggested consideration of “public opinion” or 
“the easiness of the implementation of the recommended actions”. Yet, risk 
matrices were highly appreciated and no alternatives were suggested to replace 
them. 
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The findings overlap with the findings from the previous chapter as well as the 
literature review. The simplicity of risk matrices is their main attraction, and the 
problem with subjective risk scoring is recognised by healthcare staff. 
Nonetheless, none of the participants mentioned the limitations inherent to risk 
matrices. 
5.2.3.4 Experience with the use of risk assessment guidelines 
To guide their assessment of risk, four participants use their Trust’s risk 
assessment policies (e.g. organisational risk assessment policies and clinical risk 
assessment procedures). Two other participants stated that they usually follow 
the NPSA guidance, A risk matrix for risk managers (NPSA 2008) and two others 
follow Health and Safety Executive (HSE) guidance, Five steps to risk assessment 
(HSE 2006a). The remaining four participants stated that they do not really follow 
any guidance when assessing risks, however they know where to find it.  
Most of the participants explained that healthcare staff often do not read 
guidance. For instance, T4 claimed, “I do not think anyone would go though these 
documents” and F7 claimed that “Nobody is reading the guidelines”. 
Furthermore, T9 admitted that “I am sure there are guidelines, but I do not know 
them”, and F7 pointed out that clinical staff would read policies if they feel a 
need for any support to conduct risk assessments.  
Since the reviews of the risk assessment policies in Chapter 4 reveal that they are 
not in most cases adequate to guide healthcare staff in assessing risk, this 
perhaps could be one reason for the participants’ lack of interest in such policies 
to do so. However, when participants were asked their opinion on designing a 
new risk assessment framework to guide them, they responded more positively 
and recommended a number of points for its design. Participants advised that the 
developed framework should fit with their existing risk assessment practice. T3 
pointed out that having a framework that explains all key points of risk 
assessment to be applicable to all types of risks would be useful; T7 stated that 
frameworks would make people think to conduct more effective risk 
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assessments; and T6 thought that “It would help, if somebody sits down and 
designs something like that”. However, T1 advised that “It has to be simple, easy, 
and accessible” and T8 warned, “If it doesn’t fit one size of A4, it is too 
complicated. You have to start incredibly simple”.  
The findings indicate that while there is a recommended practice, actual practice 
does not always follow this. 
5.2.3.5 Difficulties in conducting risk assessments 
The participants outlined a number of challenges which fall into ten categories as 
follows: (1) the application of risk assessment, (2) terminology, (3) training, (4) 
risk communication, (5) risk assessment tools, (6) risk scoring, (7) risk 
prioritisation, (8) time requirement, (9) fear of punitive measures and (10) post-
assessment actions. 
F6 claimed that risk assessment is most likely to be conducted following an 
incident. T7 admitted that they identify risks, but wait for something to happen 
to take action regarding those risks. T3 stated, “People do not understand the 
science behind it [risk assessment], and they make poor decisions”. Additionally, 
T1 and T8 claimed that the root causes of the assessed problems are often not 
identified. T8 and T10 mentioned the lack of attention given to near misses. In 
relation to this, T10 asserted that a very important near miss could have led to 
death if it had gone differently. While participants highlighted a number of 
challenges, they also provided some recommendations for potential 
improvements. For instance, they ascertained that the application of current risk 
assessment practice could be improved by providing training (T3), defining risks 
related to their objectives (T1), encouraging staff to conduct risk assessment 
before harm occurs (T8), understanding the problem (T9) and looking for good 
motivators (T10).  
The majority of the participants, whatever their profession, highlighted issues 
regarding risk terminology, except participants from Mental Health Trusts. T3 
claimed that people often do not know what the definition of risk means; F7 said, 
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“I think the language [risk terminology] is a problem” and, similarly, T10 said 
“They still struggle with the terminology and writing things out.” Conversely, T5 
claimed that the terminology was clear for him and his team, and T8 said that “I 
think our team knows about risk assessment, we try not to use the terminology in 
our team”. To address terminology related issues, participants recommended the 
use of ordinary language. For instance, T3 suggested, “It might be worth using 
plain English”. She then provided an example saying that it is useful to use ‘how 
big and how often’ instead of ‘risk analysis’. 
In addition to this, participants mentioned the problem of training staff in risk 
assessment. T2 suggested “I think there needs to be far more training on doing a 
good risk assessment” and similarly, T10 agreed but added, “We struggle to get 
people to training, purely because of staffing levels”. T3 also highlighted one of 
the consequences of staff not being trained on risk assessment, claiming “If 
people are not trained in risk assessment, they use the risk matrix badly”. To 
provide better training, F6 commented, “If we were trained to be a bit more 
systematic in how we thought, we could explain things better. Risk assessment 
would be much better”. T3 recommended, “I think they do not see enough real 
life examples. All they see is the risk register or risk matrix.” Yet, T8 acknowledged 
“I worked in organisations that changed their culture by training enough people.” 
Participants also mentioned risk communication as a challenge of their risk 
assessment practices. T5 said that “The major barrier is the communication and 
then seeing the output together as a team from start to end.” and F6 declared 
that it is difficult to have conversations about risks and actions required to 
minimise those risks. On providing better communication, T2 recommended that 
“having frank discussion about the risk and not being scared to ask difficult 
questions are the factors leading to good risk assessment.” 
Additionally, T3 claimed that there are only a few tools to assess risks. Yet, T7 
commented that people are seeking more tools to assess risks and they are more 
willing to learn them. 
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Risk scoring was another issue that participants raised. Participants criticised the 
subjectivity of risk scoring and the low reliability of risk prioritisation since it is 
based on risk score. For instance, T1 stated, “They all score it differently”. 
Similarly T5 claimed “Somebody might rate it as a very high risk, but it might not 
be a very high risk” and T3 said “If you do not have the right people in the room, 
you can really get it wrong.” To overcome the problems with risk scoring, F7 
asserted, “I would probably change things down, more than change things up. 
Because I would just think in a bigger picture than perhaps someone who is 
annoyed with that thing at the time”. This requires authority to enact.  
Turning to the problems with risk prioritisation, T8 highlighted the need for 
considering detectability in addition to likelihood and consequence. T8 said, 
“They are using severity and likelihood, but they are not using the third factor, 
which is likelihood of [the failure] being discovered.”  
T7 and T9 identified that undertaking the risk assessment process itself is a 
challenge, since it requires time and their available time is limited. T9 said, “In 
nursing, when you have to do a risk assessment [complete a risk assessment 
form], it is like a six-page document and it takes you forever. And it is not an 
enjoyable process.” These participants mentioned their desire to have shorter 
forms to make the assessment of organisation-wide risks (e.g. clinical and non-
clinical) a quicker process. 
Another issue raised was punishment of the organisation after harm occurs, with 
F7 sharing her concern that “There is a bit of carrot and stick involved. Obviously, 
we do not want any harm to come to our patients, but if we are not doing the 
right thing, we will be punished as an organisation as a result of that”. 
Consequently, Trusts may focus on assessing risks to meet regulatory 
requirements in order not to be punished rather than focusing on risk reduction. 
In addition to these challenges, further difficulties were identified after the 
application of risk assessment. T1 mentioned a problem with post-assessment 
practice by saying “Again, a big gap in the NHS organisations is the action plan. 
So, action plans just disappear. You do your risk assessment, this is what we are 
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going to do about it and no one ever goes back and looks at it.” Other participants 
also agreed with this by stating that problems are defined, but then nothing is 
done about them. T3 also highlighted this, saying “Risk assessment should result 
in a statement, which results in an action. And that is the bit that never ever 
happens”. 
The healthcare literature has already identified some of these challenges such as 
insufficient guidance and biased risk scoring. These interviews with healthcare 
staff indicate that the problems are ongoing. In fact, most of these challenges 
concern the clarification of the foundations of risk assessment practice and its 
application, including how to express risk and how to conduct risk assessment 
(Eidesen et al. 2009). While some of the challenges have also been experienced in 
other industries, such as ambiguity in risk terminology (Aven 2010; Aven and Zio 
2011; Aven and Renn 2009), safety-critical industries have reached a more 
mature safety level and can provide a role model for healthcare to follow (Sujan 
et al. 2015; Vincent et al. 2014). 
In summary, the findings from interviews reveal that different individuals may 
have different views on risk assessment; that a range of techniques can be used 
to support risk assessment by following different risk assessment approaches; 
that ‘work as described’ in relation to risk assessment can be different from ‘work 
as done’; that participants appreciate risk matrices but also recognise the basic 
problems in relation to their use; and that some of the challenges of conducting 
risk assessments have not been addressed yet. 
However, the limitations of the study should also be noted. Firstly, the results of 
this study only reflect the views of participants due to the purposive sampling. It 
is possible that different individuals might conduct risk assessments differently. 
For instance, participants working in Mental Health Trusts focus on the individual 
patient-based risk assessments either assessing risks by using their professional 
judgement or completing a specific risk assessment forms as in self-harm. Clinical 
engineers focus on medical device risk assessments through the use of risk 
assessment forms. Secondly, the relatively low number of participants, and 
having participants from different trusts, can be considered a limitation of this 
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study. Thirdly, the analysis of the interview data may also contain limitations. In 
this study, no further validation was conducted to ensure the reliability of 
analysis other than conducting group discussions with the research team. For 
instance, a second-cycle of interviews could have been conducted to ensure that 
all necessary data were collected from every single interviewer, and key themes 
and interpretations of the researcher were confirmed by participants. To mitigate 
such limitations, further evidence was collected in the next section. 
5.3 EVIDENCE FROM A QUESTIONNAIRE 
5.3.1 METHODS 
A questionnaire was administered to reach additional participants and thereby to 
obtain more evidence of the practical experience of NHS staff. A purposive 
sampling strategy was used to select participants with an understanding of risk 
assessment.  
There were sixteen questions in the questionnaire (see Appendix 8). The 
questions were designed to understand the characteristics of the respondents 
(e.g. their position and organisation type), to reveal respondents’ opinions on 
current practice and to interpret their knowledge of the topic. There were two 
open-ended and fourteen closed-ended questions. For each closed-ended 
question, participants were allowed to write their opinion through an ‘other’ 
option. The research team tested the prepared questionnaire in terms of the 
clarity of questions and time requirement. Both electronic and paper-based 
versions were prepared. The paper-based questionnaire was distributed and 
completed by participants during a healthcare safety event. The electronic 
questionnaire was designed through the use of Qualtrics survey software. It was 
disseminated through posting a questionnaire link to relevant groups on LinkedIn. 
Additionally, invitation emails were sent to the existing contacts. Informed 
consent was obtained through a paragraph at the front of the questionnaire. 
After conducting the questionnaire, all data were recorded on the researcher’s 
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office computer. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) V.24.0 was 
used to analyse questionnaire data in order to reveal evidence of a relationship 
between any two questions, such as between respondents’ profession and the 
respondents’ view on the sufficiency of existing guidance. To this end, the 
responses of nominal and ordinal variables were stored as numerical values (e.g. 
1 to 5 for Likert Scales) and Chi-square tests were conducted. 
5.3.2 RESULTS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
69 responses were received from the questionnaire: 30 paper-based and 39 
electronic. Responses that did not meet the inclusion criteria (n=8) were excluded 
from the study. Table 5.3 lists the characteristics of the 61 respondents. 
Table 5.3 Characteristics of questionnaire respondents 
Characteristics Number (%) 
Profession 
Clinical 41 (67) 
Non-clinical 20 (33) 
Trust type 
Acute  30 (49.2) 
Acute specialist  8 (13.1) 
Mental health  22 (36.1) 
Ambulance  1 (1.6) 
Risk training 
Received 55 (90.2) 
Not received 6 (9.8) 
 
The majority of the respondents (n=41) were clinical staff (e.g. nurses, doctors 
and psychiatrists), working in acute or Mental Health Trusts. Non-clinical 
respondents (n=20) (e.g. risk managers, heads of quality governance and clinical 
engineers) were managerial staff or staff having no direct contact with patients. 
Almost all non-clinical staff (n=19) had received at least one session of safety or 
risk management training (e.g. health and safety, risk assessment and root cause 
analysis). Similarly, a large number of clinical staff (n=36) had received training. 
CHAPTER 5: ACTUAL RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
 
 103 
There were 6 respondents who did not receive any training but who are still 
involved in risk assessment in their working Trusts. 
The majority of the participants were involved in risk assessment. The 
respondents’ frequency of involvement in a risk assessment is presented in Figure 
5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Respondents’ frequency of involvement in a risk assessment  
 
Respondents were asked “What is risk assessment used for?” and they were 
allowed to select multiple options from a range of potential answers. The 
potential answers were based on the literature review findings as well as the 
findings from the previous studies in this thesis, and the responses are 
summarised in Table 5.4.  
             Table 5.4 Responses for the aim of risk assessment 
What is risk assessment used for? Number of responses (%) 
Assessing potential harm 56 (91.8%) 
Registering risk 48 (78.7%) 
Meeting responsibilities 40 (65.6%) 
Investigation of incidents 30 (49.2%) 
Highlighting actions taken 24 (39.3%) 
Assessing who to blame 9 (14.7%) 
Other 10 (16.4%) 
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Note that ten participants selected the option of other in Table 5.4. While some 
of these participants gave a response similar to the provided options, such as 
“reduction of harm”, other responses included “support service, design, 
manufacture and maintenance of medical devices”, “taking preventative actions”, 
“professional performance” and “maximising the well-being of service users”.  
Participants were then asked which tools and techniques they use to assess risks, 
presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Responses for the techniques and methods used to assess risks 
Which methods and techniques do you use to assess risks? Number of responses (%) 
Root cause analysis 42 (68.9%) 
Risk matrix 24 (39.3%) 
Software/ system 16 (26.2%) 
Failure mode and effect analysis 11 (18%) 
Fault tree analysis 9 (14.7%) 
Event tree analysis 9 (14.7%) 
What-If (SWIFT) 8 (13.1%) 
Barrier analysis 8 (13.1%) 
Human reliability analysis 7 (11.5%) 
Hazard and operability analysis 6 (9.8%) 
Other 13 (21.3%) 
 
Additionally, participants were asked how likely they were to find risk assessment 
easy to carry out and how likely they were to conduct a risk assessment following 
an incident. Table 5.6 shows the results. 
Table 5.6 Respondents' view on given statements 
Statements 
Not likely 
at all 
Not very 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
Very likely 
Extremely 
likely 
Risk assessment is easy to 
carry out 
 2 (3.3%) 19 (31.1%) 15 (24.6%) 20 (32.8%) 5 (8.2%) 
Respondent conducts a risk 
assessment following an 
incident 
 
2 (3.3) 
 
7 (11.5) 
 
14 (22.9%) 
 
30 (49.2%) 
 
8 (13.1%) 
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More than half of the respondents found risk assessment easy to carry out. The 
majority claimed that they would conduct a risk assessment following an 
incident. 
When the respondents were asked about current difficulties in conducting risk 
assessment, they selected at least one of the given difficulties outlined in Table 
5.7. Additionally, almost 15 percent of respondents identified additional 
difficulties, which are either very similar to one listed in Table 5.7, or new, such as 
“limited resources”, “lack of evidence” and “lack of shared knowledge”. 
Table 5.7 Responses for the difficulties of risk assessment 
What are the current difficulties to conduct a risk assessment? 
Number of 
responses (%) 
Limited time availability 35 (57.4%) 
Perceived value of risk assessment 32 (52.5%) 
Insufficient knowledge/skills required 25 (41%) 
Lack of guidance 18 (29.5%) 
Lack of support from above 13 (21.3%) 
Others 9 (14.7%) 
 
When participants were asked, “Who should be involved in a risk assessment?” 
the vast majority (n=53) selected the option of “all staff”. Their responses reflect 
the Trust’s policies and procedures since risk assessment is a corporate 
responsibility. In addition, some respondents added “contractors and 
manufacturers” and “carers and relatives”. This indicates that subject matter 
stakeholders play important roles in risk assessment practice. 
Table 5.8 Responses for the optimum time needed to complete a risk assessment 
How long should each risk assessment take to complete? Number of responses (%) 
Depends 24 (39.3%) 
Up to 30 min 16 (26.2%) 
30 min- 1hour 15 (24.6%) 
1-2 hours 4 (6.6%) 
2-3 hours 1 (1.6%) 
Over 3 hours 1 (1.6%) 
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Since it was already known that NHS staff had limited time availability, 
participants were asked the following question: “How long should each risk 
assessment take to complete?” Table 5.8 gives these results. 
To understand the adequacy of current risk assessment guidance, participants 
were asked how sufficient they find NHS risk assessment guidance documents. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates all results.  
 
Figure 5.2 Responses for the sufficiency of existed guidance 
 
Respondents were also asked, “What would encourage those most to be involved 
in risk assessment?”, and they were expected to select only one of the 
statements in Table 5.9 or add one if necessary.  
Table 5.9 Responses for factors that encourage respondents to be involved in a risk 
assessment 
What would encourage you most to be involved in a 
 risk assessment? 
Number of responses (%) 
Understanding value of safety    22 (36.1%) 
Less workload 11 (18%) 
Training   9 (14.8%) 
Support from managers   9 (14.8%) 
Recognition from managers  3 (4.9%) 
Regulations 1 (1.6%) 
Other 6 (9.8%) 
 
While respondents would be encouraged most by understanding the value of 
safety, almost 10 percent of the respondents provided additional responses. 
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While some of these additional responses were different from those in the list 
provided, including ‘confidence’, ‘immediate action when risks are identified’, and 
‘financial support’, others only stated multiple options from the predetermined 
list.  
When respondents were asked, “How likely is it that a well-designed framework 
could guide you to assess risks around you?” the majority of the respondents 
agreed that a well-designed framework could guide them to assess risks (Figure 
5.3). 
 
Figure 5.3 Responses for potential contribution of a well-designed framework to guide risk 
assessment 
Lastly, an optional open question was asked: “What things should be considered 
to improve current risk assessment practice?” Twenty-two participants responded 
to the question. For instance, a respondent stated: 
“I think the basic concept of assessing risk is not well understood and it is 
often not well linked to action plans to reduce potential risk… Getting 
beyond the ‘tick box’ mentality of putting things onto the risk register just 
so we have a long list to show regulators is taking time and effort on the 
part of those with a good understanding and strong motivation to 
improve safety” 
Six other respondents also pointed out the necessity of providing a clear 
understanding of risk assessment and why it should be undertaken. Another 
respondent not only highlighted the concept of risk assessment, but also the 
regulatory pressure that organisations face and the necessity for a better culture 
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within organisations. Similarly, two other respondents claimed that risk 
assessment was: 
“Often viewed as a tick-box exercise with limited feedback to staff… They 
need to share learning, too many organisations are still brushing things 
under the carpet, and there is very little shared learning.” 
 “Risk is misunderstood, most NHS organisations are not aware of ISO 
31000 although it's been in place since 2009. Unclear objectives and risk 
assessment is rarely linked to them.” 
Additionally, a respondent stated that risks assessments tend to be conducted in 
response to change, with less focus given to existing risks.  
“The main missing factor in risk assessment is the concept of risk balance. 
Often the risks of changing things are assessed (an impact assessment) 
without balancing thought about the risks of not changing.”  
Of the remaining respondents, four stated the necessity of risk assessment 
training to improve current risk assessment practice; four mentioned guidance 
and legislations to be followed; and one pointed out the need for transparency 
without fear of consequences. 
5.3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Evidence so far reveals that participants might give different responses 
depending on professions, organisation type and perceptions. A chi-square test 
was therefore conducted to analyse whether the attributes interact in some way 
or were independent based on the organisation type, the frequency of 
involvement and job title. However, the analysis reveals that there was no 
statistically significant difference yielded between any two variables. For 
instance, a chi-square test was conducted to reveal differences between the 
responses of clinical and non-clinical staff on the sufficiency of existing guidance, 
and a p value of 0.93 was found. In other words, there is no statistical difference 
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between the responses of clinical and non-clinical staff in relation to their views 
on the sufficiency of existing risk assessment guidance. The lack of any 
relationship could also be due to the small sample size. 
Findings from the questionnaire indicate that the respondents’ aim in 
undertaking risk assessment is predominantly to assess patient harm and to 
register a risk. Arfanis et al. (2011) also found that healthcare staff often 
determine risk in relation to the well being of patients. However, respondents 
also described multiple other aims in undertaking risk assessment such as to 
support service and to increase professional performance. This indicates that risk 
assessment in hospitals covers a variety of topics.  
Not surprisingly, RCA was most often selected as a method to assess risks since 
NHS hospitals are expected to use RCA after each serious incident (Peerally et al. 
2016). However, it is often used in hospitals to investigate ‘What went wrong?’ 
rather than ‘What similarly might go wrong?’. Indeed, considerably fewer 
participants selected the methods and techniques that enable proactive risk 
assessment (e.g. FMEA and HAZOP), which might indicate that current risk 
assessment practice in hospitals tend to be reactive rather than being proactive. 
Although good risk assessment is considered to be a part of everyday practice 
with involvement of a multidisciplinary team (Woodward et al. 2004; Illingworth 
2015a), results show that risk assessment is not part of everyday practice given 
the respondent’s frequency of involvement in risk assessment. Most of the 
questionnaire respondents’ stated that they conduct a risk assessment once in 
every few months or less. This could be due to limited time availability of 
healthcare staff, an issue which was revealed in both questionnaire and interview 
results. Indeed, risk assessment can be considered to be a time-consuming 
bureaucratic exercise (Illingworth 2015b; Vincent et al. 2013). However, this 
could also be due to the lack of perceived value of the risk assessment. 
In summary, the findings of the questionnaire supported the previous findings of 
this research as well as findings from the literature review. Risk assessment is 
mostly conducted to assess harm, to register risks and to meet responsibilities; 
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most respondents would conduct risk assessments following an incident, most 
often by using the RCA; risk assessment is not an everyday practice; the desired 
duration of time for risk assessment was mostly up to 1 hour; existing guidance 
can be considered to be insufficient; and almost all respondents believe that a 
well-designed risk assessment framework would guide them in assessing risks. 
5.4 EVIDENCE FROM THE ANALYSIS OF A RISK 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
So far, the findings represent current practice as healthcare staff describe it. 
However, what they described might still be different from what they actually do. 
To address this gap, a risk management system that provides data for risks and 
incidents from a single Trust was investigated. 
5.4.1 METHODS 
Risk management data from a single acute Trust, Addenbrooke’s Hospital, were 
analysed after gaining access to the Trust’s risk management system, which 
constitutes the risk register of operational risks, and incident reporting systems. 
These were accessible through the use of Trust’s intranet system. While the risk 
register system aims to diagnose potential problems, the incident reporting 
system aims to learn from experiences to prevent the occurrence of similar 
events.  
Both the risk register and incident reporting system data were filtered for risks or 
incidents that occurred in the same fixed time period, between 01/01/2014 and 
01/01/2015. Following that, the collected data were analysed in terms of the 
number of risks and incidents that were reported, the type of information that 
was reported, the type of risk or incident, and their risk levels.  
To categorise the type of risk or incident, the Trust’s own risk categorisation 
scheme was used. The Trust classifies risks as clinical risks (e.g. delayed discharge, 
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blood wastage and drug errors), organisational risks (e.g. lack of beds, staff 
recruitment and lack of training), health and safety risks (e.g. lack of fire fighting 
equipment, stress management and slippery floors), project management risks 
(e.g. lack of funding, regulatory risks and lack of stakeholder support) and 
information risks (e.g. breach of confidentiality, poor data quality and weak 
passwords).  
5.4.2 RESULTS FROM THE RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The results from these two risk management datasets show that there were 470 
risks registered in the risk register system between 2014 and 2015, and 8733 
incidents reported in the incident reporting system for the same time period.                
Figure 5.4 shows these results in terms of the number of risks and incidents 
reported, and their identified risk levels.  
As seen in Figure 5.4, more incidents were reported than risks within the same 
time period. Even if it is assumed that a different individual registered each risk, 
only 5.6 percent of staff (470 of 8395 staff) registered a risk within the period of a 
year. If the same assumption is applied to incidents, each staff member reports 
on average at least one incident per year.  
 
               Figure 5.4 Number of reported risks and incidents between 2014 and 2015 
 
Additionally, results reveal that most of the reported incidents and risks were 
categorised as low risk. However, a significant number of risks were registered as 
moderate risks (41.7%), and a considerable number of high risks were registered 
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(8.7%). Conversely, the incident reporting system predominantly defined 
incidents as low risk (86.2%) with only a very small percentage of incidents being 
defined as high risk (0.2%).  
The risk register and incident reporting systems were reviewed in more detail to 
reveal the type of risks that were registered in these databases. Figure 5.5 
illustrates the risk register system data by considering the risk levels and the risk 
categories. The Trust used the risk matrix M4 (see Figure 4.2), which has three 
coloured bands.  
 
                       Figure 5.5 Number of registered risks between 2014 and 2015 
 
As shown in Figure 5.5, most risks were defined as clinical risks, which is not 
surprising since the main function in a healthcare Trust is to deliver care. In terms 
of the level of the risk, most of the risks were assigned to the low risk level in all 
risk categories, except clinical risks. 
To provide some examples of registered risks, all high risks for which 
management was completed (“closed high risks”) (n=17) were further reviewed. 
These registries included the details of assessor, assessed department/ward, task 
being assessed, hazards, likely adverse affects, people at risk, existing control 
measures, risk score, further actions, residual risk score, review data and the 
details of risk lead to approve the risk entry. Table 5.10 provides a summary of 
details for these closed high risks. 
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Table 5.10 Details of seventeen closed risk registries  
Reporter 
Ward/ 
Department 
Hazards 
Related to 
Risk Score 
Before and 
After 
Targeted 
Closure 
Time 
Achieved Closure 
Time 
Team leader Theatres Equipment 16-16 1 day 1 year 
Senior sister ENT surgery  Equipment 16-4 15 days 6 months 
Unit leader Theatres Equipment 25-6 8 days 6 months 
Operations 
manager 
Theatres Scheduling 16-12 9 days 9 days 
IT system 
manager 
Pathology IT system 20-2 6 months 14 months 
Senior team 
leader 
Information 
management 
IT system 25-12 14 days 2 months 
Team leader Theatres Equipment 20-4 7 weeks 7 weeks 
MRI 
manager 
MRI Unit Scheduling 20-9 4 months 4 months 
Operations 
manager 
Urology Equipment 16-8 1 week 5 weeks 
Clerk Eye Clinic Scheduling 16-8 2 months Combined into 
another risk 
Consultant 
surgeon 
Theatres Equipment 20-5 1 month 1 month 
Senior 
audiologist 
ENT Clinic IT & schedule 20-20 6 weeks 6 weeks 
Senior 
clinical 
nurse 
Theatres Equipment 16-4 5 months 6 months 
Team leader Theatres Equipment 16-4 1 day 6 months 
Senior sister ENT surgery  Staffing 20-12 4 months 8 months 
Quality 
manager 
Haematology IT, staffing & 
equipment 
16-8 3 weeks 23 weeks 
Senior sister Hepatology IT  & 
procedure 
20-6 4 days 6 months 
 
Findings from all closed high risks demonstrated that risks were most often 
(n=15) defined by the senior staff, team leaders or operation managers, and risks 
were most often (n=7) registered by the theatre staff.  
In relation to the description of tasks being assessed, it was often a specific 
existing problem that was identified (n=13) rather than a potential problem (n=4). 
For instance, the descriptions of the task being assessed included “unsafe and 
unworkable work flows in EPIC”, “lack of availability stack system for endoscopic 
transphenoidal cases”, “use of equipment no longer supported by manufacturer” 
and “operation issue: no timescale and lack of coordination of hardware and 
software installation prior to e-hospital go alive date”.  
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The hazard presented by the risk entry was selected from a predetermined list in 
all seventeen reviewed cases. However, some risk entries also included manually 
added hazards. In total, of the 56 hazards listed, 6 were manually added such as 
“patient cancellation due to equipment failure” and “delayed clinic appointments 
can result in permanent visual deterioration”. The most commonly-selected 
predetermined hazards were “targets workload” (n=10), “lack of resources 
funding” (n=6), and “inadequate staffing /skillmix” (n=4).  
The majority of these closed high-risk entries were equipment related (n=9). For 
instance, an issue with an old neuro nerve monitor was reported and the hazard 
was identified as “patient cancellation due to equipment failure”; likely adverse 
affects were determined as “patient safety, failure to meet targets and quality of 
service affected” and existing control was described as “Equipment rep has given 
a loan nerve monitor when ours is at repair”. For the required actions, “the 
replacement with a new monitor” was recommended. Another risk entry 
identified the issue as “the availability of a flexible nasendoscope/headlight light 
source”, which could lead to delays in the treatment process and in turn the 
discharge time. For this specific issue, a hazard was identified as “lack of 
resources funding”, likely adverse affects were defined as “patient safety, 
harm/injury, failure to meet targets, quality of service affected and bad publicity”, 
and existing control was defined as “Light source borrowed from clinic during 
bank holidays periods and patients referred to clinic during clinic hours where 
necessary” and the action recommended was purchasing a functioning light 
source. 
The findings also show that only 2 out of 17 risk registries retained the same risk 
score after action; 10 dropped to the moderate risk level and 5 dropped to the 
low risk level. The significant drops were often in relation to equipment and fell 
mostly because new equipment was purchased. While most of the rest still fell, it 
is not clear whether this was due to a natural change in the risk, or due to the 
implementation of the recommended actions.  
Furthermore, the majority of risk entries (n=12) were closed after target closure 
times had passed. While the average targeted closure time for these 17 closed-
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high risks was estimated to be 53 days, the average closure time was 140 days. 
Risks were managed over a much longer time period than expected. 
Turning to the incident reporting data, risk levels were assessed by the Trust to 
each reported incident in order to facilitate prioritisation. Incidents are 
summarised by risk category and potential risk level in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it can be seen, by far the most common incidents were low-risk clinical 
incidents and, following that, low-risk health and safety related incidents. To gain 
additional insight, Figure 5.7 illustrates the most commonly-occurring incident 
types, those that were reported more than 100 times, by category. 
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                      Figure 5.7 Details of reported incidents between 2014 and 2015 
 
The majority of these reported incidents were related to patient care, 
medication, patient falls, security and capacity. For instance, treatment delay 
(n=265) and pressure ulcers (n=240) were the most commonly reported incidents 
in terms of patient care related incidents; CD discrepancy (n=98) and prescribing-
omission (n=68) were the most commonly reported incidents in terms of 
medication related incidents; emergency assistance request (n=146) was the 
most commonly reported incident in terms of security related incidents; and 
staffing/workload (n=616) was the most commonly reported incident in terms of 
capacity related incidents. 
5.4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The findings from the Trust’s risk management system indicate that risk 
assessment does not receive as much attention as incident reporting. When risk 
assessment is in place, risks are often related to ongoing issues. 
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It is interesting to note that, risks are likely to be scored higher than incidents. 
This could be as a result of the blame culture in healthcare organisations 
(Hutchinson et al. 2009). Healthcare staff might fear revealing incidents that have 
resulted in more severe harm in order not to be blamed or punished for causing 
it. Indeed, blaming and an inadequate safety culture have been criticised in the 
healthcare literature by many researchers (Youngberg 2011; DoH 2000; Carroll 
and Edmondson 2002; Kaissi 2012). Equally, it could be that people simply choose 
a higher risk score when identifying risks because there is no reason to be blamed 
in highlighting something that has not happened yet. However, evidence so far 
has shown that a risk might be scored higher than it should be in order to attract 
more attention from the managerial levels. Yet, interestingly, incidents were 
reported significantly more often than risks. 
Turning to the reviewed risk register data, a number of challenges were 
observed. Although the risk register system is designed to identify tasks being 
assessed, hazards and existing controls, it tends to be misused or insufficiently 
used by assessors. For instance, most of the tasks (13 out of 17) were a very 
specific on-going problem; hazards were often described as generic risk sources 
(10 out of 17) or as consequences; causes were often not described (11 out of 17) 
and when it was described, only a single cause was identified; and existing 
controls tend to be explained by focusing on either the prevention of the 
undesired event only or on minimising its consequences only. As a result, the 
questions “What is being assessed?”, “What are the potential undesired events?”, 
“What could contribute to their occurrence?” and “What are the existing controls 
in the system?” were not clearly answered. 
Additionally, it was found that the risk register system can be used as a request 
form from front line staff to managerial bodies. For instance, a risk was registered 
by identifying the risk as “harmonic scalpel required”, selecting the hazard from a 
predetermined list as “lack of resources/funding”, scoring the risk as 9 (L:3 x C:3) 
and completing the actions required section as “insufficient equipment to meet 
increased demand of theatre activity”. Such interpretations of risk assessment 
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provide evidence supporting the view of a critical report that “risk registers tend 
to be backward-looking data-collection exercises” (Illingworth 2015a).  
There were also a number of challenges identified in relation to the design of the 
risk register system. For instance, the risk register system provided a 
predetermined list of hazards that assessors could select, or they could enter one 
manually. However, not all of the selected hazards seemed to help identify the 
specific risk sources. For instance, lack of resource funding was identified as a 
hazard for the task associated with “the availability of a flexible nasendoscope/ 
headlight light source”. Furthermore, the system did not enable the assessors to 
determine the causes of the potential undesired events. Since the potential 
causes and the overall system to be assessed often were not described, it can be 
difficult to work out the all controls needed to prevent or minimise the risks. In 
turn, there is a potential for inadequate risk assessments to be conducted. 
In summary, the review of the risk management data shows that risk 
management is predominantly reactive. Even the proactive risk register system 
tends to be used as a reactive data collection system by defining existing issues. 
The risk register forms can be inadequately completed through not providing 
much detail to help in the management of the risks and by focusing on specific 
on-going issues rather than the potential undesired events within the system to 
be assessed. All of the reviewed risk entries, except one, provided very few 
details. While some of these problems might result from a poor design of the risk 
management system, some might be due to misuse or misunderstanding 
stemming from a lack of staff training on risk assessment. In essence, the 
evidence so far demonstrates the need to improve current risk assessment 
practice. 
However, it must be noted that the dataset analysed may not reflect all risk data 
in the Trust. Also, different Trusts might register risks by providing different 
information with a different degree of sufficiency. 
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5.5 EVIDENCE FROM THE REVIEW OF THE BOARD 
ASSURANCE FRAMEWORK 
Risks are categorised as operational or strategic (Chapter 4). While the previous 
section focussed on operational risks, this section investigates strategic risks to 
understand the overall risk assessment practice better. Strategic risks relate to 
the achievement of organisational objectives, and such information is provided 
by the Board Assurance Framework (BAF). Therefore, this section reviews a 
number of BAF documents from multiple hospitals. 
5.5.1 METHODS 
This study reviewed 34 Board Assurance Frameworks (BAF) in order to explore 
the strategic risks reported by hospitals in NHS England. The 34 hospitals were 
purposively selected from the 160 NHS England acute hospitals to ensure 
different hospital types in different regions were adequately represented. BAF 
reports were collected from the selected hospitals’ websites. Table 5.11 provides 
information about the hospital type (acute specialist, acute teaching, large, 
medium and small Trusts) by region (North, Midlands and East, London, and 
South).  
Table 5.11 Characteristics of the selected hospitals 
Hospital Type North 
(n=10) 
Midlands 
and East 
(n=9) 
London 
(n=5) 
South 
(n=10) 
Acute specialist (n=2) 1 - - 1 
Acute teaching (n=8) 2 2 2 2 
Large (n=10) 4 3 1 2 
Medium (n=9) 2 3 2 2 
Small (n=5) 1 1 - 3 
 
After gathering BAF reports from the 34 selected hospitals, their top five (i.e. 
highest) risks were listed and risks were categorised as clinical risks (e.g. delayed 
discharge, blood wastage and drug errors), organisational risks (e.g. lack of beds, 
staff recruitment and lack of training), health and safety risks (e.g. lack of fire 
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fighting equipment, stress management and slippery floors), project 
management risks (e.g. lack of funding, regulatory risks and lack of stakeholder 
support) and information risks (e.g. breach of confidentiality, poor data quality 
and weak passwords). 
5.5.2 RESULTS FROM THE BAF REPORT REVIEWS 
The hospitals’ top five strategic risks were reviewed from the collected 
documents. Figure 5.8 demonstrates the strategic risks that were defined at the 
board level by at least 3 hospitals.  
 
Figure 5.8 Details of strategic risks  
 
The results reveal that most of the strategic risks were clinical and organisational. 
It was clear from the results that the majority of hospitals (n=26) reported a 
strategic risk with relevance to “workforce”. Additionally, “financial deficit” and 
“non-compliance with requirements” were also found to be frequently reported.  
As expected, the strategic risks reported reflect major problems that occur in the 
organisation, such as staff capacity, finance, mortality rate, infection and A&E 
waiting time. Similarly, Schmidtke et al. (2017) listed board level defined quality 
26 
14 
4 
3 
14 
10 
7 
7 
6 
6 
5 
4 
10 
5 
0 10 20 30 
A&E targets 
Treatment delays 
Infections 
Mortality rate 
Incident  
Patient handover 
Patient discharge 
Patient complaints 
Workforce  
Non-compliance with requirements 
Bed capacity 
Equipment 
Financial deficit 
E-care system 
Number of hospital reports 
Information  
related risks 
Organisational  
risks 
Clinical risks 
CHAPTER 5: ACTUAL RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
 
 121 
and safety issues, as “waiting times”, “incident reports”, “infections”, “mortality”, 
“pressure ulcers”, and “falls”.  
Additionally, it was observed that regulatory targets and reported incidents 
influence the identification of strategic risks. For instance, failure to meet A&E 
targets is identified as a strategic risk, where a 4-hour wait in A&E from arrival to 
admission is one of the often mentioned regulatory targets (Parkin 2016).  
Strategic risks can be identified from the risk register and incident reporting data 
as well as by considering regulatory targets and ongoing repetitive issues within 
the hospitals (e.g. workforce and bed capacity). Most importantly, finance related 
risks were revealed as part of strategic risks whereas they were not seen in the 
risk register or incident reporting systems. 
5.6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter presented evidence from a range of sources to view and analyse the 
big picture for current risk assessment practice as well as to reveal the practical 
experience of NHS staff of risk assessment practice, to define existing challenges 
and to highlight the need for the improvement of the current risk assessment 
practice. 
The findings of this chapter show that ‘work as described’ is not the same as 
‘work as done’. Perhaps, ‘work as done’ can be divided into ‘work as done as 
described’ and ‘work as done as observed’, which were found to be different too. 
For instance, risk assessment policies are assumed to be read and followed by 
healthcare staff, and healthcare staff would indeed know where to find such 
documents, but such documents tend not to be read by them. Furthermore, the 
risk register system is assumed to be used to record all risks and diagnose 
problems. However, it can be used to garner attention from higher managerial-
levels in relation to an ongoing issue. Moreover, it is recommended that risk 
matrices be used in risk assessment, and, indeed, they are used when one is 
CHAPTER 5: ACTUAL RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE  
122 
undertaken. However, while the use of risk scoring guidance is also advised, this 
might not happen in practice. Risks can be scored subjectively.  
The findings also reveal that not all healthcare staff conduct risk assessments in 
the same ways and using the same tools and techniques. This might be one of the 
reasons why there was lack of evidence in the literature in relation to the overall 
current risk assessment practice in hospitals. Based on the findings collected so 
far, current risk assessment practice in NHS England hospitals is conducted 
through (1) individual patient-based risk assessment, (2) operational risk 
assessment, and (3) strategic risk assessment. Depending on the type of risk 
assessment, risks can be recorded onto different databases. Figure 5.9 clarifies 
current risk assessment practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual patient-based risk assessment is conducted to manage risks that 
threaten the safety of individual patients. It is usually conducted through clinical 
team discussions by relying on professional experience. Mental Health Trusts are 
strongly encouraged to screen risks for each administered patient (DoH 2010). 
Following that, specific risks can be assessed further such as the risks of suicide, 
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self-harm and violence towards others (O’Rourke and Bird 2001; DoH 2007). After 
completion of the assessment, findings are documented in the patient record 
system.  
Operational risk assessment is conducted to manage all operational risks that 
threaten individuals, organisations, and the environment. It can be conducted in 
three ways, which are initial risk assessment, specialised risk assessment and 
comprehensive risk assessment.  
Initial risk assessment allows assessors to recognise major risks and the need for 
further assessments. The main goal is to allocate resources by focusing on the 
most important risks (BSI 2010). Initial risk assessment is usually conducted 
through the use of an assessor’s judgement or a Trust risk register form. Initial 
risk assessment is usually conducted for the assessment of operational risks. 
Most of the Trusts encourage their staff to record all operational risks onto the 
risk register system.  
Specialised risk assessment refers to the assessment of specific risks such as 
patient falls, violence and aggression, VTE, suicide/self-harm and display screen 
and working environment. Specialised risk assessment forms, techniques, 
checklists and assessors’ judgments are used to conduct such assessments. The 
Best Practice in Managing Risk document provides a number of tools to assess 
some of these specific risks (DoH 2007). These indicate, for instance, a number of 
tools provided for the assessment of patient falls such as the STRATIFY scale, the 
Morse Fall Scale (Morse et al. 1989) and the Hendrich Fall Risk Model (Hendrich 
et al. 1995).  
A comprehensive risk assessment can be conducted following specialised as well 
as initial risk assessments. The comprehensive risk assessment is an in-depth risk 
assessment that involves a multidisciplinary team and uses systematic risk 
assessment tools. Multiple risk scenarios can be discussed regarding the system 
to be assessed, and better action plans can be determined to achieve objectives 
as well as to improve loss control (BSI 2000). Although it is not possible to assess 
every single risk through comprehensive risk assessment, such an assessment 
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should be conducted when there is a change in the system to be assessed (NPSA 
2006), the system or task is dynamic and complex (Hollnagel et al. 2013), 
incidents are unexpected, or potential harm or loss is severe (NHS England 
2015d).  
Strategic risk assessment is conducted to manage the most significant risks to 
prevent organisations to achieve their objectives (Frigo and Anderson 2009; DoH 
2003). Board level staff assess strategic risks and the findings are documented in 
Board Assurance Frameworks (DoH 2003). Strategic risks may also consider 
unsolved operational risks and significant incidents. 
Turning to the findings from this chapter, there are a number of challenges 
identified in assessing risks in hospitals, predominantly due to the fundamentals 
and use of risk assessment practice. Table 5.12 summarises the challenges 
observed via the conducted studies. 
Table 5.12 Challenges for the current risk assessment practice 
Source Challenge 
Evidence from the 
practical experience 
of NHS staff 
1. Subjective judgements made when assessing risks  
2. Lack of use of prospective hazard analysis techniques 
3. Subjective risk scoring 
4. Lack of consideration of additional factors when prioritising risks 
5. Misuse of risk terms  
6. Lack of sufficient training on risk assessment 
7. Time requirement for assessing risks 
8. Lack of communication between staff about risk assessment 
9. Lack of follow up after completing risk assessment 
10. Lack of perceived value of risk assessment 
Evidence from the 
analysis of risk 
management systems 
1. Only a small number of NHS staff record risks in risk registers 
2. The risk register system can be used to garner attention from higher   
managerial levels. 
3. Insufficiently completed risk assessment forms 
4. The system to be assessed is not described well 
5. Contributory factors are often not stated 
6. Registered risks tend to reflect an ongoing problem 
7. The management of risks is completed significantly later than the 
targeted time 
 
To address these challenges, a number of potential recommendations can be 
made. For instance, a new risk assessment technique could be developed for use 
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by healthcare staff in order to conduct more reliable risk assessments; the safety 
culture could be improved to encourage healthcare staff to be more involved in 
risk assessment; or better safety training programmes could be designed and 
provided. However, most of the problems identified were in relation to the 
fundamentals of risk assessment and its use.  
Therefore, this research aims to design a better risk assessment approach to 
provide better guidance on the concept of risk assessment. To do so, a risk 
assessment framework will be designed by learning from the good risk 
assessment practices prescribed in safety-critical industries and by addressing the 
challenges of current risk assessment practice. The framework will be designed 
through building on the existing risk assessment framework as in Figure 5.10. The 
inputs and outputs at each step are indicated by arrows and the question marks 
indicate areas for clarification. 
 
 
 
 
 
Designing a framework can support the front-line staff to undertake more 
effective risk assessments. A successfully designed framework also has an 
important role in decision making, as in risk assessment (Johnson 2012). 
Participants of this research also highlighted the potential value of a well-
designed risk assessment framework.  
In this chapter, eight requirements were captured from interviews and 
questionnaires as well as through the review of documents and a risk 
management system in Table 5.13. Indeed, studying documents and software 
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systems are held to be invaluable techniques to elicit both user and domain 
knowledge requirements (Maciaszek 2007).  
Table 5.13 Requirements captured from the actual practice 
Requirements Justification Source 
1. Ordinary language should be 
used in risk assessment  
To ensure everyone can understand the 
terms used in risk assessment 
Interviews (page 98)  
2. Improved approach should fit 
on an A4 sheet  
Many-paged documents do not get 
attention by the healthcare staff 
Interviews (page 97) 
3. Framework should support a 
quick risk assessment 
Limited time availability of the clinical 
staff and their willingness to attend to 
time-intensive risk assessments 
Interviews (page 99) 
and questionnaire 
(Table 5.8) 
4. Risk assessment should be 
systematic 
To ensure assessors follow a clear risk 
assessment process 
Document analysis 
(page 67) and 
interviews (page 93 
and 94) 
5. Framework should be easy to 
use 
To ensure that everyone can use the 
framework easily 
Interviews (page 97) 
and questionnaire 
Table 5.6 
6. Framework should be 
adaptable to all contexts and it 
should guide the assessment of 
all risk types 
To ensure that the framework can be 
used by different professionals and for 
different purposes 
Interviews (page 97) 
7. Framework should be 
accessible 
To ensure that everyone can access the 
framework 
Interviews (page 97) 
and observations 
8. Framework should be 
compatible with other risk 
assessments tools and methods 
To ensure the framework can be 
combined with other tools and methods 
that are currently used  
Interviews (page 97) 
and observations 
 
In Table 5.13, requirements are listed for the use of the researcher to design the 
proposed framework. Three researchers had multiple group discussions to list the 
requirements. However, it should be noted that further studies could have added 
additional requirements. Indeed, further requirements are identified in the next 
chapter through the use of different sources. 
5.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter investigated the actual risk assessment in hospitals in NHS England 
through the use of mixed methods. The findings in this chapter reveal that risk 
assessment in hospitals is conducted in three different ways, which are individual 
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patient-based, operational and strategic risk assessments. The findings, however, 
also highlight a number of challenges regarding current risk assessment practice 
in hospitals. These challenges were predominantly in relation to the 
fundamentals and the use of risk assessment. Thus, this research sets its focus on 
designing a risk assessment framework to support healthcare staff in undertaking 
risk assessments. To do so, a number of requirements for a better risk 
assessment framework were identified. 
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CHAPTER 6  
PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION TO PROPOSED APPROACH 
Earlier chapters have investigated current risk assessment practice, highlighted 
problems with current risk assessment practice, revealed the need for improving 
the current risk assessment practice, and outlined the requirements captured 
from the actual practice for a better risk assessment framework. 
This chapter proposes a risk assessment framework to guide effective risk 
assessment in hospitals. To design the proposed approach, further requirements 
are captured by determining good risk assessment practice. A risk assessment 
framework is then designed by considering all requirements for use by healthcare 
staff to assist them in risk assessment. In turn, this chapter thus proposes an 
answer to the main research question: “How can current risk assessment practice 
be improved to ensure safety in hospitals?” 
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6.2 METHODS 
The Vee developmental model was used to design the proposed risk assessment 
framework. The Vee model starts with understanding user needs, which are 
translated into system requirements and detailed design (Forsberg and Mooz 
1991; Blanchard 2008; Grady 2016). In so doing, the system is decomposed into 
elements until all the lowest level details are specified, and all requirements are 
defined in relation to components, subsystems and the system (Grady 2016).  
The process of above can be done through requirements engineering, which 
involves requirements elicitation (discovery of the requirement), the analysis of 
conflicts and inconsistencies, requirements specification (documentation of the 
requirements descriptions), and validation (ensuring the quality of the 
requirements) (Sommerville and Sawyer 2003). A developed system is then 
designed in accordance with all requirements. After that, verifications of 
component, sub-systems and the system follow in order to prove that the 
developed concept meets its specifications (Grady 2016). The model ends with 
user validation to prove that it satisfies the user needs (Forsberg and Mooz 1991). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the Vee model adapted to design a risk assessment 
framework by highlighting methods applied at each stage. The model starts with 
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Figure 6.1 Vee model to develop framework adapted from Grady (2016)  
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understanding user needs, which were acquired through interviews and 
questionnaires and were presented in Chapter 5. Requirements were elicited 
from the interviews, questionnaires, and an extensive literature review as well as 
documentation analysis from hospitals and prescribed good risk assessment 
standards from other industries. An analysis was then conducted by three 
researchers to ensure that there are no conflicted and inconsistent requirements. 
Following that, requirements were listed and evaluated by the same three 
researchers in order to help the researcher (GKK) to design the proposed 
approach. Finally, multiple concepts were considered based on the requirements 
captured and one of these was selected to be developed, and, then, to be tested. 
While this chapter provides the results of the left-hand-side of the Vee model, 
the next chapter provides the results of the right-hand-side of the Vee model to 
evaluate the proposed approach.  
6.3 REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
Good risk assessment practice was described in Chapter 2. Considering the inputs 
and outputs of good risk assessment practice, key elements of the risk 
assessment process are listed in Table 6.1.  
In Table 6.1, the risk assessment is divided into three parts: risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation, and the key elements are characterised as being 
input, output and supportive elements. Requirements are captured by 
determining these elements and supported by the previous findings of this study. 
The requirements are numbered in Table 6.1 in square brackets. 
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Table 6.1 Key elements of risk assessment (the requirement captured) 
Elements Risk Identification Risk Analysis Risk Evaluation 
Inputs 
elements 
 
1) System description  [R1] 
 Aims 
 Elements 
 Interactions between 
elements  
 Boundary 
 Context 
 
1) Existing controls [R8] 
 Preventative 
 Detective 
 Recovery 
 
1) Risk acceptance 
principles [R11] 
 Application of codes 
of practice 
 Comparison with 
similar reference 
practice 
 Explicit risk level 
2) Risk sources [R2] 
 Patient 
 Staff 
 Task 
 Communication 
 Equipment 
 Control actions 
 Organization 
 Environment 
2) Consequences on [R6] 
 People 
 Organisation 
 Environment 
 
3) Nature of the risk [R3] 
 Known 
 Unforeseen 
3) Likelihood measurement 
[R8] 
  Time-based 
  Probability-based 
  Nominal 
Outputs 
elements 
 
1) Event [R4] 
 Event description 
 Links with other 
events  
 
 
1) Risk level [R8], [R11] 
  Likelihood (s) 
  Impact (s) 
 
1) Risk tolerability [R11] 
 Intolerable 
 ALARP 
 Tolerable 
2) Contributory factors [R5] 2) Detectability [R12] 2) Risk priority [R12] 
3) Consequences [R6] 
 Immediate effects 
 Knock-on effects 
3) Vulnerability [R12] 
 
3) Initial control 
measures [R13] 
 Preventative 
 Detective 
 Recovery 
 
4) Risk categories [R7] 
 Clinical 
 Organisational 
 Health and safety 
 Project management 
 Information 
4) Speed of onset [R12] 
Supportive 
elements 
 
Assessment methods (historical data, expert opinion, techniques), guidance, 
assessment principles, and communication and consultation [R14, 15] 
 
Evidence gathered so far demonstrates that risk identification tends to be 
conducted with an insufficient consideration of the system to be assessed in the 
first place (see section 5.4.2). This could be due to the fact that risks tend to be 
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identified one at a time without consideration of other relevant risks within the 
system. However, having a clear understanding of the system is essential for risk 
assessment (Redmill et al. 1999). The system description is an initial step for the 
most widely used prospective hazard analysis techniques such as FMEA and 
HAZOP (BSI 2010). Therefore, the first requirement for the proposed framework 
is:  
[R1]: The system should be described prior to the assessment. 
A clear system description should involve the details of the assessment aim, 
system context, system elements, interactions of the elements and system 
boundary (ISO 2008; INCOSE 2007). System modelling methods can be used to 
describe the system; flowcharts are widely used in healthcare (Colligan et al. 
2010). Although flow charts might be limited in their capacity to reveal all 
interactions of the system elements, they are still found to be the easiest and 
most suitable for use in healthcare (Jun et al. 2010). 
Regarding risk identification, risks should be identified at their source (BSI 2009). 
Hazards or contributory factors can be determined as risk sources (BSI 2009; 
Simsekler et al. 2015). Observations from current risk assessment practice show 
that risk sources are often selected from a prepopulated list, with list items which 
could be too generic or irrelevant to the identified risks. Additionally, it was found 
that these terms can be easily misused (see section 5.4.2). For instance, a hazard 
can be interchangeably used with a risk or an undesired event, and a risk source 
can be determined as a source where risks are first recognised (e.g. incident 
reports) rather than a source that gives rise to the risk. Thus, the second 
requirement is defined as follows: 
[R2]: A comprehensive list of risk sources should be considered when 
identifying risks. 
In the literature, there have been various lists provided to determine risk sources 
including the London protocol (Taylor-Adams and Vincent 2004), Systems 
Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (Carayon et al. 2006), Reason’s accident 
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causal model (Reason 2000) and the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework 
(YCFF) (Lawton et al. 2012). Simsekler et al. (2015) compared multiple 
classification schemes and generated a risk source classification scheme involving 
patient, staff, equipment, communication, task, organisation and environment. 
This research adjusted the risk sources classification scheme by predominantly 
building on YCFF (Lawton et al. 2012) and also considering the STAMP approach 
(Leveson 2011). The YCFF has been applied in various healthcare settings to 
describe both latent and active failures (Hernan et al. 2015). The YCFF is built on 
Reason’s model and, therefore, the criticisms of the traditional approaches might 
also apply here. Hence, a combination of the STAMP approach and YCFF was 
considered to provide a more comprehensive risk source classification scheme. 
The STAMP approach determines that accidents occur as a result of a lack of 
controls in the system. Therefore, this approach takes into account the control 
actions in the system to be assessed. Since these are not included in the existing 
classification schemes, an adjusted risk source classification scheme including 
control actions as risk sources is given in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Classification of risk sources 
Risk Sources  Example 
Patient Clinical condition, physical factors, social factors, psychological factors 
Staff Physical factors, psychological factors, social factors, cognitive factors and 
knowledge/skills 
Task Unfamiliar task, difficult task and monotonous task 
Communication Poor verbal/written communication, lack of feedback, lack of information 
Equipment Poor design of equipment, equipment not working, inadequate maintenance 
Control actions  No actions, unsafe actions, action too late, too early or out of sequence, and 
action stopped too soon or applied too long 
Organisation Organisational structure, policies/procedures/protocols, staffing/workload, 
training and safety culture 
Environment Physical environment, external environment (e.g. external authorities and 
suppliers) 
 
The nature of the risks should be also considered when identifying risks. Risks can 
be known or unforeseen. BS EN ISO 17776 (2002) recommends the use of risk 
assessment methods based on the nature of risks. For instance, a checklist and 
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structured what-if technique can be used for known risks, and FMEA and HAZOP 
can be used to assess unforeseen risks. Findings from the previous chapters 
indicate that risks in hospitals often relate to existing issues rather than 
something that has potential to occur. Indeed, risks are often identified following 
an incident and, therefore, often it is known risks which are being identified. 
Thus, the third requirement is: 
[R3]: Both known and unforeseen risks should be sought. 
A description of an event is one of the outputs of the risk identification process. 
However, anything could be explained as an event. Therefore, effective event 
identification requires linking the event with objectives and other relevant events 
(COSO 2004; BSI 2009). Additionally, events could be identified under different 
system modes such as normal, degraded and emergent modes (ORR 2015). For 
instance, monotonous risks are more likely to be identified under the normal 
system mode and extreme risks are usually identified under the emergent system 
mode. Observations from current risk assessment practice, however, reveal that 
risks are identified without linking undesired events with objectives or any other 
relevant events. This leads to the fourth requirement: 
[R4]: An event should be identified by considering objectives and links with 
other events. 
Events occur due to a combination of factors (BSI 2011b). Therefore, 
consideration of multiple factors can lead to a better understanding of events 
and, in turn, an improved assessment of risks. However, practical experience has 
shown that causal explanations are often missed in risk assessments, or that 
events are explained with a single generic cause. Accidents, in complex systems, 
occur due to combined mutually interacting factors (Leveson et al. 2016; Klockner 
and Toft 2015). Thus, contributory factors can be identified by using risk source 
classification schemes as in Table 6.2. Thus, the fifth requirement is: 
[R5]: Contributory factors to events should be identified. 
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A single event can result in different consequences and their impacts could be on 
people, the organisation and the environment (ISO 2000). In addition to this, 
different consequences can be identified by considering both the immediate and 
knock-on effects (BSI 2009; BSI 2010). Findings from the current practice have 
demonstrated that consequence can be interchangeably used with effect or 
impact. While events are identified in the risk register system, less information is 
provided regarding their potential consequences. Additionally, it is often a single 
consequence domain that is determined with a main focus on generic immediate 
effects. This indicates the sixth requirement, which is: 
[R6]: Consequences should be identified by considering all impact domains 
in line with both immediate and knock-on effects. 
After identifying all risks, risks should be categorised to manage them more 
effectively. Observations from current practice have shown that hospitals 
categorise their risks based on their risk categorisation schemes. For instance, 
risks are categorised in a Trust as: clinical, organisational, health and safety, 
project management and information risks. However, different hospitals might 
use different categories. Indeed, hospitals should adapt the most suitable 
categories for themselves by ensuring that a risk can only be defined under one 
category. Therefore, the seventh requirement is: 
[R7]: Risks should be properly categorised to help management of all risks. 
Having built on the findings of risk identification, the risk analysis process 
determines existing controls to reveal the real level of risk (BSI 2010; BSI 1996; 
BSI 2009). Controls can be characterised as eliminative, detective and reductive 
(BSI 2010; ISO 2012; AFSC 2000). Similarly, Card et al. (2014) provides five 
prompts to determine controls, which are elimination, design controls, 
administrative controls, detection or situation awareness and preparedness (Card 
et al. 2014a). Reviews of the risk assessment policies and procedures reveal little 
evidence in relation to such considerations. Indeed, it has been claimed that 
control actions in hospitals are poorly determined (Card et al. 2014a; Card et al. 
2014b). Thus, the eight requirement is: 
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[R8]: All existing controls should be determined to estimate the real level 
of risk. 
The level of risk is estimated through the combination of severity of consequence 
and likelihood of occurrence (BSI 2010; BSI 2009). In the current risk assessment 
practice, severity and likelihood measurement scales are provided to estimate 
risk levels. Each scale is assigned a score from 1 to 5 and a nominal description(s) 
is provided for each score. Then, these two scores are multiplied to estimate a 
risk score by the use of risk matrices. However, the use of risk scores and risk 
matrices is found to be challenging as discussed in Chapter 4. For instance, the 
risk scores might show little relation to the quantitative value of the risk and risk 
matrices might assign a risk to the wrong risk level. Therefore, the ninth 
requirement is: 
[R9]: Risk scores should not be the sole basis on which to make risk-based 
decisions. 
Furthermore, the risk analysis process can determine uncertainties, whose 
detectability can be considered as a factor in measuring uncertainty (NASA 2011). 
In the analysis of current practice, there was no evidence found to measure 
uncertainty or discussions around detectability. Actually, observations reveal that 
the practical risk assessment practice tends to focus on certain existing issues 
without consideration of potential uncertainties, and current practice itself leads 
to more uncertainty than it should address. Although consideration of 
uncertainty might be perceived as an additional burden, it can contribute to risk 
analysis and prioritisation. Adding this dimension may well help to distinguish 
between risks at the same risk-level. Thus, the tenth requirement is: 
[R10]: Uncertainties should be determined when assessing risks. 
Having built on the risk analysis process, the tolerability of a risk is evaluated by 
comparing the risk level with risk criteria. Studying recommended practice in 
hospitals has shown that risk matrices are used to estimate the level of risk, and 
the risk criteria are set with coloured bands on these risk matrices. However, it is 
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not clear whether or not hospitals use risk matrices to determine the tolerability 
of a risk. Actually, it is recommended in literature that multiple factors should be 
considered to make decisions on the tolerability of a risk including the risk level, 
codes of practice (e.g. standards and legal requirements), and comparison with 
similar reference practice (ORR 2015). This leads to the eleventh requirement: 
[R11]: Tolerability of a risk should be determined based on risk level, codes 
of practice and comparison with similar reference system(s). 
The tolerability of a risk can be categorised as acceptable, tolerable or ALARP and 
unacceptable. This is often linked with the coloured bands on risk matrices. A 
lower coloured band indicates acceptable risks, medium band(s) apply to 
tolerable or ALARP principles and the upper band indicates unacceptable risks 
(BSI 2010). Yet, as stated, other factors should also be determined. Indeed, risk 
appetite can be different from one risk to another. For instance, written rules 
might assign a low or medium risk to an intolerable band. To illustrate this with 
an example, a risk of a wrong site surgery might be assigned to an undesirable or 
even tolerable risk band by considering its likelihood and consequence scores. 
However, this is something that hospitals would not tolerate. Additionally, 
sometimes a high risk can be tolerated if its benefit outweighs its harm or loss. 
For instance, chemotherapy itself is a very risky procedure. Yet, its benefit can be 
more significant than its harm. Therefore, such a high risk could be tolerable. 
Thus, coloured bands can be linked with risk tolerability since a lower coloured 
band is generally tolerable, a medium band(s) is generally undesirable or ALARP, 
and an upper band is generally intolerable. 
After the determination of risk tolerability, risks are prioritised for treatment 
implementation. Risks can be prioritised based on the estimated risk levels, 
organisational objectives, stakeholder needs, legal requirements, resource 
intensity for required control actions, detectability of a risk, vulnerability and 
speed of onset (COSO 2012; EN 2013). In hospitals, risks are predominantly 
prioritised based on risk scores. However, as mentioned in Chapter 4, using 
explicit risk scores can lead to random risk prioritisation. To address this 
challenge, the twelfth requirement is: 
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[R12]: Risks should be prioritised by considering the level of risk in 
combination with other factors. 
Although the risk evaluation process only considers the tolerability and 
prioritisation of a risk, consideration of the required actions is also a common 
practice in healthcare. Since different individuals might take part in the different 
steps of the risk assessment process, providing an initial list of the required 
actions may well help managerial level staff when taking over the risk 
assessment. These actions can be determined as required control actions by 
considering the same control types as mentioned earlier. Thus, the thirteenth 
requirement is: 
[R13]: Eliminative, detective and reductive control actions should be listed. 
Although all requirements in relation to the risk assessment process have been 
described so far, there are some additional requirements that should also be 
considered while conducting risk assessments, which were described as 
supportive elements in Table 6.1. Supportive elements should be used at all 
stages of risk assessment to achieve effective assessments. These elements 
include: risk assessment techniques, historical data, expert judgement, and 
communication and consultation and guidance (BSI 2009; BSI 2010; BSI 2014). In 
hospitals, risks might be assessed in a variety of ways, including conducting a risk 
assessment through the use of gut feeling, risk registers, or risk assessment 
forms. In most cases, historical data are not used to assess risks. However, 
historical data tend to be collected to fulfil legal requirements. While the 
healthcare staff often use professional judgement, there is little evidence found 
demonstrating strong communication and consultation between healthcare 
professionals. Thus, the fourteenth requirement is: 
[R14]: Risk assessment should be implemented utilising assessment 
methods as well as communication and consultation at all times. 
Furthermore, findings from risk assessments should be well documented for staff 
to be aware of the assessed risks and to be able to monitor them (BSI 1996; BSI 
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2010). In hospitals, risks are documented on a risk register database or risk 
assessment forms. However, it is not clear how many of the assessed risks are 
documented, how much of this documented information is shared with other 
people and how many of these documented risks are managed. Yet, observations 
reveal that risk assessment tends to be conducted as a paper exercise; not all the 
risks are documented; not all the assessed risks are shared with relevant people 
and not all the risks are monitored in the scheduled time period. Thus, the 
fifteenth requirement is: 
[R15]: Risks should be documented, findings should be shared and 
documented risks should be monitored. 
The requirements listed so far could help design a risk assessment framework. It 
should also be mentioned that the list of requirements presented here is not 
exhaustive, and that it constitutes one approach to addressing the problems 
identified in this research.  
Before moving onto the proposed risk assessment framework, all requirements 
captured so far in this research are listed in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3 All requirements for the design of the risk assessment framework 
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Requirement Description 
Rationale Behind the 
Requirement  
Chapter 
2 
Chapter 
4 
Chapter 
5 
1 The system should be described prior to the assessment  
  
2 A comprehensive list of risk sources should be considered when 
identifying risks. 
   
3 Both known and unforeseen risks should be sought.  
  
4 An event should be identified by considering objectives and links 
with other events. 
   
5 Contributory factors to events should be identified.  
  
6 Consequences should be identified by considering all impact 
domains in line with both immediate and knock-on effects 
   
7 Risks should be properly categorised to help the management of 
all risks. 
   
8 All existing controls should be determined to estimate the real 
level of risk. 
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9 Risk scores should not be the sole basis on which to make risk-
based decisions. 
   
10 Uncertainties should be determined when assessing risks.  
  
11 Tolerability of a risk should be determined based on risk level, 
codes of practice and comparison with similar reference 
system(s). 
   
12 Risks can be prioritised by consideration of risk levels in 
combination with other factors. 
   
13 Eliminative, detective and reductive control actions should be 
listed.  
   
14 Risk assessment should be implemented utilising assessment 
methods as well as communication and consultation at all times. 
   
15 Risks should be documented, findings should be shared and risks 
should be monitored. 
   
16 Ordinary language should be used in risk assessment 
   
17 Improved approach should fit to an A4 sheet 
   
18 Framework should support a quick risk assessment 
   
19 Risk assessment should be systematic    
20 Framework should be easy to use 
   
21 Framework should be adaptable to all contexts and should guide 
the assessment of all types of risks 
   
22 Framework should be accessible 
   
23 Framework should be compatible with other risk assessments 
tools and methods 
   
6.4 PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
To design for an improved risk assessment approach, three concepts of a risk 
assessment framework were determined. These were the development of a 
guideline, a process diagram and a visual framework. Following the discussions 
made with the research group, such a guideline could be a long document that 
cannot be used in the everyday practices of healthcare staff. Some participants 
also criticised their many-paged risk assessment documents as requiring too 
much time, and healthcare staff tend not to read existing risk assessment policies 
and procedures. While a process diagram can show the risk assessment process 
from its inputs to outputs, it might not be detailed enough to highlight essential 
parts. Yet, a visual risk assessment framework can explain risk assessment 
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practice both by providing key points and demonstrating the risk assessment 
process with a sequence of activities.  
The proposed risk assessment framework has been iteratively developed to 
improve its usefulness and usability. Since one of the requirements was to 
represent the proposed approach on an A4 size piece of paper, the initial risk 
assessment framework was designed to fit on an A4 sheet and also to meet all 
requirements. In so doing, the researcher was inspired by the Inclusive Design 
Toolkit (Waller et al. 2007) and System Safety Assessment Toolkit (Ward et al. 
2017) that were designed at the Engineering Design Centre. After having 
discussions with the research team on the initial design of the proposed risk 
assessment framework, a need for an extension to the framework was revealed. 
It was not clear how to apply each step on the risk assessment model. At this 
point the researcher was influenced by the IDEO Method Cards (IDEO 2003). 
Although this approach would not meet with the requirement of fitting on an A4 
size paper, compromises were needed to begin to address the varied 
requirements. So, explanation cards were added to the proposed risk assessment 
framework.  
To document findings, a risk assessment form was designed by following the 
steps of the proposed risk assessment model. Then, the researcher conducted a 
case study and led regular group discussions to develop the proposed risk 
assessment framework further. At the same time, the researcher started 
conducting interviews with healthcare staff to evaluate the usability and 
usefulness of the proposed approach, and continuous improvements were made. 
This chapter provides the final version of the proposed risk assessment 
framework. 
The major changes in the design of the proposed risk assessment framework are 
shown in Figure 6.2. 
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In the earliest versions, the framework was drawn by providing questions in the 
circles of the risk assessment process cycle, and key prompts were listed in boxes 
outside of the cycle. While the framework explained the risk assessment process 
by addressing a set of questions, it was not always clear how to apply each step 
or activity that was described. Following the discussions made with the research 
group, questions turned to verb and noun formats, and the key prompts turned 
to explanation cards. Later on, a risk assessment form was added to allow the 
proposed risk assessment practice to be applied. In the final version, the 
framework consists of a risk assessment model, explanation cards and a risk 
assessment form. 
The proposed risk assessment model is drawn in a circular shape to allow 
iteration in the risk assessment process and different colours are used to 
highlight different stages (Figure 6.3).  
Figure 6.2 Initial versions of the risk assessment framework 
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Figure 6.3 Proposed risk assessment model 
 
It consists of identify, analyse, evaluate and manage phases, with four steps 
explained in each phase. Each step is explained with a card (Figure 6.4) to guide 
healthcare staff on its application by providing some prompts. 
 
Figure 6.4 Risk assessment explanation cards 
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These cards can be used to assist healthcare staff in both risk assessment and 
training purposes since they provide a generic understanding of risk assessment 
(see Appendix 9 for the explanation cards). While the front of the cards 
represents which step is being explained, by asking the associated question, the 
reverse provides a number of prompts to support the application of the step. 
6.4.1 IDENTIFY PHASE 
Identify is the first phase of the risk assessment process, where the system is 
described, potential undesired events are defined, their contributory factors are 
determined and their potential consequences are identified. Therefore, this 
phase seeks to answer the question “What might happen?” 
Figure 6.5 depicts a summary of the identify phase. Potential undesired events 
are defined by considering the system description. Following that, the factors 
contributing to these undesired events and their consequences are described. 
These steps are repeated until all potential events, their contributory factors, and 
their consequences are identified. 
 
Sub-system 
Element1 Element2  … Elementn  
 Undesired Event11 
Undesired Event12 
… 
 ontributory factor111 
 ontributory           
 ontributory factor11n 
 onsequence111 
 onsequence112 
 onsequence11n 
… 
contains of 
might be in relation 
to 
can be 
described 
from 
External factors 
Undesired Event1n 
… Sub-system 
Figure 6.5 Summary of risk identification phase  
… 
System 
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To illustrate an example, a Mental Health Trust can be determined as a system 
and the process of an individual’s admission is a sub-system, where entering an 
individual’s details into the electronic system is one of its elements. When 
determining this element, there might be an undesired event of mistyping the 
individual’s information due to the administrator being tired, the information 
being unreadable, the computer being broken, or the administrative staff being 
interrupted during the task of information entry. As a result, this might lead to 
mistreatment and distress as well as patient claims. So, risk can be defined, for 
instance, as a potential for mistyping the individual’s details that result in error in 
treatment. 
6.4.1.1 Describe system to be assessed 
The system to be assessed needs to be described in order to identify all potential 
risks within the system. How well the system is described affects how many risks 
can be recognised. Therefore, this step aims to describe the system by addressing 
the question: “What is being assessed and how does the system work?”, by 
identifying the: 
 assessment aim (“What does the system aim to achieve?”),  
 system elements (“What are the parts of the system?”),  
 interactions of the system elements (“What is the relationship between 
the system elements?”),  
 system boundary (“What is the scope of the system?”),  
 system context (“What is around the system to be assessed?”). 
6.4.1.2 Define undesired events 
Having built on the system description, potential undesired events are identified 
by responding to, “What could go wrong?” Undesired events are thus defined by 
considering the described system. 
Undesired events can be categorised to help risk management. Organisations 
should set their own categorisation scheme based on their needs. Undesired 
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events can be categorised as: clinical practice (e.g. delayed discharge), 
organisation (e.g. bed shortage), health and safety (e.g. fire), and information 
(e.g. breach of confidentiality), for example. 
6.4.1.3 Determine contributory factors 
Since multiple factors can contribute to the occurrence of an undesired event, it 
is essential to understand the reason behind the undesired event. These factors 
can be viewed as risk sources. Thus, this step aims to determine all contributory 
factors of undesired events by asking, “What could contribute to the occurrence 
of undesired events?”  
In Table 6.4, a classification scheme is presented to support consideration of all 
contributory factors. 
Table 6.4 Contributory factors list 
Contributory Factors Examples 
Patient factors 
Clinical condition, physical factors, social factors and psychological 
factors 
Staff factors 
Physical factors, psychological factors, social factors, cognitive factors, 
and skills and knowledge 
Task factors Unfamiliar task, difficult task and monotonous task 
Communication factors 
Poor verbal and written communication, lack of feedback between all 
stakeholders, and lack of information provided 
Equipment factors Poor design, equipment not working, and inadequate maintenance  
Control actions 
No actions, unsafe actions, actions too  late, too early or out of 
sequence and actions stopped too soon or applied too long 
Organisational factors 
Organisational structure, policies, procedures and protocols, 
staffing/workload factors, training and safety culture 
Environmental factors 
Physical environment, external environment (e.g. external authorities 
and suppliers) 
 
Consideration of all the contributory factors not only guides assessors to identify 
all those factors leading to the undesired events, it also helps the assessor 
determine the controls required to prevent undesired events. However, it must 
be noted that not all undesired events can be prevented. 
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6.4.1.4 Describe potential consequences 
Consequences are the outcomes of the potential undesired events. This step 
describes all potential consequences by addressing the question: “What are the 
potential consequences of the undesired events?” 
A single event might have multiple consequences. These consequences can be 
categorised based on the impacts on: 
 people (e.g. harm),   
 organisation (e.g. reputation), 
 environment (e.g. waste disposal). 
For instance, patient falls might lead to patient harm, formal complaints and low 
staff morale. In addition, the effects of these consequences can be: 
 immediate (e.g. if an old patient falls, this could result in hip fracture) 
 knock-on (e.g. hip fracture could lead to death in the long term) 
6.4.2 ANALYSE PHASE 
Having built on the identify phase, risks are analysed to determine their level of 
risk. This phase involves examining current controls, estimating severity of the 
consequence, estimating likelihood of occurrence and estimating risk level.  
Therefore, this step aims to address the question: “What is the level of risk?”  
To summarise the analysis phase, a diagram is shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Undesired Event11 
… 
Undesired Event1n 
… 
Undesired Eventnn 
Likelihood11 
Severity11 
Level of risk11 
Level of risknn 
… 
Level of risk1n 
has 
… 
are combined 
to estimate 
Figure 6.6 Summary of analyse phase 
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6.4.2.1 Examine current controls 
In the system to be assessed, there might already be some controls in place, and 
these current controls should be examined to estimate the real risk level. 
Therefore, this step seeks to respond to the question: “What are the current 
controls and how effective are they?” These controls can be: 
 to prevent undesired events,  
 to detect undesired events, 
 to reduce the severity of the consequences.  
This is visualised as a system in Figure 6.7 by considering the undesired event, 
contributory factors and consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although it is essential to determine all existing controls, their effectiveness 
should also be measured by determining how well they perform in achieving their 
intended goal. The effectiveness of existing controls can be categorised as: 
effective, neutral and ineffective. 
6.4.2.2 Estimate severity 
The consequences of an undesired event can have varying degrees of severity. 
Severity determines the significance of the consequences. Therefore, this aims to 
address the question “How severe are the described risks?” 
Figure 6.7 Potential controls in the system 
Undesired Event11 
ontributory factor111 
 ontributory factor112 
 ontributory factor11n 
 onsequence111 
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Detective 
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The severity of a risk can be estimated before considering the existing controls, 
by considering existing controls and after the implementation of the additional 
required controls. While estimating all would help management to understand 
the inherent, current and residual risks, it is the current severity of a 
consequence which needs to be determined to reveal the real level of a risk. This 
is estimated by identifying existing controls in the system and assessing their 
effectiveness.  
Severity can be categorised with a nominal descriptor as well as with descriptions 
provided for each consequence domain. For practical reasons, a score of 1 to 5 is 
assigned to each descriptor and description. For instance, Table 6.5 provides an 
example of such guidance provided for the consideration of harm. 
Table 6.5 Severity rating guidance by considering harm 
Severity Score 
Nominal 
Descriptor 
Explanation (harm) 
1 Negligible Minimal injury requiring no/minimal intervention or treatment 
2 Minor Minor injury or illness requiring minor intervention  
3 Moderate Moderate injury requiring professional intervention 
4 Major Major injury leading to long term incapacity/disability 
5 Catastrophic Death or multiple permanent injuries or irreversible health effects  
 
Since a risk might result in different degree of severity in the same consequence 
domain, a worst-credible strategy can be applied. For instance, patient falls might 
result in different degrees of harm such as minor injury, hip fracture or death. As 
patient falls leading to death would be a really rare case, hip fracture can be 
determined as a reasonably worst-credible case. 
6.4.2.3 Estimate Likelihood 
The likelihood of occurrence of a risk is evaluated when estimating the level of 
risk. This step seeks to respond to the question: “What is the likelihood of 
occurrence of the consequences?” 
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Likelihood can be categorised in three ways: with a nominal descriptor, time-
based descriptions and probabilistic descriptions. Again, a score of 1 to 5 is 
assigned for each descriptor and description. For instance, Table 6.6 
demonstrates an example for all likelihood categorisation schemes based on the 
existing guidance provided by the report of “A risk matrix for risk managers” 
(NPSA 2008). 
Table 6.6 Likelihood rating guidance 
Likelihood Score Nominal Descriptor Time-based Descriptions Probability Descriptions 
1 Rare 
Not expected to occur for 
years 
<0.1 % 
2 Unlikely At least annually 0.1- 1% 
3 Possible At least monthly 1-10 % 
4 Likely At least weekly 10-50 % 
5 Almost certain At least daily >50 % 
 
Probability descriptions can be used for one-off projects whereas time-based 
descriptions can be used for continuous operations. 
6.4.2.4 Estimate risk level 
Risk level is estimated by combining the severity and the likelihood of a risk to 
support risk based decisions. Therefore, this step seeks to respond to “What is 
the level of risk?” 
Risk level is estimated by multiplying the severity and likelihood ratings. Since 
scores are assigned to each descriptor, risk level is estimated by multiplying the 
severity and likelihood scores. Risk levels can be categorised as low (L), medium 
(M) and high (H) risks. Risk matrices are used as shown in Figure 4.1 to present 
the risk level as well as to support the evaluation of the risks.  
6.4.3 EVALUATE PHASE 
This step uses the findings from the analyse phase to compare them with the risk 
criteria to decide whether or not the risk is tolerable and whether there is any 
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need to take action. Thus, this phase aims to address “Is there any need for 
action?” To do so, the tolerability of a risk is evaluated, required controls are 
listed, required actions are defined and findings of the assessment are 
documented as well as shared. 
6.4.3.1 Evaluate risk tolerability 
Since risks operate at different levels, some are more or less tolerable than 
others. Therefore, this step seeks to answer the question: “How tolerable is the 
risk?”.  
Decisions on the tolerability of a risk can be taken by considering the risk in 
combination with the following factors: 
 explicit risk level 
 written rules 
 potential benefits of taking the risk. 
The explicit level of risk can give some insights into the tolerability of the risk. 
Low risks, which are assigned to green coloured cells as in Figure 4.1, are often 
found to be generally tolerable. Medium risks, assigned to orange coloured cells, 
are generally undesirable and red ones, assigned to red coloured cells, are 
generally intolerable.  
6.4.3.2 List required controls 
Putting additional controls into the system to be assessed can modify risks. To do 
so, first all the controls required should be listed. Therefore; this step seeks to 
address “What new controls are required to modify the risk?” These controls can 
be listed by considering:  
 ineffective existing controls 
 contributory factors 
 controls to prevent undesired events 
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 controls to detect undesired events 
 controls to reduce the severity of consequences. 
However, it should be also noted that new controls might raise new risks in the 
system. 
6.4.3.3 Define required actions 
To put such controls in place, actions are needed. Therefore, this step seeks to 
address the question “What actions are required to implement the new controls?” 
This step aims to define: 
 a list of required actions 
 action prioritisation 
 management responsibility for these actions 
 review frequency of the risks. 
Required actions are determined through taking into consideration the list of 
required controls. The recommended actions should be Specific (e.g. what, why 
and how), Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely (SMART). Actions can be 
prioritised by considering the criticality of the risk(s) to be modified (e.g. level of 
risk, the rapidity with which the risk will manifest itself and its detectability), 
organisational objectives, legal requirements, and required resources. 
Management responsibility is assigned by considering the estimated level of risk, 
and if the assigned staff do not resolve a risk, it can be escalated to a higher 
managerial level. 
To check whether or not the defined action plan is in place, regular reviews can 
be organised and additional reviews can be arranged if necessary. 
CHAPTER 6: PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
 
 153 
6.4.3.4 Document and share findings 
All assessed risks should be documented to review risks and share findings. This 
step, therefore, seeks to address “What are the findings and what lessons are 
learnt?”  
Documented risks can be changed over time, and, therefore, they should be 
reviewed. However, they should be documented first. A risk assessment 
document should cover the following information: 
 description of the system to be assessed 
 limitations and assumptions made in the assessment 
 assessment methodology 
 risk assessment findings and results 
 discussions of the results 
 references. 
Assessment findings should be shared to make sure all lessons are learnt by all 
relevant stakeholders. The assessor or the assessment team should share findings 
with all relevant staff. Having implemented the required actions, updated 
feedback is provided to the assessor or the assessment team as well as all 
relevant staff. Additionally, feedback can be also given to the relevant 
stakeholders. Following this, the whole organisation can be informed about the 
significant findings of the assessment. This can be achieved by establishing 
reports or risk newsletters as well as by informing people during meetings.  
6.4.4 MANAGE PHASE 
This phase involves management of all steps to conduct effective risk assessment 
by seeking to answer the question “How to manage?”. In so doing, a team should 
be assembled, historical data should be reviewed, techniques should be 
identified to conduct assessment and all activities related to these should be 
managed at all stages of the risk assessment process. 
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6.4.4.1 Assemble team 
Effective risk assessment practice requires the involvement of a multidisciplinary 
team. This step aims to maintain and sustain appropriate people in the team by 
seeking to address “Who should be in the assessment team?” To assemble a 
team, it is recommended to have at least: 
 a facilitator with experience in risk assessment, 
 a multidisciplinary group of experts in the system to be assessed. 
A properly selected team can help identify more risks objectively. Selection of the 
team members would depend on the assessment context. It is desirable to have 
an external team member, who is not directly involved in the system, in the 
assessment team to prevent cognitive bias. 
6.4.4.2 Review historical data 
Historical data is useful to predict future events that follow past trends. To 
benefit from the historical data, this step aims to respond to, “What can be learnt 
from historical data?” 
Historical data can be obtained from incident reports, risk registers, quality and 
performance reports, organisational or national safety alerts, audit reports and 
national or international reports. 
However, it should be noted that the healthcare system is a dynamic system. 
Thus, not all events follow the same trends, and risks might change over time. 
That is why additional techniques are employed to predict future events. 
6.4.4.3 Identify techniques 
There are a large number of risk assessment techniques available in the 
literature. Risk assessment techniques are used to reveal known and unforeseen 
risks and to carry out effective assessments. Therefore, this step aims to address 
“Which techniques should be used?” 
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Different techniques can be used in different circumstances. System diagrams can 
be used to describe systems. Peer review and team discussions can be used to 
make better judgements. Brainstorming, structured what-if and Delphi 
techniques can be used to identify large sets of risks. Bow-tie (or barrier) analysis 
can be used to display the pathway of an event from its contributory factors to 
consequences as well as to examine current controls. Furthermore, more 
structured risk assessment techniques, such as FMEA or HAZOP, can be used to 
identify the ways failures occur and the ways they could be treated. 
Additionally, risk assessment forms can be used to conduct risk assessments. The 
risk assessment form that was designed for the application of the risk assessment 
model developed here, and which also documents findings, is given in Figure 6.8. 
Figure 6.8 Proposed risk assessment form 
6.4.4.4 Manage activities 
A large number of activities can take place when conducting a risk assessment. 
Each risk assessment step is tied to another one, and all steps are iteratively 
repeated until all risks are assessed. Therefore, it is necessary to manage all 
activities and to deploy the best use of people, data and techniques throughout 
risk assessment.  
This step addresses the question: “How should people, data and techniques be 
deployed throughout risk assessment?” Thus, it is essential to: 
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 communicate with all stakeholders of the assessment at all times 
 review the assessed risks on a regular basis as well as when there is a 
change in the system 
 iterate through all steps of the risk assessment framework 
 tailor the framework to the assessment needs. 
Communication with the assessment team and other relevant stakeholders is key 
to good risk assessment. Building strong communication between relevant 
stakeholders not only helps towards effective risk assessment; it also facilitates 
the sharing of lessons learnt from the risk assessment.  
All assessed risks should be reviewed on a regular basis as well as when there is a 
change in the system or it is made otherwise necessary. The review frequency 
can be set by considering the tolerability of the risks. For instance, tolerable risks 
can be reviewed annually; undesirable risks quarterly; and intolerable risks 
monthly. 
Risk assessment is an iterative process. Iterations can be between different steps 
or the entire risk assessment process may need iteration. 
While a number of prompts have already been provided in order to conduct an 
effective risk assessment, the framework should be tailored to the needs of the 
risk assessment.  
6.5 DISCUSSION 
The proposed risk assessment framework aims to support healthcare staff in 
carrying out better risk assessment practice. BSI (2009) states, “The success of risk 
management will depend on the effectiveness of the management framework 
providing the foundations and arrangements that will embed it throughout the 
organisation at all levels.” Designing a framework has also been found to be 
useful by other researchers in supporting healthcare staff with a variety of 
patient safety topics (Hinrichs 2009; Simsekler 2014; Card 2013). For instance, 
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Simsekler (2014) designed a risk identification framework to represent the inputs 
and outputs of a risk identification process and found it useful in recognising 
more risks; and Card (2013) developed a risk control tool to generate stronger 
risk controls. This research, similarly, proposes a risk assessment framework by 
building on both of these researchers’ studies. 
Turning to the requirements listed in Table 6.3, the proposed framework was 
designed to meet all requirements. However, there were two requirements that 
could not be met: “The improved approach should fit to an A4 sheet” and 
“Uncertainties should be determined when assessing risks”. While the early 
versions of the risk assessment framework aimed to fit on an A4 page, it was 
difficult to address the challenges discussed in this thesis and also meet this 
requirement. The framework aims to minimise uncertainties by encouraging the 
consideration of detectability and team involvement. However, it is not designed 
to measure uncertainty. This was due to the fact that most of the risks identify to 
existing issues and even consideration of two dimensions (likelihood and 
consequence) was problematic. Also, it could have increased the time needed to 
conduct the risk assessment, and minimising the time taken was also another 
requirement. This was also a requirement that can arguably be determined as 
met. There are different types of risk assessments, as explained in Figure 5.9, and 
not all of them require all steps to be completed. Thus, the framework allows 
flexibility, but encourages the completion of all steps when necessary. While it 
may still be thought to be time consuming by healthcare staff, the appropriate 
application of the proposed framework is believed to save time overall by 
minimising harm and loss that might occur in the future.  
Yet, it must be mentioned that there could be other ways of improving current 
risk assessment practice, and so different ways of designing an improved risk 
assessment practice need to be considered. This study focuses solely on what is 
believed to be possible to change and to implement, but still the framework 
could have also been different in two ways: the terminology and the concept of 
risk assessment.  
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Regarding the terminology, the researcher aimed to limit using risk terms (e.g. 
hazard and risk) to ensure the simplicity of the framework. There has been 
ambiguity in the understanding of risk terms in even safety-critical industries 
(Aven 2012a; Aven 2010; Johansen and Rausand 2015). Not surprisingly, the 
findings of this research study also reveal that the use of risk terminology can be 
a problem. The simplification of these terms was also captured as a requirement. 
Thus, the proposed framework aimed to use ordinary language. In addition, an 
explanation card was provided just to describe all terms used in the proposed risk 
assessment framework.  
Turning to the concept of risk assessment, the proposed framework used the 
term risk as a “potential undesired event that has effect(s) on objectives”. 
Although this definition is arguable and does not meet with the ISO definition as 
“effect of uncertainty on objectives” (BSI 2009), the evidence so far shows that 
risks are often used to refer to a current problem. Thus, this research followed a 
traditional approach by considering risk as a potential undesired event.  
Additionally, consideration of the Safety II approach might make a significant 
contribution to the current risk assessment practice. Hollnagel et al. (2015) 
published a white paper on the need to move from Safety I to Safety II in 
healthcare. Therefore, the proposed framework could have been designed to 
consider “What does the system aim to achieve?”, “What are the functions or 
elements in the system, and how do they operate?”, “How do things go right?” 
and “Which actions should we take and in what order of priority to make sure 
things go right?” However, this approach has not yet been widely used and there 
are a number of criticisms regarding the usability and adoptability of Safety II 
(Carthey 2013; Larouzée and Guarnieri 2015; Roelen et al. 2011). In fact, there is 
even little evidence to show that risk assessment, from the Safety I perspective, 
could have been sufficiently applied in healthcare (Card et al. 2012b; Dul et al. 
2012; Gray and Cohen 2012; Vincent et al. 2013; Ward et al. 2010). Thus, the 
framework is predominantly built on the Safety l approach by providing a number 
of prompts that were generated from the limitations of the current risk 
assessment practice and the requirements captured to improve current practice.  
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6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the risk assessment approach developed in this 
research. It is an approach which has taken into account all the requirements of 
as well as challenges in the current risk assessment practice. The proposed 
practice is represented with a risk assessment framework. The framework aims to 
support healthcare staff in risk assessment, and it involves a risk assessment 
model, explanation cards and an assessment form. The risk assessment model 
consists of 12 main steps, with 4 steps to be considered at each of these 12 steps. 
Each step is explained with an explanation card to provide a better understanding 
of how each step can be applied; and the risk assessment form is provided to 
support the application of risk assessment practice and to document findings. 
The proposed risk assessment framework was developed after evaluating the 
general principles behind different risk assessment guidelines, as well as by 
considering the ways in which current risk assessment practice in hospitals needs 
improving. For instance, this framework encourages a consideration of the 
system to be assessed not only from its elements, but also their interactions. 
Additionally, it determines contributory factors by also determining control 
actions, and it encourages the determination of multiple factors when making 
risk-based decisions rather than solely relying on risk matrices. Since the 
framework clarifies the fundamentals of risk assessment practice, adopts 
elements of best practice from safety-critical industries, and is based directly on 
research findings regarding current healthcare risk assessment practice, it is 
expected to provide adequate support to healthcare staff on understanding and 
conducting risk assessment. 
The next chapter evaluates the proposed risk assessment framework. 
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CHAPTER 7  
EVALUATION OF PROPOSED RISK 
ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION OF PROPOSED 
APPROACH 
The previous chapter proposed a risk assessment framework to support 
healthcare staff during risk assessment. This chapter evaluates this framework to 
determine potential improvements as well as to test its usefulness, perceived 
usability and expected value through conducting a case study, interviews and a 
questionnaire. In so doing, this chapter aims to address the research question: 
“What views do healthcare staff have on the proposed risk assessment practice?”  
7.2 METHODS 
As mentioned earlier in Section 6.2, this chapter investigates the right-hand-side 
of the Vee developmental model (Figure 6.1) utilised in designing the proposed 
risk assessment framework. Evaluation of the framework was conducted through 
group discussions, a case study, interviews and a questionnaire. These methods 
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were particularly selected to minimise the time required to be involved and to 
maximise the number of participants involved. 
A case study was undertaken by the researcher to test the proposed practice and 
to show an example to participants of its application. A scenario was developed 
through reviewing the literature to provide a real-life example, and the proposed 
framework was used to conduct the risk assessment. The scenario for the case 
study was as follows: 
In a hospital setting, a neuro-rehabilitation unit will be moved from an old 
building to a new building, and the standards of the patient rooms will be 
changed. Since there is a change in the system, a risk assessment will be 
conducted to assess risks in the new neuro-rehabilitation unit before the 
move occurs. As part of this, a risk assessment will be conducted to assess 
all risks in relation to the patient’s accommodation in a single-bed patient 
room.  
The case study was first discussed with three members of the research group 
and, in turn, necessary adjustments were made to the design of the case study as 
well as for the framework. The completed case study was then shared with 
interviewees to represent an example of the potential use of the proposed 
approach.  
Informal interviews were arranged by sending invitation emails to potential 
participants. In addition to the use of existing contacts, the researcher identified 
potential participants through reviewing profiles of NHS staff on LinkedIn. The 
selection of these participants was based on their profile information to ensure 
they had sufficient experience of risk assessment. After filtering their profiles 
based on their job titles, a number of participants were selected and sent the 
invitation email, and the interview time was arranged with those participants 
who were willing to participate. Prior to the interviews, the risk assessment 
framework and an evaluation form were sent to the participants, and participants 
were informed about the research study and interview schedule. Interviews were 
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conducted face-to-face or by telephone to reach more participants from different 
geographical regions in England.  
Interviews consisted of two parts. In the first part, the researcher provided the 
risk assessment framework explanation cards to the participants, and explained 
the proposed approach using the case study as an example. The participants 
were allowed to interact at any point. In the second part, discussions were held 
with the participants regarding their feedback on the framework. 
Interview participants then completed a questionnaire following discussions (see 
Table 7.2). If the interview was a telephone interview, participants delivered their 
questionnaire responses by email. The questionnaire consisted of three parts. 
Firstly, there were four questions that were designed to understand the 
characteristics of the respondents (e.g. job title, years of experience and 
frequency of involvement in a risk assessment). Secondly, seventeen 
predetermined statements were provided to participants to decide the level of 
their agreement or rejection of the given statement through the use of a Likert 
scale (i.e. strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree). Among 
these seventeen statements, eight were about the usefulness of the proposed 
approach, three were about usability and six were about expected value. In the 
last part of the questionnaire, participants were encouraged to respond to three 
open-ended questions to help the researcher improve the current version of the 
proposed approach. 
7.3 RESULTS FROM THE EVALUATION  
The case study was used to test the risk assessment framework as well as to test 
to provide an example of its potential application. Different versions of the 
proposed risk assessment framework were used to test how each step functions 
with the predetermined risk assessment scenario. For instance, the first version 
identified risk sources first and then risk scenarios. Subsequently, this was 
reversed, with the identification of undesired events coming first and then 
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contributory factors, which could then be considered as risk sources. The 
difficulty of identifying risk sources was also observed in current practice. Yet, it 
was found to be easier to identify a potential undesired event and then consider 
all contributory factors that would give rise to it. 
To test the proposed risk assessment framework, the researcher conducted a risk 
assessment by considering the given scenario through completing the designed 
risk assessment form in line with following prompts. Figure 7.1 partially 
demonstrates the completed risk assessment form for the given scenario (see 
Appendix 10 for the complete risk assessment form).  
 
Figure 7.1 A completed risk assessment form  
 
The interview and questionnaire were conducted to evaluate the experience of 
potential users of the proposed risk assessment framework. There were ten 
participants that were involved in both the interview and questionnaire. While 
two of these participants (F6 and T10) were previously involved in other studies 
conducted in this research, eight of the interviewees were new to it. The 
characteristics of the participants are given in Table 7.1. 
CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION OF PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH  
164 
Table 7.1 Characteristics of participants for evaluation questionnaire 
Identifier 
Interview 
Type 
Interview 
Duration 
Type of 
Trust 
Position 
Years of 
Experience 
in NHS 
Frequency of 
Involvement in 
a Risk 
Assessment 
F6 Face-to-
face 
120 mins Acute 
teaching 
An 
anaesthetist 
9 Rarely 
T10 
Face-to-
face 
120 mins Acute 
specialist 
Risk manager 30 Daily 
F7 Face-to-
face 
90 mins Acute 
teaching 
Clinical 
scientist 
15 1 per week 
F8 Face-to-
face 
83 mins Acute 
specialist 
Head of risk 
management 
15 Daily 
F9 Face-to-
face 
83 mins Acute 
specialist 
Head of 
governance 
and 
improvement 
8 Rarely 
T11 Telephone 29 mins Other Consultant in 
risk 
leadership 
25 A few times in 
a week 
T12 Telephone 68 mins Acute Quality and 
safety 
manager 
10 Daily 
F10 Face-to-
face 
86 mins Acute 
teaching 
Clinical 
engineer 
15 1 per 2 months 
F11 Face-to-
face 
82 mins Acute 
teaching 
Corporate 
risk/ project 
manager 
8 Weekly 
T13 Telephone 28 mins Other Clinical 
director  
35 At least 
monthly 
 
The average completion time for each interview was approximately 79 minutes, 
and the average number of years’ experience in NHS for a participant was 17. 
Observations from the interviews reveal that participants with risk management 
as part of their main responsibility or with the least experience of risk assessment 
tended to express greater interest than other participants. Yet, they were all 
interested in the research and the proposed framework. 
Since the interviews were informal and not recorded, the main results were 
generated via the questionnaire. Following an interview, participants were 
requested to rate their acceptance or rejection of a list of given statements by 
selecting “strongly agree”, “agree”, “neutral”, “disagree” or “strongly disagree”. 
Table 7.2 shows 10 participants’ responses to the listed statements. 
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Table 7.2 Results from the evaluation questionnaire 
 
Statements 
St
ro
n
gl
y 
A
gr
e
e 
A
gr
e
e 
N
e
u
tr
al
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
St
ro
n
gl
y 
D
is
ag
re
e 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
Usefulness 
I would be likely to identify more risks by using the 
RAF 
2 3 4 1  3.6 
I would be likely to analyse risks more effectively by 
using the RAF 
 9 1   3.9 
I would be likely to better evaluate risks by using the 
RAF 
1 8 1   4 
I would be likely to assess risks more systematically by 
using the RAF 
4 3 3   4.1 
I found the RAF useful to guide me on risk assessment 3 6 1   4.2 
Using the RAF could make me more confident about 
risk assessment 
2 4 4   3.8 
Using the RAF could improve current risk assessment 
practice 
5 4 1   4.4 
Using the RAF could make patients safer 3 2 4 1  3.7 
Perceived usability 
I found the RAF clear and understandable 3 6 1   4.2 
I found the RAF easy to use 2 7 1   4.1 
I found the RAF easily compatible to our existing 
approach 
2 7 1   4.1 
Expected value 
The RAF improved my current knowledge on risk 
assessment 
1 3 4 2  3.3 
The RAF increased my awareness on risk assessment 1 1 6 2  3.1 
The RAF could be beneficial to guide me on risk 
assessment 
4 3 2 1  4 
I can see the value in having the RAF 6 2 2   4.4 
It is worth spending more time on risk assessment to 
use the RAF 
3 4 3   4 
Switching from the old approach to the RAF is 
essential 
3 3 3  1 3.7 
 
The average rating of the responses for each statement is shown in Table 7.2 and 
was calculated by assigning a score to each Likert scale category (i.e. strongly 
agree=5, agree=4, neutral=3, disagree=2 and strongly disagree=1) in order to aid 
numerical analysis.  
In relation to usefulness, participants mostly agreed with the given statements. 
Participants agreed that the proposed risk assessment framework (RAF) would 
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improve their risk assessment practice with an average agreement rating of 4.4 
out of 5. Regarding each step of the risk assessment, the RAF was found to be 
most helpful in terms of the risk evaluation step with an average agreement 
rating of 4. However, one participant claimed that it would not help her identify 
more risks or make patients safer at all. Despite this, all participants found it 
useful in guiding them on risk assessment with an average agreement rating of 
4.2. 
Although there were only three questions asked in relation to perceived usability, 
participants strongly agreed with the statements provided in this part. While only 
one participant was neutral, all other participants agreed or strongly agreed with 
these statements in relation to the RAF being clear and understandable, easy to 
use and easily compatible with their existing approach. 
However, lower agreement ratings were received in relation to the expected 
value. Participants were more neutral on statements such as the RAF improving 
their current knowledge of risk assessment (with an average agreement rating of 
3.3 out of 5) or increasing their awareness of risk assessment (with an average 
agreement rating of 3.1 out of 5). This could be due to participants’ significant 
experience of risk assessment. However, they mostly agreed that the RAF could 
be beneficial in guiding them in assessing risk (with an average agreement rating 
of 4) or they agreed that they could see the value in having the RAF (with an 
average agreement rating of 4.4). This, however, was not enough for them to 
strongly agree that they would switch from the old approach to the RAF, which 
was still reasonably agreed with an average agreement rating of 3.7. 
In addition to these results, participants were given the opportunity to make brief 
comments on three open-ended questions to improve current versions. When it 
was asked “What is familiar and what is new about the RAF?”, they all provided a 
brief explanation. For instance, T13 stated, “The general framework is familiar. 
However, it builds in a more robust and comprehensive approach to risk 
assessment and risk control”. F10 recognised that the iterative cycle reflects the 
design process toolkit and highlighted the reduced jargon and technical terms. 
Similarly, T11 pointed out that “the methodology is presented in much more user-
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friendly terms than by experts such as ISO 31000 and the Health and Safety 
Executive”. 
T12 highlighted that the inclusion of the contributory factors was the part she 
liked most. She also added “I would see my primary use of the RAF as a training 
aid used during face to face training sessions, with staff then able to use the RAF 
as a post-training prompt to remind them of the steps they need to follow when 
carrying out a risk assessment.” 
Other respondents stated that the RAF is familiar to them in terms of its main 
steps, but they found the details to be new, systematic and helpful.   
Participants were also asked “What changes would you recommend to improve 
the RAF?”, and seven of the participants responded to this question. T12 
provided three recommendations: to have stronger linkages from contributory 
factors and controls/actions, to consider estimating the target risk score as well 
as the actual risk score, and to consider when to conduct a comprehensive risk 
assessment. T11 recommended having stronger links to objectives and to 
promote the framework for assessing opportunities as well as downside risks. T13 
recommended the need for more explanation of what ‘system’ means.  
T10 suggested providing additional cards to explain a number of risk assessment 
techniques to support assessment; whereas F9 found the card that lists 
techniques as too complicated and not very helpful. F8 recommended tailoring 
the cards to each target audience. Similarly, F7 recommended considering 
additional versions for specific uses as in medical device risk assessment, and F11 
recommended having separate versions for clinical risk assessment and 
organisational risk assessment. 
Finally, participants were given additional space to add further comments, and 
seven participants provided comments in this space. T10 stated that the RAF 
follows their new risk management training handbook closely, F9 found the 
framework to be well presented and simple to understand, and she stated that it 
could be used as a teaching aid. F7 found it very accessible and easy to follow. 
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F10 stated that she would like to implement it, F11 found it to be a useful tool, 
and F6 found the team approach necessary and found the RAF to be “really 
good”. T13 also appreciated the work by stating, “I think this is an excellent 
framework that will help many people”. 
Although promising results were received from the evaluation of the RAF, it must 
be mentioned that these responses only reflect the opinions of the participants. 
However, given considering the participants’ experience in risk assessment, their 
feedback is of greater value than a higher number of responses received from 
participants having no experience in risk assessment. 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
The results provided an initial evaluation of the proposed risk assessment 
framework (RAF). Overall, the results were mainly promising and participants 
were satisfied with the usefulness of such a framework. They considered its use 
as a training package as well as a tool to assess risks. Yet, results were not that 
promising when it came to participants’ opinion on the essentiality of the 
replacement of their existing risk assessment approach with the proposed risk 
assessment framework. Furthermore, the RAF would not help healthcare 
practitioners overcome the barrier of limited time availability as the proposed 
practice encourages team involvement and follows a more detailed procedure 
than simply filling in a form, checklist or just relying on their professional 
judgement. However, it was noted that the proposed framework should be 
tailored depending on the needs. Considering the fact that risk assessment in 
hospitals is conducted in different ways as shown in Figure 5.9, not all risk 
assessments require such a comprehensive risk assessment. A comprehensive 
risk assessment can be considered when there is a change in the system (e.g. 
change in devices, people and process), a requirement (e.g. reports from external 
authorities), an on-going unresolved issue that raises risks, or potential for severe 
harm or loss (NPSA 2006; Hollnagel et al. 2013; NHS England 2015d). 
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Although the usefulness and perceived usability of the proposed risk assessment 
was evaluated in this chapter, the framework itself would make little impact on 
the system unless the assessment is taken a step further, and recommended 
actions are implemented. However, feedback indicates that it is thought that the 
RAF would improve current risk assessment. Indeed, good risk assessment would 
lead to better decisions made on risks, and subsequently better use of resources 
for modifying risks (DoD 1984). However, it must be noted that risk assessment is 
not a stand-alone activity, and it must be combined with other risk management 
activities.  
While positive feedback was received from the evaluation of the proposed 
framework, the limitations of the evaluation process should be also mentioned. 
These were in relation to the selection of the participants and the design of the 
evaluation process. The researcher intentionally selected participants with 
experience in risk assessment to obtain more feedback on its improvement. 
However, participants with no experience in risk assessment might provide 
different responses. Although their responses would also contribute to this 
research, there could have been a possibility that they might not have known 
existing practice. Participants were selected from a range of professions including 
both clinical and non-clinical staff, and the framework was designed for all 
hospital staff that is involved in a risk assessment.  
More importantly, the evaluation process has limits due to the methods used as 
well as methods not selected. The evaluation questionnaire was not designed to 
contain duplicating and reversing questions. Also, the questions were phrased 
positively, which might lead to various forms of bias including acquiescence bias 
and confirmation bias. Consequently, respondents might have biased selections 
made in favour of this research. Furthermore, the case study did not really allow 
participants to actually use the proposed risk assessment framework. Participants 
could have given more comments as well as more reliable responses in terms of 
the practicality of the proposed framework. 
Alternatively, the evaluation process could have been designed differently to 
minimise any types of bias. A control study could have been used to evaluate the 
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proposed framework by involving two groups. First, both groups could have been 
given the same case study and expected to conduct a risk assessment by the 
same risk assessment guideline. This is to measure the ability of each group in 
conducting risk assessment. Later on, one group could have been provided an 
FMEA template with guidance and the second group could have been provided 
the proposed risk assessment framework to conduct a risk assessment on 
another the same case study. The findings of these two groups could have been 
then compared by considering the number of risks and contributory factors listed 
and the quality of control measures advised in order to demonstrate the real 
effect of the use of the proposed framework. However, this study was designed 
to only conduct an initial evaluation due to the limited accessibility and time 
availability of healthcare staff. 
7.5 SUMMARY 
The evaluation presented in this chapter of the risk assessment framework 
developed in this research provided valuable insights in terms of its usefulness, 
perceived usability and expected value as well as potential improvements. 
Participants agreed most that the RAF could improve current risk assessment, 
and they highlighted its value for use in training purposes. 
Overall, the results indicate that the RAF would support healthcare staff in 
conducting risk assessments, and that its successful application could improve 
current risk assessment practice in hospitals. 
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION TO CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a brief response to each research question, discusses this 
study’s contribution to the field of risk assessment research and the healthcare 
industry, and outlines a number of proposals for further work. 
8.2 KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study set out to design a good risk assessment approach in hospitals to 
improve safety by investigating: 
How can current risk assessment practice be improved to ensure safety in 
hospitals? 
In order to address this research question, current risk assessment practice was 
investigated, the existing challenges were identified and a new approach was 
proposed by learning from prescribed good practice. In line with the main 
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research question, the following five research sub-questions were investigated 
throughout this research to respond to the main research question. 
1. What is prescribed good practice in risk assessment? 
2. How is current risk assessment performed in hospitals? 
3. What are the problems with current risk assessment practice in hospitals?  
4. How would good risk assessment practice be tailored to hospitals? 
5. What views do healthcare staff have on the proposed risk assessment 
practice? 
8.2.1 WHAT IS PRESCRIBED GOOD PRACTICE IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT? 
This research reviewed a number of national and international safety and risk 
management standards to describe prescribed good risk assessment practice. 
Although good practice in other industries might not necessarily be the best 
practice in healthcare, key elements of good risk assessment practice were 
identified in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 by considering their applicability to the 
hospital setting (see Table 6.1).  
Overall, risk assessment practice involves three steps: risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation. The risk identification process involves taking into 
account risk sources, events, contributory factors and consequences. The risk 
analysis process includes the examination of existing controls, and the 
consideration of likelihood and impacts as well as other factors such as 
detectability, vulnerability and speed of onset. The risk evaluation process 
consists of determining risk tolerability and risk priority.  
However, there are some particular details that matter for good risk assessment 
practice, including a clear system description, the identification of risks from their 
sources, having good communication between staff, the involvement of the right 
people, the use of the most appropriate techniques, the documentation of the 
assessment findings, and the identification of relevant actions following the risk 
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assessment. Indeed, good risk assessment practice requires multiple factors to be 
taken into account together, since risk assessment is not a stand-alone activity. 
In the healthcare literature, there have been few studies published to provide 
guidelines on good risk assessment practice. While Simsekler (2014) conducted a 
research study that provides guidelines on risk identification and Card (2013) on 
risk control, there are a few studies conducted on risk assessment as a whole to 
describe good risk assessment practice. For instance, the National Patient Safety 
Agency has published two key reports, which are Risk Assessment Programme 
(NPSA 2006) and Healthcare Risk Assessment Made Easy (NPSA 2007), to guide 
healthcare staff on risk assessment. Even though the former report does provide 
a certain level of detail on how to conduct risk assessment, it advocates 
conducting risk assessment with cause-effect thinking, which supports the notion 
that risk assessment is built on traditional accident models. Additionally, the 
aforementioned report still does not offer much detail on how to analyse and 
evaluate risks. The latter report is also too generic and does not go into much 
detail on how to apply each step. 
This research, however, modifies and combines the risk assessment standards 
provided from national and international organisations to describe good risk 
assessment practice. It treats risk assessment as something more than just a 
process. Thus, good risk assessment practice is described by also considering pre-
and post-risk assessment activities. Moreover, this research describes good 
practice from the perspective of modern accident models where multiple factors 
can contribute to the occurrence of a potential undesired event, instead of simply 
examining causal relationships.  
8.2.2 HOW IS CURRENT RISK ASSESSMENT PERFORMED IN 
HOSPITALS? 
Current risk assessment practice in hospitals in NHS England was investigated in 
Chapters 4 and 5 using mixed methods, including document analysis, interviews, 
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questionnaires and a review of risk data. Analysis of all datasets reveals that 
there are three types of risk assessment (see Figure 5.9), which are: 
 individual patient-based risk assessment, usually made using professional 
judgement or a specific risk assessment form, the findings from which are 
recorded in the patient records system;  
 operational risk assessment, which can be initial, specialised or 
comprehensive, and which is made using professional judgement, specific 
risk assessment forms or risk assessment techniques, the findings from 
which are recorded in a risk register database;  
 strategic risk assessment, often made through professional judgement, 
the findings being recorded in the Board Assurance Framework (BAF). 
Different hospitals might assess risks slightly differently due to the risk matrix 
they used, the guidance provided, the assessors’ professional judgement and 
hospital type. However, almost all of them use a similar process when assessing 
risks and predominantly use risk matrices when assessing operational risks. 
In the healthcare literature, risk assessment often refers to specific assessments 
rather than to an overview of all risk assessment types. For example, numerous 
papers have been published on the assessment of venous thromboembolism 
(Wilson 2015), falls (Hendrich et al. 1995), and self-harm (O’Rourke and Bird 
2001) related risks. There are also a few studies that have conducted 
comprehensive risk assessments (Bonfant et al. 2010; Broggi et al. 2013; Alba 
Mesa et al. 2015). However, none of them provide a holistic understanding of all 
risk assessment types performed in hospitals.  
8.2.3 WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT RISK 
ASSESSMENT PRACTICE IN HOSPITALS?  
A number of problems were highlighted in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 in relation to the 
design of the risk assessment process (e.g. the risk matrix, the guidance provided 
and assessment steps), to its application (e.g. subjective judgement, lack of use of 
risk assessment techniques and the misuse of the risk terms) and to other factors 
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(e.g. limited time availability, poor risk-related communication and the perceived 
value of risk assessment) (see Table 5.12). The findings of this study reveal that 
most of the challenges stem from there being only a basic understanding of risk 
assessment.  
This study provides evidence that supports and extends the existing knowledge of 
the challenges of current risk assessment practice. For instance, it was already 
claimed that a risk register system tends to be used as a bureaucratic data 
collection system (Illingworth 2015a). This study extends the existing knowledge 
that the risk register systems can be also used as a political tool to unfairly garner 
attention from higher managerial levels. Additionally, while risk scoring was 
claimed to be subjective (Card et al. 2013), this study provides evidence that 
healthcare staff may not use guidance to score risks, which increases the 
possibility of bias in risk scoring.  
8.2.4 HOW WOULD GOOD RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE BE 
TAILORED TO HOSPITALS? 
This research study reveals that there is indeed great potential to improve 
current risk assessment practice in hospitals. This research focused on designing a 
risk assessment framework by learning from prescribed good practice as well as 
current challenges. Good practice, in this research, refers to risk assessment 
practice that helps address the existing challenges and that is built on the 
prescribed good risk assessment of safety-critical industries. However, there 
could have been a variety of other ways to improve current risk assessment 
practice. For instance, improvements can be focused on organisational culture, 
regulations, or perhaps designing specific risk assessment techniques. Indeed, a 
combination of all these would have the greatest impact on the improvement of 
current risk assessment practice. However, this study focused solely on what is 
believed to be possible to change, and thus a new risk assessment framework 
was developed. To do so, requirements were captured from the literature review 
(Chapter 2) and the review of current risk assessment practice (Chapters 4 and 5) 
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to design the proposed risk assessment framework, following the Vee 
developmental model (see Table 6.3). 
The proposed risk assessment framework aimed to support healthcare staff in 
better risk assessment practices. It consists of a risk assessment model, 
explanation cards with a number of key prompts to help implement the model, 
and a risk assessment form to allow its users to actually conduct a risk 
assessment following the proposed risk assessment model.  
In hospitals, the risk assessment process is often described by a simple flow chart 
that does not provide sufficient detail on how to conduct risk assessment or by 
written statements that mostly focus on responsibilities rather than how to do. 
Even if some hospitals recommend implementation of a well respected risk 
assessment standard of ISO 31000, there are no details provided on how to 
transfer that knowledge into healthcare.   
In the healthcare literature, there have been a number of studies published to 
encourage the healthcare industry to learn from safety-critical industries due to 
their risk assessment practice being considered as good or even better than the 
healthcare industry (Macrae 2008; Sujan et al. 2017; Vincent et al. 2014; The 
Health Foundation 2012; Ward et al. 2010). However, only Ward et al. (2010) 
conducts a study that tailors the prospective hazard analysis techniques for the 
use of healthcare staff by simplifying them and designing a toolkit.  
This study; however, focuses on how to conduct risk assessment by tailoring the 
prescribed good risk assessment practice by also addressing the existing 
challenges.  
8.2.5 WHAT VIEWS DO HEALTHCARE STAFF HAVE ON THE 
PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE? 
Development and testing of the framework were conducted through many 
meetings between the three research group members. Following that the 
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proposed risk assessment framework was evaluated by conducting interviews 
and a questionnaire in Chapter 7.  
The evaluation of the proposed risk assessment framework provided valuable 
insights in terms of its usefulness, perceived usability and expected value of. The 
participants’ feedback indicated that it is useful in guiding people on risk 
assessment, and that it could improve current risk assessment practice. 
Additionally, participants highlighted its value as a training tool.  
However, there was less agreement between participants regarding switching 
from the old approach to the proposed new approach. The proposed risk 
assessment requires spending more time on risk assessment, which is not 
desirable in healthcare. Thus, it is likely that participants would not easily switch 
from their old approach to the proposed risk assessment framework.  
Furthermore, there was less agreement that the proposed risk assessment 
framework could make patients safer. Indeed, risk assessment is not a stand-
alone activity as mentioned earlier. Therefore, it would be really difficult to 
predict any significant impact on patient safety without any follow up steps for 
the implementation of the recommended actions. 
Turning to the main research question: “How can current risk assessment practice 
be improved to ensure safety in hospitals?”, the findings of this research study 
indicate that there are a range of ways to potentially improve current risk 
assessment practice. These could be through the development of a new risk 
assessment technique, the improvement of safety culture in hospitals, and the 
design of a range of risk assessment training courses as well as through the focus 
on specific issues such as the subjectivity of risk scoring and the clarification of 
risk terminology. For instance, Simsekler (2014) focused on providing an 
improved risk identification guide, and, similarly, Card (2013) focused on 
providing guidance on risk control. Additionally, Ward et al. (2010) designed a 
toolkit for the use of prospective hazard analysis techniques in the healthcare 
context.  
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This research, however, aimed to improve current risk assessment in hospitals by 
first providing a clear understanding of risk assessment practice as a whole, and 
then by developing a risk assessment framework to better support healthcare 
staff on conducting risk assessments.  
8.2.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research provides important contributions to the current understanding of 
risk assessment practice in hospitals, and a new risk assessment framework. 
Actual risk assessment practice in hospitals is an area which appears to have been 
poorly described. In the literature, the risk assessment practice is only explained 
with a specific context as mentioned earlier, such as VTE, falls and self-harm. 
While some claims have been made related to actual risk assessment as in risk 
scoring being subjective (Card et al. 2013), and risk register systems being 
bureaucratic data collection (Illingworth 2015a), there are no studies conducted 
to provide evidence for the different types of risk assessment (e.g. individual 
patient-based and operational) by considering both the recommended and the 
actual practice. Indeed, this study revealed that the recommended and the actual 
practices are different.  
This research aimed to fill this gap in understanding by investigating the current 
risk assessment process in hospitals in terms of both ‘work as described’ and 
‘work as done’, and highlighting a number of problems in relation to its design 
and application. Although some of the challenges have been already identified, 
this study supports the findings of previous studies as well as extending the 
existing knowledge. For instance, while risk matrices are criticised in different 
industries in terms of their use and inherent limitations (Ale et al. 2015; Ball & 
Watt 2013; Baybutt 2015; Card et al. 2013; Cox 2008; Cox & Popken 2007; Duijm 
2015; Smith et al. 2009; Vatanpour et al. 2015), there has been no study 
published so far to investigate applicability of such limitations in the healthcare 
context, other than a similar study with a limited scope (Card et al. 2013).  
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
 179 
In doing so, this research has presented the big picture of current risk assessment 
practice in hospitals (Figure 5.9), and developed a framework to support 
healthcare staff in good risk assessment practice, a framework, which has 
undergone an initial evaluation and been found to be useful in guiding healthcare 
staff in risk assessment. 
8.3 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
A number of limitations have been encountered in this research, which led to the 
consideration of further work. Limitations are in relation to access to resources, 
literature review, sampling, the generalisability of the research and the 
evaluation of the proposed risk assessment framework. 
It was difficult to access resources from hospitals and to obtain ethical approvals. 
The researcher obtained two approvals to access data and people, a letter of 
access and Health Research Authority (HRA) approval. A letter of access was 
obtained through the application of a research passport to the Cambridge 
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. Further permissions were also gained 
from the Trust’s risk manager to access the Trust’s risk management system. HRA 
approval was obtained to conduct the research in multiple other NHS 
organisations in England. It took a considerable amount of time to obtain 
approvals.  
This research conducted a narrative review in Chapter 2 instead of a systematic 
review. While narrative review mostly relies on the experience of the researcher 
to include studies, systematic reviews include studies based on the predefined 
selection criteria (Pae 2015). As a result, the literature review for risk assessment 
in  hapter 2 could be subjective and, therefore, biased by the researcher’s 
selections. However, this was aimed to be minimised by conducting group 
discussions with the members of the research group, who have expertise in 
safety and risk assessment. Further work could be done by conducting a 
systematic review of the applications of the risk assessment practice in hospitals 
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by the use of same databases. This could have provided more detailed 
information on the application areas of risk assessment in hospitals, and reliable 
evidence for the real effect of the use of risk assessment on the care delivered.  
Additionally, sampling was found to be another limitation of this research study. 
This research used purposive sampling, where sampling is non-probabilistic and 
based on a set of selective criteria (Holloway and Wheeler 2010), by only 
conducting interviews with healthcare staff having experience in risk assessment. 
This was due to the fact that many healthcare staff might not have adequate 
knowledge of risk assessment and it was difficult to involve healthcare staff in 
this research study, due to their limited time availability and unwillingness to 
participate in such a study. Since purposive sampling might lead to bias, mixed 
methods were used to minimise bias in this research study including document 
analysis, interviews, questionnaires and risk management data analysis. However, 
the selected sampling strategy also ignored other key stakeholders within the risk 
assessment practice such as regulators and patients. While the hospital staff are 
the primary participants of the risk assessment practice, regulators have a 
significant influence on the way they conduct risk assessments, and patients 
might help healthcare staff understand the system to be assessed from patients’ 
perspectives as well as by recognising their needs. While it is arguable to what 
extent patients should be involved in risk assessment, they can have a significant 
contribution to the risk assessment. Further studies can, therefore, be conducted 
by understanding the roles of regulators and patients in the current risk 
assessment practice. 
Using purposive sampling could lead to criticism of the generalisability of the 
research. Although some hospitals might conduct risk assessment slightly 
differently in detail, the review of the risk assessment policies and procedures in 
Chapter 4 revealed that the main process of risk assessment is similar in all 
hospitals. Despite this, participants’ views on risk assessment can be different 
even in the same hospital. However, the proposed risk assessment framework 
can still be generalisable since it provides support for good risk assessment 
practice in hospitals. 
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Evaluation of the proposed risk assessment is also limited. Firstly, the evaluation 
questionnaire was not designed to provide duplicating and reversing questions to 
establish the reliability of the responses. Secondly, participants’ views on the 
proposed risk assessment framework could have been biased since they 
evaluated the framework based on the explanations rather than on their 
experience of using it. Ideally, the actual impact of the proposed framework 
would be assessed in a real-life setting, but practically it is difficult to convince 
healthcare staff to use such a framework in this setting. However, as mentioned 
earlier in Section 7.4, a further evaluation could be conducted through a control 
study by having two groups. First, both groups could be provided a first case 
study and expected to conduct risk assessment by the use of their hospital’s risk 
assessment documents. Later on, one group could be provided an FMEA 
template with guidance and the second group could be provided the proposed 
risk assessment framework to conduct risk assessment on a second case study. 
The findings of these two groups could then be compared to demonstrate the 
real effect of the use of the proposed framework. 
Additionally, the proposed framework could be further evaluated in a wider 
setting through involving risk assessment experts in other industries and 
healthcare professionals as well as external authorities to learn from their 
experiences. Lastly, a computer-based version of the proposed risk assessment 
framework could be designed to improve the accessibility of the proposed 
framework. 
In conclusion, this research sheds light on the existing risk assessment practice in 
hospitals in England by revealing the described and the actual practice, and it 
provides a useful framework for supporting healthcare staff to assess both clinical 
and non-clinical risks. 
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Standard/ Guideline Title 
AS/NZS 4360: 1999 Risk management 
BS 6079-3: 2000 Project management- part 3: guide to the management of business 
related project risk 
BS 8444-3: 1996 Risk management- part 3: guide to risk analysis of technological 
systems, London:  
BS 8800: 2004 Occupational health and safety management systems- guide 
BS EN 15224: 2011 Health care services- quality management systems- requirements 
based on EN ISO 9001:2008 
BS EN 31010:2010 Risk management: risk assessment techniques 
BS EN 60812: 2006 Analysis techniques for system reliability: procedure for Failure 
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
BS EN 62198: 2014 Managing risk in projects- application guidelines 
BS EN ISO 14971: 2012 Medical devices- application of risk management to medical 
devices 
BS EN ISO 17776: 2002 Petroleum and natural gas industries- offshore production 
installations- guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard 
identification and risk assessment 
BS ISO 31000: 2009 Risk management: principles and guidelines 
BS ISO 31100: 2011 Risk management- code of practice and guidance for the 
implementation of BS ISO 31000, 
BS ISO/IEC 16085: 2004 Information technology- software life cycle processes- risk 
management 
CAP 760: 2010 Guidance on the conduct of hazard identification, risk assessment 
and the production of safety cases 
COSO: 2004 Enterprise risk management- integrated framework 
COSO: 2012 Risks assessment in practice 
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HM Government: 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act 
HM Treasury: 2004 The orange book: management of risk- principles and concepts 
HSE: 2001 Marine risk assessment 
HSE: 2006a Five steps to risk assessment 
HSE: 2006b Guidance on risk assessment for offshore installations 
INCOSE: 2007 Systems engineering handbook: a guide for system life cycle 
processes and activities 
ISO 17776: 2000 Petroleum and natural gas industrires- offshore production 
installations- guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard 
identification and risk assessment 
ISO/DIS 31000: 2017 Risk management- guidelines 
ISO/IEC 15288: 2008 Systems and software engineering- system life cycle processes 
ISO/TS 16901: 2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore 
LNG installations including the ship/shore interface 
MIL-STD-882B: 1984 System safety program requirement 
MIL-STD-882E: 2008 Department of Defense standard practice system safety 
NASA/SP-2011-3422 Risk management handbook 
ORR: 2015 Common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment 
PD ISO Guide 73: 2009 Risk management- vocabulary 
PD ISO/IEC Guide 73: 
2002 
Risk management-vocabulary- guidelines for use in standards 
PD ISO/TR 16732-2: 
2012 
Fire safety engineering- fire risk assessment 
PD ISO/TR 31004: 2013 Risk management- guidance for the implementation of ISO 31000 
RSSB GE/GN8643: 2014 Guidance on risk evaluation and risk acceptance 
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Audit: Aven (2011) defines risk management audit as a “systematic, independent and 
documented process for obtaining evidence and evaluating it objectively in order to determine 
the extent to which the risk management framework, or any selected part of it, is adequate 
and effective” (Aven 2011). Audits help to recognise actual practice as opposed to prescribed 
practice (Governance/ Risk Strategy and Policy, West Middlesex University Hospital NHS 
Trust). 
Risk registers: Risk registers are defined as “a database that holds the main record of all 
identified risks to the trust’s objectives and operations.” (pg 7, Risk Management Strategy and 
Policy, Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust). 
Incident reporting: Documenting adverse events, analysing and using that for learning and to 
improve current practice (Risk Management Strategy, Great Ormand Street Hospital for 
Children NHS Foundation Trust). 
Heat map/ risk map/ risk matrix: A risk assessment tool to calculate the level of risk and 
determine acceptability of that risk (BSI 2010). 
Root Cause Analysis: RCA identifies the root causes of a loss or error to identify corrective 
actions (BSI 2010). 
Checklist: This is defined as “lists of questions intended to prompt consideration of a full range 
of safety issues.” (Mullai 2006). 
Whistle blowing: It is described as raising a concern and drawing attention to it within the 
organisation or an outside body (Francis 2015; Chapman 2011). 
Walk-around/ walkabout: Walk-around gives operational staff to the opportunity to discuss 
safety related issues with their managers directly (Vincent et al. 2013). 
Horizon scanning: This is described as “systematic activity designed to identify, as early as 
possible, indicators of changes in risk.” (HM Treasury 2004). 
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Benchmarking: Benchmarking is defined as focusing on a specific event or process, comparing 
measures with common metrics and identifying opportunities for improvements (COSO 
2012). 
SWOT: This evaluates a business as a whole or a series of issues by determining strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Chapman 2011). 
Brainstorming/ mind storming: This is a group discussion to trigger people’s imaginations (BSI 
2010). 
PEST/PESTLE analysis: Its acronym stands for “political, economic, social, technological, legal 
and environmental”, and it is used to analyse the impacts of these factors on an organisation 
(Chapman 2011). 
Decision tree: This is a way of representing decision alternatives by determining uncertainties 
(BSI 2010). 
Grapevine and intuition: This is explained as the recognition of risk management issues from 
ad hoc comments, hearsay or intuition (Risk Management Procedure, Colchester Hospital 
University NHS Foundation Trust). 
Lean analysis: Lean is a systematic method to focus on reducing waste, synchronising work 
flows and managing variability in production flows (de Koning et al. 2006). 
FMEA: This is a risk assessment technique to identify how systems, components or processes 
can fail (BSI 2010). 
Bow-tie analysis: This helps to describe and analyse the pathways of a top event from causes 
to consequences (BSI 2010). 
Event tree analysis: ETA is a graphical representation of sequences of events starting from an 
initiating event (BSI 2010). 
Fault tree analysis: FTA is again a graphical representation to identify and analyse factors 
contributing to an undesired event (BSI 2010). 
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Interview Schedule 
Research Title: Designing a systems-based risk assessment framework for safety 
improvements in hospitals  
Interviewer: Gulsum Kubra Kaya 
Introduction 
Introduce myself: 
My name is Kubra, and I am a researcher at the Engineering Department of the 
University of Cambridge.  
Describe the research and its aim: 
The research title is ‘Designing a systems-based risk assessment framework for safety 
improvements in hospitals’. The research aims to extend people’s understanding of 
proactive risk assessment practices in hospitals in order to ensure safety for all. To 
achieve this goal, your experiences in safety and risk assessment will help me 
understand current practice and design a new risk assessment approach.  
Describe how long it will take 
The interview will take approximately 45 minutes (maximum 1 hour). 
Mention about the confidentiality issues 
Data will be transcribed and stored anonymously and securely. After completion of 
the research all papers containing personal information will be disposed of through 
secured waste bins, all electronic data will be deleted from the university computers. 
Questions for the Semi-structured Interviews 
Rapport building 
Can you please tell me a bit about your background and your role in the trust? 
How long have you been working in the NHS? 
Here, I would like to learn more about your experience on safety? 
How frequently do you take part in a risk assessment? 
If you have ever received any safety/risk management training, please can you tell what 
they are? 
As the research aims to improve current risk assessment practice, it is essential to understand 
the practical application first. At this point your experiences will help me understand the 
practical application of risk assessment. 
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Understanding the current risk assessment practice  
At this point, I am interested in learning from your actual experience of risk assessment. Here 
are some questions that I hope will help you in describing your experience: 
Have you ever involved in a risk assessment?  
 If yes, could you please share your experience with me?  
 What was the assessment for (e.g. response to an incident, to identify potential 
risks and to meet regulatory requirements)? 
 What were the risks (e.g. clinical, non-clinical)? 
 Was it an individual or team assessment? 
 How much time did you spend on the assessment? 
 Did you use any methods or software to conduct the assessment? 
 Did any documents guide you on the assessment (e.g. risk assessment 
procedure, HSE 5 steps to risk assessment and NPSA healthcare risk assessment 
made easy)? If yes, which documents are they? 
 How do you rank the likelihood and consequence of the risks (e.g. based on the 
guidance provided on the risk assessment policy)? 
 How do you prioritise risks (based on RPN; if same?)? 
 How do you record and act on risks (using the risk register system; paper 
recording)? 
 Who would you ask for help on risk assessment (line manager?)? 
 Who is responsible for conducting risk assessment in your working area? And 
what is his/her job title? 
 
 In your experience, what were the key factors that lead a good risk assessment? 
 How much difference did your assessment made on the assessed issue? 
 What did the users think about the results of the assessment?  
 How could it have been done better? 
 
 If no, 
 What would make you do a risk assessment? 
Improvement of the risk assessment practice 
Here, I would like to ask questions related to the potential improvements. 
Do you think that risk matrix is to prioritise risks or to distribute responsibilities? 
 Probe: Is it a useful tool?, Doing its job to prioritise? 
On a scale of 1 to10, how likely do you think that the following would help: 
 Clarifying risk assessment terminology, process and scope? (providing 
definitions with examples, defining key points in the risk assessment 
process?) 
 Guidance on the use of risk assessment methods? 
 Explaining good risk assessment practice principles? 
On a scale of 1 to 10, how likely do you use: 
 A risk assessment guidance? 
APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 211 
 An improved guidance more than current guidance? 
How do you learn from other conducted risk assessments that you were not involved? 
 Probe: Any feedback mechanism? 
Guidance on risk assessment 
To understand what the current guidelines on risk assessment are, I would like to ask the 
questions of: 
What are the current key documents in your area which deal with risk assessment? 
 Probe: Trusts Risk assessment procedure/policy? NPSA documents? 
How accessible is your trust’s risk management or assessment 
procedure/strategy/policy? 
 Probe: Any paper copy around your working area?, Online easily accessible? 
Are people keen to use these documents? 
 Probe: Useful/needed?  
Do you think that these documents are sufficient enough to guide you? 
 Probe: Clear process descriptions?, Clearly defined responsibilities? 
What else do you think should be included in a risk assessment guideline? 
 Probe: A framework to highlight key points for the assessment? 
 Probe: A guidance of how to use risk assessment tools? 
General questions on risk assessment 
To understand your view on risk assessment, I would like to ask following questions: 
In your view, 
What do you understand by risk assessment? 
 Probe: definition and its process steps? 
Who do you think should involve in a risk assessment practice? 
 Probe: Managers?, Senior staff?, Line managers?, Nurses? 
What are the benefits of conducting risk assessment? 
 Probe: useful/needed? 
What do you think a good risk assessment would look like? 
 Probe: a good software use?, use of PHA  tools?, proactive approach?, 
systems thinking? 
What are the pitfalls in doing a risk assessment? 
 Probe: Time-consuming? 
Wrap-up Discussion 
Is there anything else that you would like to add? 
Closing 
Thank you very much for participating in this interview. Your time is very much appreciated 
and your comments have been very helpful.  
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Interview Participant Information Sheet 
Designing a systems-based risk assessment framework for safety improvements in hospitals  
Before you decide to take part in this study it is important that you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. The researcher can be contacted 
at the address at the end of this document if you would like to discuss any aspect of this 
study. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
Purpose of the study 
Safety in healthcare has been a major target for improvement over the last 20 years. Risk 
assessment is one of a number of approaches to ensure safety in hospital settings. Although 
risk assessment has already been adopted from other industries, there is still great potential 
to improve current practice by learning from the practical experience of NHS staff. This 
research project aims to improve risk assessment practice by developing a new risk 
assessment approach, through a literature review, and interviews, workshops and 
questionnaires with NHS staff. This study is a 3-year PhD research project, which will be 
completed towards the end of 2017.  
Why have I been chosen?  
This research focuses on hospital settings, and involves clinical and non-clinical staff, as both 
groups have valuable insights on current practice and problems in risk assessment. Both 
groups will also be will be potential users the designed approach. 
Do I have to take part?  
Taking part in any part of this research is entirely voluntary and participants can refuse to take 
part or withdraw at any point, without needing to give a reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
An interview will take place, face to face in your trust, or by phone, and it will take 
approximately 45 minutes (maximum 1 hour). If you give permission, interviews will be audio 
recorded. Alternatively, the researcher will take notes. Data will be transcribed and stored 
anonymously and securely. After completion of the research all papers containing personal 
information will be disposed of through secured waste bins, all electronic data will be deleted 
from the university computers. 
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Are there possible disadvantages and/or risks in taking part? 
There are no significant disadvantages or risks in taking part in this interview, other than the 
time it will take to collect your responses. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your participation will help the researcher to develop a better understanding of risk 
assessment practice in hospitals. It may also help participants to think differently about safety 
risk assessment, which may in turn lead to further improvements in patient safety. Research 
findings will be shared if requested. Findings of the research may help participant to 
understand and apply effective risk assessment practices in their working environments. 
What if there is a problem?  
This study is sponsored by Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and the 
University of Cambridge and covered by University and NHS indemnity. 
Who should I contact if I wish to make a complaint? 
If you wish to complain or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been 
approached or treated during this study, you can do this through the NHS complaints 
procedure. In the first instance it may be helpful to contact the Patient Advice and Liaison 
Service (PALS) at your hospital. 
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All data will be linked to individuals only by a code, with personal details kept in a locked file 
or secure computer with access only by the immediate research team. 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
Results will be presented in the researcher’s PhD thesis. Results may also be presented at 
conferences and written up in journals. If any individual data are presented, the data will be 
anonymous, without any means of identifying the individuals involved. Results can be shared 
with participants if they request. 
Ethical review of the study 
This project has received ethical approval from the Health Research Authority and Local 
R&Ds. 
Contact for further information 
 
Investigator Name: Gulsum Kubra Kaya 
E-mail address: gkk21@cam.ac.uk 
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